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 Abstract:  The 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(“UNCLOS”) represents the culmination of thousands of years of 
international relations, conflict, and now nearly universal adherence to an 
enduring order for ocean space that is the most significant achievement for 
international law since the UN Charter.  UNCLOS establishes international 
property law erga omnes that, by legal and political necessity, required a 
bargained consensus to be effective.  This bargain, in essence, provided 
coastal States with extended but limited jurisdictions, while ensuring that 
the seabed and its mineral resources beyond were the “common heritage of 
mankind” that would peaceably and sustainably benefit all.  Yet whether 
UNCLOS in fact and in law is now living up to this bidding is in doubt.  The 
critical task of delineating a true outer limit to the continental shelf is now a 
matter of implementing the delicate balance between applied science and 
supervised unilateral claims embodied in Article 76.  The attempt to ‘legalize’ 
scientific criteria still retains legal vagueness and ambiguities as well as the 
uncertainties inherent in any nascent scientific endeavor.  Further, the 
administrative and financial support established to assist in working through 
these challenges has brought its own bureaucratic obstacles.  This has led to 
a near-perfect storm for small island developing States, which rely most 
heavily on marine resources for their culture and survival yet also face the 
most complex dilemmas in Article 76—all the while having generally the 
least capacity available to prepare their submissions.  The challenges facing 
the seabed come not from implementation of a legal process, but from 
substantive overlap and even conflict between Part XI and other 
international law.  Part XI seems to provide clear grounds to refute the 
assertion of international patent rights for seabed organisms.  This could set 
the stage for a fragmentation of international intellectual property rights 
under TRIPS and the UNCLOS seabed regime.  And the expansion of bottom 
trawl fishing that directly impacts and exploits coral and the seabed is 
excused under high seas fishing freedoms, but could also be viewed as 
infringing on the basic tenets of the seabed “common heritage” and thus could 
invoke individual State responsibility or the regulatory jurisdiction of Part 
XI.  At each juncture, as this paper suggests, the necessity of consensus for 
international property law can also become an effective and constructive tool 
for encouraging countries to work together on managing the implementation, 
development, and proliferation of the law of the sea.   
 Tough Love:  the Dramatic Bir th and Looming Demise of 
UNCLOS Property Law (and What Is To Be Done About It) 
Introduction 1 
Part I.  Development of the Law of the Sea:  From Freedom of 
Common Seas to Conflict over Oceans 7 
A.  ‘Ancient’ Law of the Sea 7 
B.  ‘Classical’ Freedom of the Seas:  From Natural Law to Positivism 8 
C.  ‘Specially Affected States’, Unilateral Claims, and a Breakdown in Positivist 
Order 10 
Part II.  The Development of UNCLOS as International Law Erga 
Omnes 22 
A.  UNCLOS as a Grand Bargain 22 
B.  UNCLOS and the Necessity of Consensus for Legal Property Rules 26 
Part III.  Meeting the Legal and Implementation Challenges of 
Article 76:  SIDS as Ridge Laboratories or Canaries in the 
Continental Shelf Coal Mine? 32 
A.  “Implementing” Article 76:  The Definition, Delineation, and Difficulties of 
the Legal Continental Shelf under UNCLOS 34 
1.  Definition, Rights, and Obligations in the UNCLOS Continental Shelf 34 
2.  The Scientific and Legal Challenges of the Delineation Process 36 
B.  The Precarious Position of SIDS Under Article 76 41 
C.  The Problems and Prospects for Implementing Article 76 “in Particular” for 
SIDS 45 
1.  Special Capacity-Building, Advice, and Assistance for SIDS and Other 
Developing Countries 45 
2.  The Status of SIDS in Completing Submissions to the CLCS 46 
3.  Facilitating Progress and Order for SIDS Under Article 76 48 
Part IV.  The Enduring Frontier:  Two Problems for UNCLOS and the 
Seabed “Common Heritage” 49 
A.  Disentangling Part XI:  The UNCLOS Regime for the Seabed and Its 
Resources 50 
B.  Intellectual Property in the Deep:  Intangible Rights in a Spatial Regime? 54 
C.  Deep Sea Fisheries Under Part XI:  When High Seas Freedoms Hit Rock 
Bottom 60 
1.  “Activities in the Area”:  Corals and Their Calcium Structures as “Mineral 
Resources” 63 
2.  “Activities in the Area”:  “Exploitation” as Consumptive Use 67 
3.  Regulatory, Litigious, and Political-Legal Options to Effectively Address 
Bottom Trawling Under UNCLOS 69 
Conclusion:  UNCLOS as Property Law and Lawmaking 73 
 
 1 
 
 
 
 
The product of “the largest and most complex negotiation ever held,”1 
the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (“UNCLOS”)2 
represents the culmination of thousands of years of international relations, 
conflict, and now nearly universal adherence to an enduring order for ocean 
space.  Its adoption marked the most significant achievement for 
international law since the UN Charter3 and UNCLOS has been viewed 
variously as “a Constitution for the Oceans,”4 a “world order treaty,”5 and a 
“primary pillar of international law.”6  Yet whether UNCLOS in fact and in 
law is now living up to this bidding is in doubt. 
UNCLOS is more than just its treaty and requires more than just the 
formal validity of its law for normative force.  Like other treaty regimes, 
UNCLOS was created from, and must endure within, a political context.  
UNCLOS came into force as the codification of a bargained consensus to 
manage conflicts over boundaries, resources, and new human demands and 
technologies.  This bargain, culminating in UNCLOS, was famously laid out 
by Malta’s Ambassador to the United Nations, Arvid Pardo, in a speech to the 
General Assembly in November 1967.7  The proposal, and eventual 
                                            
1 William Wertenbaker, The Law of the Sea—I, THE NEW YORKER 38, 38 (1 Aug. 1983) 
[hereinafter “Wertenbaker I”]. 
2 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature 10 Dec. 1982, in 
force 16 Nov. 1994, 1833 U.N.T.S. 396, reprinted in UNITED NATIONS, THE LAW OF THE SEA:  
UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA (UN Pub. Sales No. E.83.V.5) 
[hereinafter “1982 Convention”]. 
3 Cf. Satya N. Nandan, An Introduction to the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of 
the Sea, in ORDER FOR THE OCEANS AT THE TURN OF THE CENTURY 9, 9 (DAVOR VIDAS & WILLY 
ØSTRENG eds. 1999) ([hereinafter “VIDAS & ØSTRENG”])). 
4 See, e.g., Tommy T.B. Koh, A Constitution for the Oceans, xxxiii, available at 
<http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_overview_convention.htm>. 
5 Christian Tomuschat, Obligations Arising for States Without or Against Their Will, 241 
RECUEIL DES COURS 209, 268-71 (1993-IV). 
6 David J. Bederman, Counterintuiting Countermeasures, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 817, 817 (2002).  
Bederman identifies “seven pillars” of international law as:  state responsibility, the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court, diplomatic immunities, the law of the sea, the 
law of treaties, the Nuremberg Principles, and jurisdictional immunities of states.  See id. 
7 Arvid Pardo (Malta), Address Before the United Nations, Request for the Inclusion of a 
Supplementary Item in the Agenda of the Twenty-Second Session. Declaration and Treaty 
Concerning the Reservation Exclusively for Peaceful Purposes of the Sea-Bed and the Ocean 
Floor, Underlying the Seas Beyond the Limits of Present National Jurisdiction, and the Use of 
Their Resources in the Interests of Mankind, Note Verbale to the Secretary-General, 22nd 
Sess., Annex, Mem., UN Doc. A/6695 (17 Aug. 1967); & Arvid Pardo (Malta), General Debate 
of Agenda Item 92, “Examination of the question of the reservation exclusively for peaceful 
purposes of the sea-bed and the ocean floor, and the subsoil thereof, underlying the high seas 
 2 
agreement, at its heart provided coastal States with extended but limited 
jurisdictions, while providing that the seabed and its mineral resources 
beyond were the “common heritage of mankind” that must peaceably and 
sustainably benefit all. 
The first task of the law of the sea has been to establish a network of 
spatial property rules for areas of ocean space held privately, publicly, in 
common, or not at all.8  This has involved setting coastal States’ jurisdictions 
off from each other and from those areas beyond.  Certain property rules 
might be established on a bilateral or multilateral basis, as for boundaries 
between opposite and adjacent States,9 but others, as between national 
jurisdictions and areas beyond, cannot.10  The latter are in rem property rules 
that must be held and recognized erga omnes.  Property rules, in other words, 
cannot be made legal merely by unilateral claim or inter se agreement:  they 
require a universality of recognition to be law. 
Erga omnes property rules embodied in juridical sovereignties, 
jurisdictions, and freedoms are fundamental in international law and, as this 
paper argues, require a consensus by States to be legally effective.  The 
delineation of maritime boundaries affects the position of every other State;11 
a broader continental shelf necessarily entails a smaller seabed “common 
heritage,” for example, and the legality of any delineation depends as much 
on a coastal State’s claim as on others’ recognition and respect for the claim.  
Res nullius areas (the regime for the high seas prevailing into the 20th 
century) are characterized by “freedoms,” which owe their existence to a lack 
of exclusive claims by any State or undue interference to the freedoms of 
others.  Res communis areas (roughly the UNCLOS regime for the high seas) 
are similarly unowned, but require a respect for the present and future 
enjoyment of the commons.  Res publica areas (essentially the UNCLOS 
regime for the seabed and its mineral resources beyond the legal continental 
                                                                                                                                  
beyond the limits of present national jurisdiction, and the use of their resources in interests 
of mankind,” 22nd Sess., UN Doc. A/6695; A/C.1/952 (1 Nov. 1967).  See also Arvid Pardo, 
Who Will Control the Sea-Bed?, 47 FOREIGN AFF. 123 (1968). 
8 Philip Allot aptly identifies UNCLOS as an exercise in “power sharing” and that the 
Convention’s law necessarily addresses “boundary phenomena” to set where one State’s 
right, power, or freedom ends and others’ begin.  Power Sharing in the Law of the Sea, 77 AM. 
J. INT’L L. 1, 10-11 (1983) [hereinafter “Allot”]. 
9 UNCLOS Article 74, for example, envisions that opposite or adjacent States will delimit 
exclusive economic zones that would overlap “by agreement on the basis of international law” 
(emphasis added). 
10 But cf. JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 23-43, 
87 (2005) (positing a theory of international law in terms of inter se relationships between 
individual States only) [hereinafter “GOLDSMITH & POSNER”].  For a critical discussion and 
analysis, see Part II(B), infra. 
11 See Fisheries Case (U.K. v. Norway), 1951 ICJ 116, 132 (Judgment of 18 Dec.) (“The 
delimitation of sea areas has always an international aspect.”). 
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shelf) also prohibit private claims of ownership, but require that economic 
uses be carried out under the authority of a public authority or trustee.12 
Although UNCLOS as political bargain and legal regime may aspire to 
endurance and universality, it is undoubtedly an imperfect and incomplete 
instrument.  The original UNCLOS made only passing provision13 for 
migratory and trans-jurisdictional ‘straddling’ fish stocks, a deficiency which 
spawned the 1995 Straddling and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks 
Implementing Agreement (“Straddling Fish Stocks Implementing 
Agreement” or “1995 Agreement”).14  In its most serious challenge, the 
International Seabed Authority (“ISA” or “Authority”) in its original form met 
strong opposition, notably by the United States which voted against adoption 
of the final Conference text even though the rest of UNCLOS was generally 
accepted as customary law.15  The original ISA would have administered the 
strikingly redistributive “common heritage of mankind” seabed regime of 
Part XI, but, in the U.S. view, it was too expensive and afforded too little 
control to industrialized countries relative to G-77 developing countries.  The 
United States, Soviet Union, United Kingdom, Japan, and others attempted 
to formulate their own parallel licensing regime that allowed them greater 
control with less taxes, regulations, technology transfers, and set-asides than 
did the original Part XI.16  But conflict between the two overlapping regimes 
posed great uncertainties for any seabed venture.  The Secretary-General 
convened States to renegotiate as the seabed minerals regime had become 
politically and legally unsustainable (and practically non-threatening) with 
the collapse by the late 1980s of world commodity prices and the Soviet model 
                                            
12 In the law of the sea context, the territorial sea and the contiguous zone are often thought 
to be public things owned by the coastal State.  See A.N. YIANNOPOULOS, CIVIL LAW SYSTEM:  
LOUISIANA AND COMPARATIVE LAW 415 (2d ed. 1999) [hereinafter “YIANNOPOULOS”].  The Area 
might also be viewed as a public thing regulated by the ISA.  See discussion, infra, Part IV. 
13 See 1982 Convention, supra, Article 63(2). 
14 Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on 
the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 Relating to the Conservation and Management of 
Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks (8 Sept. 1995), A/Conf.164/37, 34 
ILM 1547 (1995). 
15 For a thorough account of the formulation of the United States position, see generally 
William Wertenbaker, The Law of the Sea—II, THE NEW YORKER 57 (8 Aug. 1983) 
[hereinafter “Wertenbaker II”].  On UNCLOS, minus Part XI, as customary law, see Hugo 
Caminos & Michael R. Molitor, Progressive Development of International Law and the 
Package Deal, 79 AM. J. INT’L L. 871, 873 (1985) [hereinafter “Caminos & Molitor”].  
Objections to Part XI are usually attributed to the United States and other industrialized 
countries, but it is worth remembering that Arvid Pardo shared their objections to the 
inefficiency of the original ISA organization.  See Arvid Pardo, The Convention on the Law of 
the Sea:  A Preliminary Appraisal, 20 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 489, 499-501 (1983) [hereinafter 
“Pardo, 1983 Preliminary Appraisal”]. 
16 See generally NATALIE KLEIN, DISPUTE SETTLEMENT IN THE UN CONVENTION ON THE LAW 
OF THE SEA 336-46 (2005) [hereinafter “KLEIN”]; & R.R. CHURCHILL & A.V. LOWE, THE LAW 
OF THE SEA 232-33 (3d ed. 1999) [hereinafter “CHURCHILL & LOWE”]. 
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of the command-driven economy.17  This renegotiation yielded the 1994 Part 
XI Implementing Agreement (“1994 ISA Implementing Agreement” or “1994 
Agreement”).18  The 1994 Agreement amended provisions of Part XI19 to 
allow industrialized States greater flexibility and control over seabed 
activities, while preserving the ISA’s regulatory and revenue-sharing 
mandate and the basic res publica status of the seabed.  This  cleared the way 
for nearly every country to agree to UNCLOS, as modified.20  President 
George W. Bush now supports U.S. accession “as a matter of national 
security, economic self-interest, and international leadership.”21 
UNCLOS’s challenges did not end with the 1994 and 1995 
Implementing Agreements.  Nowhere are these challenges more acute than 
for where States have devoted their most exacting negotiations and careful 
compromises—the delineation of national jurisdictions (via the legal 
continental shelf) and the scope and governance of the “common heritage” 
area beyond.  The central question of this paper is whether UNCLOS as a 
treaty and as a regime is sufficient to sustain its status as the governing—
even constitutional—property law for the sea.22  While UNCLOS did settle on 
                                            
17 See Report of the Secretary-General, Consultations of the Secretary-General on 
Outstanding Issues Relating to the Deep Seabed Mining Provisions of the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea, A/48/950 (9 June 1994); & CHURCHILL & LOWE, supra, at 
237. 
18 See Agreement Relating to the Implementation of part XI of the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982, G.A. Res. 263, U.N. GAOR, 48th 
Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/48/263 (1994), reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 1309.  See also David Freestone 
& Alex G. Oude Elferink, Flexibility and Innovation in the Law of the Sea, in STABILITY AND 
CHANGE IN THE LAW OF THE SEA:  THE ROLE OF THE LOS CONVENTION 169, 184-90 (ALEX G. 
OUDE ELFERINK ed., 2005) [hereinafter “Freestone & Elferink”]. 
19 See INTERNATIONAL SEABED AUTHORITY, UNOFFICIAL CONSOLIDATION OF PART XI OF THE 
CONVENTION AND THE IMPLEMENTATION AGREEMENT, available at 
<http://www.isa.org.jm/en/usefullinks/default.asp>.   
20 Some States retain their own particular opposition to UNCLOS.  Israel, for example, was 
one of only four countries to vote against final adoption of UNCLOS because of a provision 
that could be read to allow revenues generated from seabed activities to benefit “peoples who 
have not yet attained full self-governing status,” such as the Palestinians through the P.L.O., 
even though the consensus required at the ISA Council to make such payments would likely 
never materialize.  See Wertenbaker II, supra, at 66-67.  Turkey also continues its opposition 
to UNCLOS in part because it cannot reserve from provisions of the treaty that would alter 
its claim to the Turkish straits.  See UN Doc. A/59/PV.56 at 14 (17 Nov. 2004). 
21 U.S. OCEAN ACTION PLAN 35 (2004), available at <http://ocean.ceq.gov/>.  For a critique of 
the ongoing U.S. position, see Shirley V. Scott, The LOS Convention as a Constitutional 
Regime for the Oceans, in STABILITY AND CHANGE IN THE LAW OF THE SEA:  THE ROLE OF THE 
LOS CONVENTION 12-16 (ALEX G. OUDE ELFERINK ed. 2005) [hereinafter “Scott”]. 
22 Cf. Edward L. Miles, Implementation of International Regimes:  A Typology, in VIDAS & 
ØSTRENG, supra, 327, 328: 
In recent years, one can observe a shift in emphasis among analysts 
interested in international regimes from a focus on problems of supply (or 
processes of regime formation) to the consequences of regime formation, 
or the question whether regimes really matter.  To use Mancur Olson's 
terminology relative to collective action problems, issues of supply relate 
to the question:  Will there be cooperation?  Issues concerning regime 
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a concrete scientific-technical definition and process for delineating the legal 
continental shelf, the implementation of this mechanism is off to a halting 
start.  And the modified Part XI is only now being tested by its first mining 
contracts and possibly conflicting regimes for deep sea intellectual property 
and bottom fisheries. 
This inquiry begins in Part I with a recapitulation of the development 
of the law of the sea in terms of its objects, sources, intellectual foundations, 
and participants.  As oceans are wilds, and generally uninhabitable by 
humans, the law has followed where technology, trade, and exploitable 
resources have led peoples to claim and use the oceans in potentially 
conflicting ways.  A recurring theme is how coastal States’ claims of offshore 
jurisdictions have been balanced with the prerogative of others to use the 
oceans as they can.  The early ‘freedom of the seas’ doctrines fashioned by the 
Romans, and later elaborated in Europe in the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries, were the product of customary practices, which by the eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries took on the patina of natural law and the positivism 
of consent.  But while freedom of the seas worked reasonably well in a pre-
globalization era, the twentieth century witnessed tremendous expansion in 
knowledge about and use of the oceans.  For the first time vast offshore 
claims could be maintained by coastal States on the basis of new 
technological, commercial, and military feasibility.  Taken to the extreme, 
mid-20th century unilateralist doctrines of ‘exploitability’ and ‘specially 
affected States’ threatened intractable conflict and persistent disorder on the 
oceans. 
Perhaps the last great project by the General Assembly, UNCLOS 
represents the promise of a new, consensual law of the sea.  Part II describes 
the bargain.  The Conference negotiations focused around three central and 
related questions.  First, how would States’ offshore jurisdictions be defined 
and delineated from each other and from ocean space beyond?  This first 
question set the scope for the second:  what rights, interests, responsibilities, 
and obligations would States have in relation to the oceans and to each other 
in each of these zones?  The Conference from its preparatory stages took 
broad views of both these questions, working from the assumption that the 
seabed beyond national jurisdictions would be res publica in which all have 
an interest and from which all should benefit, but also that coastal States 
should be assured certain and relatively expansive offshore jurisdictions.  
This broad view stemmed from and suggested an answer to the third central 
question: that is, what structure would the negotiations and final text have?  
The approach taken was to negotiate a grand agreement that would be 
accepted as a whole and as the result of consensus.  This was the only way 
agreement could be reached and the only way any regime setting boundaries 
and maintaining a common heritage could be legally effective. 
                                                                                                                                  
consequences relate to the question:  Was it enough to solve the problem 
for which the regime was created in the first place? 
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Despite the tremendous accomplishment for international law that 
UNCLOS represents, the Convention faces challenges, analyzed in Parts III 
& IV, to meet its objective of setting legally effective property rules for all of 
ocean space.  Part III examines the implementation of Article 76 on the legal 
continental shelf, which is the crucial nexus separating the extent of coastal 
State jurisdiction over seabed natural resources from the “common heritage” 
beyond.  Before UNCLOS, the definition of the continental shelf remained 
unsettled.  Important maritime nations, with the help of the International 
Court of Justice (“ICJ”),  pulled the definition to the extent of ‘exploitability’ 
and prescription, while less developed and inland States struggled to assert 
an interest in the commons.  The solution Conference negotiators reached 
was to depoliticize extended continental shelf claims by defining the breadth 
of continental shelfs according to legalized scientific criteria.  But UNCLOS 
also left it up to each coastal State to undertake the scientific research and 
analysis necessary to make a continental shelf claim—and to do so on a 
deadline (now set for 2009).  Successful implementation of this approach, one 
part science and one part unilateral claim, requires serious worldwide efforts 
to sample and map the sea floor, to prepare claims for consultation with the 
scientific-advisory Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf 
(“CLCS”), and to accept the results.  In particular, the most scientifically and 
legally challenging aspect of Article 76 concerns “ridge” claims, about which 
small island developing States (“SIDS”) are particularly vexed.  Despite 
innovative capacity-building initiatives for SIDS, the Article 76 process is 
facing serious challenges.  Without a concerted effort to streamline the 
submission process, to reform the CLCS and the UN Division on Ocean 
Affairs and the Law of the Sea (“DOALOS”) to engage with SIDS in a more 
active partnership, and to adapt by consensus the rules and regulations 
governing the submission deadline, the current implementation trajectory 
threatens to tip the delicate but fundamental balance struck in Article 76. 
Part IV raises questions about the efficacy of the spatial regime 
governing certain seabed resources in a world where human activity in the 
deep ocean is expanding in ways not neatly anticipated by UNCLOS.  It 
argues in particular that recent efforts to patent organisms originating in the 
seabed runs afoul of the basic proscription in Part XI against appropriation of 
“any part” of the Area.  It also takes up recent negotiations over destructive 
bottom trawl fishing, which scrapes the seabed and thus does not fit 
comfortably within the high seas regime and might, in fact, invoke the 
jurisdiction of the ISA under Part XI.  In this regard, this paper proposes an 
agenda for a new consensus for action by the General Assembly to effectively 
regulate bottom trawling so as to avoid a painful reopening of the 
foundational debates over the seabed global commons. 
Part V concludes with an instrumental agenda for international law 
and UNCLOS lawmaking of consensus to address the ever-evolving 
challenges of the law of the sea. 
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Part I.  Development of the Law of the Sea:  From Freedom of 
Common Seas to Conflict over Oceans 
The development of the law of the sea, culminating in UNCLOS, serves 
as both a cautionary tale about the fragility of unmanaged international 
lawmaking and as an object lesson in how shared interests threatened by the 
potential for conflict can induce new agreement on a universal basis.  The 
development of the law of the sea, beginning with the earliest Roman 
customs, evolving to the British and Grotian ‘freedom of the seas,’ and 
continuing on to the postwar reliance on the consent and abilities of certain 
‘specially affected’ States, has followed humankind’s evolving needs and uses 
in the oceans.  Pre-UNCLOS, the development of the ‘law’ was unilateralist 
and relied primarily on developing customary law, first under the guises of 
natural law and, later, of positivism.  This worked passably well when fish 
stocks were thought to be inexhaustible, a cannon shot could travel only 
three miles, and only a small number of States had any significant reach into 
the oceans.  But the 20th century witnessed exponential growth in worldwide 
fishing, new technologies enabling large scale seabed mining, new political 
and moral demands by new international actors, and continuously expanding 
civil, scientific, and military traffic on the oceans that overwhelmed the 
existing patchwork of customs and treaties.  After several false starts, the 
groundwork for a new law of the sea would soon emerge from the disorder. 
A.  ‘Ancient’ Law of the Sea 
The ancient Greeks had the very first formal rules concerning what 
might now be called ‘maritime’ or ‘admiralty’ law to regulate marine 
commerce, carriage, and ships.23  The second century Roman jurist 
Marcianus, in the first recorded juridical view of ocean space,24 wrote that the 
sea, its fish, and even coastal waters were “communis omnium naturali 
jure,”25 or, “common or open to all men by the operation of natural law.”26  
Under this view, the oceans up to the shore belonged to all and could be 
appropriated by no one.27  The Emperor Antoninus struck a similarly 
naturalist tone, proclaiming “I am the master of the land, but the law is the 
master of the sea.”28  (Of course, there was little need to further develop the 
                                            
23 See Percy Thomas Fenn, Jr., Justinian and the Freedom of the Sea, 19 AM. J. INT’L L. 716, 
717 (1925) [hereinafter “Fenn”].   Cf. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 988 (8th ed. 2004). 
24 See Fenn, supra, at 716.  Marcianus’s view of the sea and shore as res communis was 
seconded by a number of other Roman legal scholars, Ulpian being the first of these, and 
incorporated into the Code of Justinian in 529 A.D..  Id. at 726-27. 
25 Arvid Pardo, The Law of the Sea:  Its Past and Its Future, 63 OR. L. REV. 7, 7 (1984) 
[hereinafter “Pardo, The Law of the Sea”]. 
26 Id. (emphasis added). 
27 See Fenn, supra, at 716.  Compare with Grotius’s view, explored infra. 
28 Wertenbaker I, supra, at 46. 
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law of the sea since during this time the Mediterranean was controlled by the 
Roman navy and surrounded by the Roman empire.29) 
B.  ‘Classical’ Freedom of the Seas:  From Natural Law to Positivism 
With the collapse of the Roman Empire, the fragmented European 
States began to compete and conflict over the oceans, particularly concerning 
trade routes, fishing rights, transit taxes, and policing.30  These 
developments led to the first real claims of jurisdiction to waters adjacent to 
States’ coasts by the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries.31  The Spanish and 
Portuguese proceeded over the next two hundred years to divvy up the entire 
ocean amongst themselves—all lands east from a line off Cape Verde were 
Portuguese and all those to the west were Spanish.32  Spain was also 
reserved the right “to sail . . . freely, securely, and peacefully” across the 
Portuguese ocean to the New World.33  “Thus, over a period of one thousand 
years, the Western world passed from a policy of total freedom of the sea to 
the principle of legal division of the entire ocean.”34 
Increasing use of the seas over this period brought about a 
counterrevolution in the law of the sea whose intellectual and legal effects 
continue to resonate today.  This counterrevolution was led by the great 
Dutch jurist Hugo Grotius.  As Spanish, Portuguese, and papal influence 
waned by the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and as commerce by sea 
expanded in Asia and the Americas, the Dutch East India Company 
commissioned Grotius to justify its trade routes in the Far East, despite 
extant exclusive Portuguese maritime claims there.35  The result was his 
seminal 1609 work Mare Liberum.36  Grotius looked to natural law for the 
view that the realm of commerce was beyond all earthly papal and religious 
authority and, since “no one can give away what he does not himself possess,” 
the Pope’s (and Portuguese) claims to oceanic trade routes in Southeast Asia 
were invalid.37 
Grotius’s argument was more than just a rejection of papal authority 
over the oceans:  he viewed ocean space as a common thing (res communis), 
                                            
29 See Pardo, The Law of the Sea, supra, at 7. 
30 See id. at 7-8. 
31 See id. at 8. 
32 Id. at 8-9. 
33 Id. at 9. 
34 Id.  Other States made smaller claims of sovereignty and jurisdiction over parts of the 
ocean during this period as well.  Venice claimed the Adriatic and England the North Sea.  
See Wertenbaker I, supra, at 46. 
35 See Pardo, The Law of the Sea, supra, at 9-10. 
36 See HUGO GROTIUS, THE FREEDOM OF THE SEAS, OR, THE RIGHT WHICH BELONGS TO THE 
DUTCH TO TAKE PART IN THE EAST INDIAN TRADE (R. Magoffin trans. 1916), available at 
<http://socserv2.socsci.mcmaster.ca/~econ/ugcm/3ll3/grotius/Seas.pdf> [hereinafter “GROTIUS, 
MARE LIBERUM”]. 
37 GROTIUS, MARE LIBERUM, supra, at 46-47.  See also CHURCHILL & LOWE, supra, at 4-5. 
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open for all to use but no one to keep or abuse.38  His views echoed Marcianus 
from more than a thousand years earlier and remain pertinent today.  To 
Grotius, the cornerstone of private, exclusive property rights was effective 
occupation, to which beyond a narrow coastal band the oceans were 
insusceptible.39  Grotius cautioned that resources and rights-of-way can be 
crowded out, exhausted, or consumed by a policy of open use, and it is worth 
emphasizing that he argued that one’s right to the resources of the sea 
existed only insofar as it would not interfere with the interests of others to do 
the same in the present and future.40  He also suggested that benefits from 
common things should be enjoyed by all.41 
In Grotius’s time fish stocks were thought inexhaustible and marine 
pollution and destructive fishing practices had not yet become a real concern.  
This meant practically that actors would be unencumbered to use the oceans 
as they saw fit.  In this vein, Grotius was readily appropriated by laissez-
faire philosophy to support expansively ‘free’ high seas.42  By the 20th 
century, res communis responsibilities had been almost completely 
overshadowed by res nullius freedoms.  Britain, its dominant Royal Navy, 
and its jurists can take much of the credit during this period for enforcing 
and ensuring these freedoms, tempered only by regulation of piracy and slave 
trafficking.43  John Locke (The Second Treatise of Civil Government (1690)), 
an Englishman who also had tremendous influence on the US Constitution, 
looked to natural law to argue that property rights are not created in an 
object until a person takes it and mixes it with labor.  This would mean that 
the ocean and its resources are unowned until, for example, a fisherman by 
his effort catches a fish.44  John Selden (Mare Clausum (1635)) and, later, 
                                            
38 See Wertenbaker II, supra, at 67-68 (criticizing interpretations of classical models of 
property ownership that viewed the ‘commons’ as really the property of no one (res nullius) 
as misinterpreting both Locke and Grotius, who viewed the commons as belonging both to no 
one and to all). 
39 See Pardo, The Law of the Sea, supra, at 10-11.  See also Wertenbaker I, supra, at 46.  On 
this point, Grotius wrote: 
If the Portuguese call occupying the sea merely to have sailed over it 
before other people, and to have, as it were, opened the way, could 
anything in the world be more ridiculous? . . .  [T]here is not a single 
person in the world who does not know that a ship sailing through the 
sea leaves behind it no more legal right than it does a track. 
GROTIUS, MARE LIBERUM, supra, at 32. 
40 See id.; Pardo, The Law of the Sea, supra, at 11; & GROTIUS, MARE LIBERUM, supra, at 23-
24 (“All that which has been so constituted by nature that although serving some one person 
it still suffices for the common use of all other persons, is today and ought in perpetuity to 
remain in the same condition as when it was first created by nature.”), & 26. 
41 “Is it not vastly more just that the benefits accruing from the enjoyment of common things 
should be given to the entire human race than to one nation alone?”  Id. at 36-37. 
42 See Wertenbaker I, supra, at 46. 
43 See Nina Tannenwald, Law Versus Power on the High Frontier:  The Case for a Rule-Based 
Regime for Outer Space, 29 YALE J. INT’L L. 363, 401 (2004).  See also Pardo, supra, at 11-12. 
44 Cf. discussion, infra Part IV(C)(2). 
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Corelius van Bynkershoek (De Dominio Maris Dissertatio (1702)), stressed 
custom and State practice rather than natural law to posit that offshore 
waters for at least some distance could be effectively controlled and defended, 
if not actually inhabited, while the waters beyond were res nullius.45    Thus 
the pragmatic ‘cannon-shot doctrine’ was born to set the breadth of the 
territorial sea at three nautical miles,46 approximately the distance a cannon 
on shore could fire out to sea.47  But the tumultuous 20th century would 
witness the dusking of this Pax Britannia. 
C.  ‘Specially Affected States’, Unilateral Claims, and a Breakdown in Positivist Order 
Russia’s claim in 1911 of a six-mile territorial sea, with six additional 
miles of exclusive fishing rights beyond, presaged the turmoil throughout 
most of the twentieth century for law and order on the sea.48  France, Italy, 
Spain, and the Ottoman Empire quickly followed Russia with their own 
extended offshore claims that they justified by the increasing range of 
artillery in an increasingly unstable Europe as well as by new demands for 
fishing and seabed resources.49  After World War I, with England weakened, 
an increasingly assertive United States claimed for itself an extended 
‘contiguous zone’ wherein it held jurisdiction to prescribe and enforce its 
criminal law, particularly against liquor smuggling.50  The failure of the 1930 
Hague Conference to agree on the breadth or definition of coastal waters 
susceptible to exclusive coastal State jurisdictions51 signaled the complete 
desuetude of the cannon-shot doctrine.52  But nor was there a clear successor 
rule. 
Complete freedom of the seas beyond just a narrow coastal band 
suffered a procession of ever grander new claims by the alignment of States 
in a reconstructing post-World War II world.  The first decisive move was 
U.S. President Truman’s two unilateral proclamations of 28 September 1945:  
                                            
45 See CHURCHILL & LOWE, supra, at 4-5, 71-75. 
46 For the sake of simplicity, the terms ‘nautical miles’ and ‘miles’ are used interchangeably 
throughout this paper. 
47 See id. at 77-78. 
48 See Wertenbaker I, supra, at 46. 
49 See CHURCHILL & LOWE, supra, at 78; & GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra, 59-66 (critiquing 
the view that the three mile territorial sea was customary international law rather than 
merely incomplete evidence of a coincidence of State behavior).  See also Cecil Hurst, Whose 
Is the Bed of the Sea, 4 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 34 (1923) (arguing that a State could claim 
ownership of the continental shelf to the extent it had practiced exclusive exploitation of 
seabed resources for a long, continuous period). 
50 See Pardo, The Law of the Sea, supra, at 12. 
51 The plural ‘jurisdictions’ is used here to indicate both exclusive sovereign jurisdiction and 
regulatory/commercial jurisdiction. 
52 See id. at 13. 
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the Fisheries Proclamation53 and the Continental Shelf Proclamation.54  
These proclamations asserted new regulatory and exclusive rights in oceans 
areas well beyond the traditional three mile limit.  They also precipitated a 
varied array of unilateral claims by other States and new multilateral 
attempts to codify a law of the sea. 
The Fisheries Proclamation asserted jurisdiction to regulate fishing55 
beyond the traditional three mile limit in ocean areas “contiguous to [United 
States] coasts”, which Truman might deem as “conservation zones.”56  This 
Proclamation was born out of concern during the 1930s over Japan’s 
technologically sophisticated and aggressive distant water fishing operations 
(particularly for salmon and halibut) in the northern Pacific Ocean beyond 
the United States’ and Canada’s traditional three mile territorial seas.57  
With the attack at Pearl Harbor, this concern over Japan’s fishing operations 
took on the additional form of “food security,” especially since the Japanese 
fishing fleet had also been used for military intelligence gathering in the 
Pacific during the 1930s.58 
Truman’s Continental Shelf Proclamation went a step further than the 
Fisheries Proclamation and claimed an exclusive right to control the “natural 
resources of the subsoil and sea bed of the continental shelf beneath the high 
seas but contiguous to the coasts of the United States.”59  Here too Truman 
was acting from the experience of the war and the United States’ position 
afterwards where oil was an increasingly necessary strategic and economic 
resource.60  This proclamation’s definition of ‘continental shelf,’61 a legal term 
                                            
53 Policy of the United States with Respect to Coastal Fisheries in Certain Areas of the High 
Seas, Proclamation No. 2668, 3 C.F.R. 68 (1943-1948) (28 Sept. 1945) (implemented by Exec. 
Order No. 9634, 3 C.F.R. 437 (1943-1948)) [hereinafter “Fisheries Proclamation”]. 
54 Policy of the United States with Respect to the Natural Resources of the Subsoil and Sea 
Bed of the Continental Shelf, Proclamation No. 2667, 3 C.F.R. 67 (1943-1948) (implemented 
by Exec. Order No. 9633, 3 C.F.R. 437 (1943-1948)). 
55 The Fisheries Proclamation did not assert exclusive sovereignty or jurisdiction over fish 
resources in any such ‘conservation zones,’ but maintained that “the character as high seas of 
the areas in which such conservation zones are established and the right to their free and 
unimpeded navigation are in no way thus affected.”  Fisheries Proclamation, supra. 
56 3 C.F.R. at 68 (1943-1948). 
57 See generally Harry N. Scheiber, Japan, the North Atlantic Triangle, and the Pacific 
Fisheries:  A Perspective on the Origins of Modern Ocean Law, 6 SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 27, 38-
59 (2004). 
58 See id. at 51-58, 79. 
59 3 C.F.R. at 67 (1943-1948).  The declaration asserted property rights by stating that the 
United States “regard[ed] [the continental shelf] as appertaining to the United States, 
subject to its jurisdiction and control.”  See also United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19, 38-
39 (1947) (holding that the U.S. federal government had “paramount rights in and power 
over” the continental shelf per the Continental Shelf Proclamation); United States v. 
Louisiana, 339 U.S. 699, 704 (1950) (reaffirming United States v. California); United States 
v. Texas, 339 U.S. 707, 717-18 (1950) (same). 
60 See H. Shirley Amerasinghe, The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, 
reprinted in I UNCLOS COMMENTARY, supra, 1, 1 [hereinafter “Amerasinge”]. 
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not commonly used by geoscientists,62 was itself vague, but nevertheless the 
United States used it to claim exclusive natural resource rights in the seabed 
as far out as 50 miles from the West Coast and 250 miles from the East 
Coast.63 
Truman’s proclamations quickly became precedent for other States’ 
new, larger, and often differing unilateral property and regulatory claims into 
what had been res nullius high seas.  These new claims included differences 
both of degree (such as differing breadths for the territorial sea or exclusive 
offshore fishery rights) and of kind (such as new regulatory initiatives for 
research or pollution control).  William Wertenbaker, reporting at large for 
The New Yorker in 1983, described the incongruous legal state of affairs for 
offshore rights between World War II and the adoption of UNCLOS: 
More than ninety countries, including the United States, 
claimed control over fishing as far as two hundred nautical 
miles from their shores.  Canada and the Soviet Union have 
regarded much of the Arctic as special areas subject to their 
jurisdiction.  Canada, citing the risk of pollution, which has 
been seen as a growing threat by most countries, enacted a 
law that could, for instance, deny oil tankers the right of 
innocent passage. . . .  While some countries came to the 
conference claiming rights only to fish or other resources, a 
number claimed total sovereignty over waters out to twelve, 
fifty, a hundred, or even two hundred miles offshore.  
Indonesia, the Philippines, Fiji, and other island nations 
claimed their interisland waters as their archipelagic waters.  
Three-mile sovereignty, traditional in European maritime 
law, is now claimed by less than half the number of countries 
that claimed it thirty years ago—twenty-one as opposed to 
                                                                                                                                  
61 The Continental Shelf Proclamation and the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act of 1953, 
Pub. L. 67-212, 67 Stat. 462 (1953) (codified at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-43 (2000)), define the 
continental shelf in terms “of which the subsoil and seabed appertain to the United States 
and are subject to its jurisdiction and control.”  But defining property rights in terms of 
‘appurtenance’ is circular and ambiguous (Cf. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 111 (8th ed. 2004) 
(defining “appurtenance” as:  “Something that belongs or is attached to something else” 
(emphasis added))), as the term might then be either legally prescriptive (that which ‘belongs 
to’) or materially descriptive (that which ‘is attached to’). 
62 See Ian Brownlie, Book Review (reviewing CONTINENTAL SHELF LIMITS:  THE SCIENTIFIC 
AND LEGAL INTERFACE (PETER J. COOK & CHRIS M. CARLETON eds. 2002) [hereinafter “COOK 
& CARLETON”]), 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 286, 286 (2002) [hereinafter “Brownlie”]; Robert W. Smith 
& George Taft, Legal Aspects of the Continental Shelf, in COOK & CARLETON, 17, 18 
[hereinafter “Smith & Taft”]; JOSEPH STARKE, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 191 
(1963 ed.) (describing the Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf as a “misnomer” 
because its definition included considerable areas beyond physical shelf limits); Case 
Concerning the Continental Shelf (Tunisia v. Libya), 1982 ICJ 18, 45 (24 Feb.); & Part III(A), 
infra. 
63 See Henry M. Arruda, The Extension of the United States Territorial Sea:  Reasons and 
Effects, 4 CONN. J. INT’L L. 697, 704 (1989). 
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forty-five; and while the number of countries in the world has 
more than doubled, those claiming twelve miles or more has 
risen from three to a hundred and seven.  Fourteen countries 
assert that their borders and territorial waters extend two 
hundred miles out to sea.  By 1978, only three countries 
made no territorial or economic claim whatever beyond three 
miles.64 
As increasing economic demands and new technologies continued to 
open the oceans to ever farther and deeper human activity, international 
conflicts began to grow out of legal differences.  Yet traditional sources and 
positivist methods of international law failed to harmonize or ease concerns 
over this “creeping jurisdiction.”65  Indeed, the prevailing positivist view of 
international law actually encouraged coastal States’ increasingly bold claims 
by giving the imprimatur of legality to the most strongly held, even outright 
provocative, positions.66  The ICJ in particular, pronounced views during this 
period on customary international law and the law applicable inter se the 
parties that emphasized their rights acquired and lost by prescription.  
Without a comprehensive law of the sea to work from, the Court had only the 
consent of the States before it to consider as sources and subjects of the law.  
To put it another way, individual States had considerable and increasingly 
inequitable latitude to establish their rights vis-à-vis both another party to a 
dispute and, by necessary implication, erga omnes the rest of the oceans and 
all other States.  While in the abstract the manifest intentions of States may 
be straightforward markers for identifying applicable positive law, this 
individualized and relativist approach proved incapable of sustaining itself 
absent a broader and deeper agreement on the oceans as a whole.67 
                                            
64 Wertenbaker I, supra, at 46.  Wertenbaker also recounts conflicting unilateral claims to 
international straits.  See id. at 47.  See also Amerasinghe, supra, at 1-2. 
65 Edward Miles, The Structure and Effects of the Decision Process in the Seabed Committee 
and the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, 31 INT’L ORG. 159, 174 
(1977) [hereinafter “Miles”]. 
66 See Wertenbaker I, supra, at 47 and discussion infra.  Wertenbaker notes, for instance, 
that “in the spring of 1979 [U.S.] Navy ships were ordered to sail in [others’] newly claimed 
waters whenever possible, on the principle that a right of way could be maintained by being 
used.”  Id. 
67 But cf. Alan Boyle, Further Development of the Law of the Sea Convention:  Mechanisms for 
Change, 54 INT’L COMP. L.Q. 563, 575 (2005) [hereinafter “Boyle”].  Boyle posits here that: 
While the Court’s decisions do take account of special circumstances, such 
as geography or dependence on fisheries, and naturally pay particular 
attention to the practice of the parties in dispute, the Court has always 
been careful to articulate its conclusions in terms of a general law of the 
sea applicable to all States. 
While it is true, as discussed in this Part, that the Court repeatedly maintained that all 
parties in law of the sea disputes were subject to international law, the Court also seemed to 
go out of its way to limit the reach of its judgments to the parties inter se.  The cases 
analyzed here suggest that the Court’s approach left open the possibility of much broader 
coastal State claims so long as such claims had not met the persistent and interested 
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The ICJ’s 1951 Fisheries Case (U.K. v. Norway)68 set the course for 
emphasizing States’ practice and their unilateralist claims as determinative 
of the law applicable inter se.  The case arose from Norway’s seizure of British 
trawlers “equipped with improved and powerful gear” operating in parts of 
the fish-rich banks of the North Sea (fjords, bays, islets, and reefs along the 
jagged Norwegian coast known as the “skjærgård”) to which Norway in 1935 
had claimed exclusive fishing rights.69  Norway justified its claims on the 
basis straight baselines longer than ten miles, an approach that would allow 
it to claim a convex rather than concave exclusive fishing jurisdiction for 
certain openings to the sea wider than ten miles.  The United Kingdom 
maintained, by contrast, that ten mile baselines were a “general principle” of 
international law.70  While the majority opinion recognized that “the 
delimitation of sea areas has always an international aspect” and cannot “be 
dependent merely upon the will of the coastal State,”71 it upheld the 
unilateral Norwegian claim.72  The Court did so on the basis of Norway’s 
longstanding and “historic” assertions of exclusive fishing rights to the areas 
as well as from the lack of persistent objections by other fishing nations.73 
This might not be so remarkable had the dispositive reliance on 
historic claims been limited to the otherwise vexing skjærgård.  More 
problematic, however, was the ICJ’s judgment in the 1969 North Sea 
Continental Shelf Cases (W. Germany v. Denmark; W. Germany v. 
Netherlands).74  These cases found customary law in the ambiguous, 
incomplete, and controversial 1958 Geneva Conventions and accorded 
definitive weight in the law of the sea to the positive éffectivités of just a 
small cadre of coastal States.75  These conventions—concerning the 
Continental Shelf, the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, the High Seas, 
and Fisheries and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas—
                                                                                                                                  
objections of opposite or adjacent coastal States.  There was no real recognition of a general 
interest by all States in the delineation of the ocean commons.  Further, and as Boyle seems 
to recognize, it was this very possibility that left the general law enunciated by the Court and 
reflected in the 1958 Geneva Conventions subject to increasingly vocal attack from newly 
independent and developing States.  Cf. id. at 563.  The Court since the adoption of 
UNCLOS, however, has recognized the Convention as the general umbrella for the law of the 
sea.  See, e.g., Case Concerning the Continental Shelf (Libya v. Malta), 1985 ICJ 13, 29-34 (3 
June); Case Concerning the Continental Shelf (Tunisia v. Libya), 1982 ICJ 18, 47-49 (24 
Feb.). 
68 1951 ICJ 116, supra. 
69 Id. at 124. 
70 Id. 
71 Id. at 132. 
72 Id. at 143. 
73 See id. at 136-39. 
74 1969 ICJ 3 (Judgment of 20 Feb.). 
75 Cf. id. at 40, ¶ 66. 
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were drafted by the International Law Commission (“ILC”)76 and adopted by 
a vote in the first United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea 
(“UNCLOS I”).77  UNCLOS I failed, however, to reach general agreement on 
the breadth of the territorial sea or on an unambiguous definition of the 
continental shelf.78  UNCLOS I also failed to attract even close to a majority 
of States to become party to the agreements, which itself called into serious 
question their legal efficacy.79  (The Second United Nations Conference on the 
Law of the Sea (“UNCLOS II”) also failed two years later by one vote to adopt 
an agreement fixing the breadth of the territorial sea or the extent of offshore 
fishing rights.80) 
Article 1 of the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf81 
provided the ambiguous and problematic ‘exploitability’ definition for the 
legal continental shelf.  This article provided that States had exclusive 
sovereign rights to natural resources of their continental shelfs.82  This 
convention defined the ‘continental shelf’ as extending:  “to a depth of 200 
metres or, beyond that limit, to where the depth of the superjacent waters 
admits of the exploitation of the natural resources of the said areas.”83  This 
test of ‘exploitability’ was the most problematic.  It allowed developed coastal 
                                            
76 See Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, UN GAOR, 8th 
Sess., Supp. (No. 9), UN Doc. A/3159 (1956), reprinted in 2 Y.B. INT’L L. COMM’N 189, UN 
Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1956. 
77 See United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, Official Records, 7 vols., UN Doc. 
A/CONF.13/37-A/CONF.13/43 (1958). 
78 See Wertenbaker I, supra, at 39. 
79 See Amerasinghe, supra, at 3: 
These four [Geneva] conventions have secured an average of about 40 
ratifications as compared with a total of nearly 150 sovereign States in 
the world of today.  It is a moot point, therefore, whether those 
conventions which passed into law with so few ratifications can be 
regarded as representing the will or reflecting the interests of the great 
majority of the peoples of the world. 
80 See Second United Conference on the Law of the Sea, Official Records, UN Doc. 
A/CONF.19/9 (1960).  Even had UNCLOS II been adopted, the instrument likely would still 
have failed.  Constantin Stravropoulos, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General 
to UNCLOS III during its first two sessions, remarked: 
Even if, instead of failing by one vote, the [Second] Conference had 
succeeded by one vote . . . , I believe that it would only have been a 
temporary success and that the whole question would have been reopened 
together with other aspects of the law of the sea under the impact . . . of 
technological changes and the growth in the number of States which form 
the society of nations. 
Constantin A. Stravropoulos, Procedural Problems of the Third Conference on the Law of the 
Sea, reprinted in I UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA 1982:  A 
COMMENTARY lvii, lx (MYRON H. NORDQUIST ed. 1985) [hereinafter “I UNCLOS 
COMMENTARY”]. 
81 1958 T.I.A.S. 5578, 15.1 U.S.T. 472 (1964). 
82 Id. art. 2. 
83 Id. art 1(a) (emphasis added). 
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States to expand their sovereignty so far as their technological capabilities 
and economic demands would allow. 
This ‘exploitability’ criterion, and the inequitable advantages it would 
endow to the technologically advanced, in fact aroused great consternation at 
the time, particularly among inland, developing, and newly independent 
States.  Like the doctrine of res nullius, which had earlier been used to justify 
colonial claims in Africa and Asia,84 Ambassador Arvid Pardo of Malta was 
worried that ‘exploitability’ would set off an unjust land and resources grab 
that could potentially claim the entire seabed.85  It was discomfort with these 
implications—Malta, after all, had achieved independence only three years 
earlier—that led Pardo to make his historic 1967 General Assembly appeal to 
convene a new conference on the law of the sea.86  Pardo was of the view that 
the world would soon experience serious shortages of metal ores and that the 
continental margin and deep seabed held nearly limitless mineral resources 
that would soon be technologically and economically within reach.87 
                                            
84 Colonialism relied on res nullius to justify territorial expansion into Africa and Asia which, 
because they were inhabited by ‘uncivilized’ and nomadic peoples, were thought to become 
occupied only with the arrival of the Europeans.  See generally Antony Anghie, Finding the 
Peripheries:  Sovereignty and Colonialism in Nineteenth–Century International Law, 40 
HARV. INT’L L.J. 1 (1999).  It is worth noting in this regard that Grotius was an outright critic 
of this argument:  “[I]t is heresy to believe that infidels are not masters of their own 
property; consequently, to take from them their possessions on account of their religious 
belief is no less theft and robbery than it would be in the case of Christians.”  GROTIUS, MARE 
LIBERUM, supra, at 16. 
85 Pardo observed of the ‘exploitability’ doctrine:  “That’s almost free license. . . .  We could 
see a scramble like the one for land in Africa in the last century.”  William Wertenbaker, 
Seabed and Ocean Floor, THE NEW YORKER 24, 25 (1 June 1968) [hereinafter “Wertenbaker 
1968”].  Pardo’s concerns echoed those expressed a year earlier by US President Johnson that 
a seabed land grab would lead to international conflict just as colonialist territorial 
expansion had led to world wars: 
Under no circumstances, we believe, must we ever allow the prospects of 
rich harvest and mineral wealth to create a new form of colonial 
competition among the maritime nations.  We must be careful to avoid a 
race to grab and to hold the lands under the high seas.  We must ensure 
that the deep sea and the ocean bottom are, and remain, the legacy of all 
human beings. 
(Johnson quoted in Amerasinghe, supra, at 3 (emphasis added).) 
86 See Pardo, supra, at 14 ¶ 104 & at 1, ¶ 6 (emphasis added): 
My Government decided to take action at this session of the General 
Assembly because rapidly developing technology makes possible the 
exploration, occupation and exploitation of the world’s sea-beds and much 
of its ocean floor.  We are convinced that in accordance with historical 
precedent this capability will lead, indeed is already leading, to 
appropriation for national use of these areas, with consequences for all our 
countries that may be incalculable. 
See also id. at 8-9 (emphasis added). 
87 See Wertenbaker I, supra, at 48.  This position had become popularized by the work of 
John L. Mero.  See generally VI UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA 1982:  
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Pardo’s speech endorsed what would become the central substantive 
and procedural elements of UNCLOS.  Pardo’s first concern was that a “clear 
definition” for the outer limits of the continental shelf should be formulated 
to supplant ‘exploitability.’88  This would necessarily set off the deep seabed, 
as “common heritage of mankind,” from the possibility of national claims or 
appropriation.89  Pardo also proposed that this deep seabed area be managed 
by an “international agency” to oversee exploitation of mineral resources, 
marine scientific research, and damage to the seabed from, inter alia, nuclear 
waste and pollution.90  Finally, Pardo realized that “the concurrence of all 
[was] essential” to effectuate these sweeping rules for ocean space and so he 
recommended that a special and “widely representative” committee take up 
the work of preparing for a new law of the sea conference.91 
Pardo’s speech found wide support and the General Assembly soon 
passed a resolution without any dissenting votes examining “the question of 
the reservation exclusively for peaceful purposes of the sea-bed and the ocean 
floor, and the subsoil thereof, underlying the high seas beyond the limits of 
present national jurisdiction, and the use of their resources in the interests of 
mankind.”92  The General Assembly also established an ad hoc, and later 
permanent, “Committee to Study the Peaceful Uses of the Sea-Bed and the 
Ocean Floor beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction.”93  This was followed 
in 1970 by the seminal General Assembly Resolution 2749 “Declaration of 
Principles,” which, again without a vote against, “solemnly declar[ed]” that 
the seabed and its resources “are the common heritage of mankind” and that 
the exploration and exploitation of resources in this area “shall be carried out 
for the benefit of mankind as a whole.”94  The work and structure of this 
seabed committee, which would take a comprehensive and consensus-based 
approach to the subject,95 together with the reservation of a ‘common 
heritage,’ would be carried into UNCLOS. 
Despite these developments in the General Assembly, as well as 
continuing conflicts between major maritime nations over the extent of 
                                                                                                                                  
A COMMENTARY 10-16 (SATYA N. NANDAN et. al eds. 2002) [hereinafter “VI UNCLOS 
COMMMENTARY”] (citing JOHN L. MERO, THE MINERAL RESOURCES OF THE SEAS (1965)). 
88 Pardo, supra, ¶ 14 (2d sess.). 
89 Id. ¶ 13. 
90 Id. ¶¶ 10, 11, 15. 
91 See Pardo, supra, at ¶¶ 16. 
92 GA Res.. 2340 (XXII) (18 Dec. 1967). 
93 Id. ¶ 1 & GA Res. 2467A ¶1 (XXIII) (21 Dec. 1968). 
94 GA Res. 2749 ¶¶ 1, 7 (XXV) (17 Dec. 1970).  The “desir[ability] . . . [of] develop[ing] the 
principles” of this resolution is specifically cited in the preamble to UNCLOS.  The 
Declaration of Principles was not adopted by consensus, but, rather, by a vote of 108 to none, 
with 14 abstentions.  DIVISION FOR OCEAN AFFAIRS AND THE LAW OF THE SEA, CONCEPT OF 
THE COMMON HERITAGE OF MANKIND:  LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF ARTICLES 133 TO 150 AND 
311(6) OF THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA 188 (1996) [hereinafter 
“DOALOS, CHM LEGISLATIVE HISTORY”]. 
95 See discussion infra in Part II. 
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offshore property and resource rights, the ICJ in North Sea Continental Shelf 
Cases viewed article 1 of the 1958 Continental Shelf Convention as settled 
customary law and continued to stress the “inherent rights” of a coastal State 
unilaterally to define and claim its rights as against the world in an offshore 
continental shelf.96  The Court at first glance seems to have disavowed mere 
‘exploitability’ as determinative by stressing that the legal continental shelf 
was the “natural prolongation” of a State’s landmass under the sea.97  This 
might have suggested that the legal continental shelf must be limited by the 
actual geology and geomorphology of a coastal State’s landmass.98  A careful 
examination of the Court’s positivist reasoning reveals, however, that it 
would not have intervened against claims extending well beyond the “natural 
prolongation” so long as one coastal State’s claim did not directly overlap 
with any others’.  As the Court put it: 
It is said not to be possible to maintain that there is a rule of 
law ascribing certain areas to a State as a matter of inherent 
and original right . . . without also admitting the existence of 
some rule by which those areas can be obligatorily delimited.  
The Court cannot accept the logic of this view.  The problem 
arises only where there is a dispute and only in respect of the 
marginal areas involved.  The appurtenance of a given area, 
considered as an entity, in no way governs the precise 
delimitation of its boundaries.99 
Thus, by the ICJ’s reasoning, coastal States could stake their own continental 
shelf claims and would only have to justify them when they intruded on 
competing claims by opposite or adjacent coastal States.100  A State not 
directly making such an overlapping claim, in other words, would have no 
                                            
96 1969 ICJ at 22, 40. 
97 Id. at 29. 
98 See Brownlie, supra, at 286. 
99 1969 ICJ at 32 (emphasis added).  The Court also said in this regard:   
Whenever a given submarine area does not constitute a natural—or the 
most natural—extension of the land territory of a coastal State, even 
though that area may be closer to it than it is to the territory of any other 
State, it cannot be regarded as appertaining to that State;—or at least it 
cannot be so regarded in the face of a competing claim by a State of whose 
land territory the submarine area concerned is to be regarded as a natural 
extension. 
Id. at 31 (emphasis added).  Here again the Court qualifies a concrete definition for the 
continental shelf on the condition of having an actual competing claim by another State. 
100 Even from the Court’s positivist perspective, it need not have taken this narrow view on 
the enforcement and limits of coastal state inherent rights.  It could have, for instance, 
recognized the erga omnes character of jurisdiction and sovereignty and explored whether 
any State offended by another’s might be able to invoke responsibility for breach of an 
obligation erga omnes, as contemplated under article 42 of the ILC’s Draft Articles on the 
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts.  UN GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 
10, UN Doc. A/56/10 (2001) [hereinafter “ILC State Responsibility Draft Articles”]. 
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standing to challenge what it might view as an overly aggressive 
jurisdictional intrusion into international waters. 
Even had the Court announced a generally binding rule, it may have 
been overrun by a concert of aggressive coastal States’ claims supported by 
the Court’s own ‘specially affected States’ doctrine.  Gerry Simpson saw this 
doctrine as allowing particular States to have unequal influence in 
international lawmaking.101  The Court in North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, 
for example, accorded greater weight to coastal States—‘specially affected’ 
because they were the only States who could claim the appurtenant 
continental shelf—than to landlocked States who, the opinion surmised, had 
“no interest” in the delineation of the continental shelf.102 
While formal jurisprudence focused on the positive acts of a few 
‘special’ States, the preparatory work for UNCLOS III continued with the 
interested participation of coastal, landlocked, developed, and developing 
countries alike.103  Yet the ICJ’s 1974 Fisheries Jurisdiction (U.K. v. Iceland; 
West Germany v. Iceland) judgments,104 which grew out of the so-called “Cod 
Wars,”105 extended to fisheries a similar reliance on claims by certain 
‘specially affected’ fishing nations to establish the generally applicable law 
from their existing inter se treaties and practices.  Iceland, following the lead 
of the Truman Proclamations, since 1948 had asserted exclusive fishing and 
regulatory rights to “Continental Shelf Fisheries” on the basis of the need to 
protect its own offshore fishing from increasingly sophisticated distant-water 
fleets.106  In 1971 Iceland claimed exclusive fishing rights out to fifty miles,107 
which would cut out British and German fishermen from grounds they had 
                                            
101 See GERRY SIMPSON, GREAT POWERS AND OUTLAW STATES 48-53 (2004).  This doctrine was 
the stronger form of what he (without judgment) termed “legislative inequality.”  For a 
critique of Simpson’s rather narrowly historiographic approach, see Peter Prows, Book 
Review Essay, Between Apology and Utopia:  ‘Middle’ States & The New World Orders 
Problem (reviewing GERRY SIMPSON, GREAT POWERS AND OUTLAW STATES:  UNEQUAL 
SOVEREIGNS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER (Cambridge University Press, 2004)), 
available at <http://www.globallawbooks.org/reviews/getFile.asp?id=168>. 
102 1969 ICJ at 42.  Judge Tanaka’s dissent offered a similarly frank appraisal of the 
dominant role ‘specially affected’ coastal States play in defining the legal continental shelf:  
“We cannot evaluate the ratification of the [1958 Geneva Continental Shelf Convention] by a 
large maritime country . . . as having the same importance as similar acts by a land-locked 
country which possesses no particular interest in the delimitation of the continental shelf.”  
Id. at 176 (Tanaka, J., dissenting). 
103 Landlocked Czechoslovakia and impoverished Somalia, for example, were members of the 
original Ad Hoc Committee established to take up Ambassador Pardo’s proposal.  See 
A/RES/2340 ¶ 1.  The original ad hoc Seabed Committee became a permanent one by 1968 
and its membership soon grew from thirty-five to ninety-one countries.  See Wertenbaker I, 
supra, at 48. 
104 1974 ICJ 3 (25 July). 
105 See generally Wertenbaker I, supra, at 47. 
106 1974 ICJ at 10-13. 
107 Id. at 14. 
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fished for centuries and considered part of the high seas.108  These competing 
claims soon led to a forceful escalation, with Iceland seizing British fishing 
vessels and Royal Navy gunboats clashing with Icelandic patrols.109  The 
United Kingdom and West Germany soon asked the ICJ to intervene.110 
The Fisheries Jurisdiction judgments began by acknowledging that the 
preparatory work for UNCLOS III represented the “manifest desire on the 
part of all States to proceed to the codification of [the law of the sea] on a 
universal basis,”111 but the Court insisted that this had no bearing on extant 
positive law.112  The Court ultimately held that Iceland’s unilateral extension 
of exclusive fisheries jurisdiction was “not opposable” against the United 
Kingdom and West Germany and that the parties were under an obligation to 
undertake “good faith” negotiations to reach an “equitable” solution.113  These 
negotiations were to be guided by “preferential rights” for Iceland to regulate 
offshore fishing as well as the “historic title” of West Germany and the 
United Kingdom due to their longstanding fishing in the disputed area.114  
Here again the Court subrogated a general rule to the “kaleidoscopic” claims 
of the ‘special’ or ‘historic’ claims of States as against each other only.115 
The positivist logic of these cases elevated the conflict among nations 
as they were encouraged to assert themselves and challenge each other 
(sometimes backed by force) to maintain prescriptive claims.116  It also 
                                            
108 See Wertenbaker I, supra, at 47. 
109 See id. 
110 See 1974 ICJ at 16. 
111 1974 ICJ at 23. 
112 Id. at 23-24: 
[The] various proposals and preparatory documents produced in [the 
third Conference], . . . must be regarded as manifestations of the views 
and opinions of individual States and as vehicles of their aspirations, 
rather than as expressing principles of existing law. . . .  In the 
circumstances, the Court, as a court of law, cannot render judgment sub 
specie legis ferendae, or anticipate the law before the legislator has laid it 
down. 
113 Id. at 34. 
114 Id. at 26-27.  The Court also asked the parties to consider that fishing freedoms were 
conditional on a duty to have “reasonable regard to the interests of other States in their 
exercise of the freedom of the high seas.”  Id. at 22 (quoting art. 2 of 1958 Geneva Convention 
on the High Seas). 
115 This “kaleidoscopic” view was made explicit in an unusual separate concurring opinion 
written by five of the ten judges voting in the majority.  See D.P. O’CONNELL, 1 THE 
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA 539-42 (I.A. SHEARER ed., 1982).  These judges stressed that 
the judgment was limited to the facts of the case and suggested that had the United 
Kingdom not asserted its own historic fishing rights to the disputed area that it could not 
have contested Iceland’s “preferential” claim.  See 1974 ICJ at 45 (joint separate opinion of 
Forster, Bengzon, Jimenez de Arechaga, Negendra Singh, and Ruda, JJ.). 
116 In addition to the Cod Wars described supra, Wertenbaker recounts numerous other 
hostile conflicts over resources and regulation in the oceans: 
Some countries have seized or fired on ships that have continued to use 
those [territorial] waters and planes that flew over them.  In several 
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emboldened unilateralist national regulations to address growing concerns 
about marine pollution, fisheries, and scarce resources.117  These concerns 
took on an added dimension as smaller and developing countries, born from 
their own political and economic situations, followed Pardo’s and Malta’s lead 
in insisting on a fair say about ocean space.118  Without a new agreement, the 
status quo reliance on individual and inter se claims, enforceable against the 
world, had failed to really ensure anybody’s interests in the oceans to the 
                                                                                                                                  
cases, warships have been sent out.  In 1980, Cuban planes strafed a 
Bahamian fishing vessel.  A few years earlier, Argentina fired upon a 
Russian vessel.  British and Icelandic warships harassed one another 
during the nineteen-sixties and seventies [in the Cod Wars], and French 
and Brazilian Navy ships clashed in the “lobster war” of 1963.  American 
tuna boats have been seized by Ecuador during the past thirty years; 
French shrimp boats have been seized by Brazil; and a few years ago 
American tuna boats were seized by Costa Rica, though they were not 
actually fishing.  The United States has seized Soviet and East European 
fishing ships off New England and Japanese ships off Alaska.  In 1967, 
two United States Coast Guard icebreakers in the Arctic were forced to 
turn back by Soviet authorities.  In 1968 and 1975, the American ships 
Pueblo and Mayaguez were seized by North Korea and Cambodia, 
respectively, after entering waters claimed by those countries.  In August 
of 1981, American fighter planes shot down two Libyan planes that had 
fired on them because they were in airspace over waters claimed by 
Libya. 
Wertenbaker I, supra, at 45-46.  Wertenbaker also describes conflicts in straits between 
countries that would claim ownership and others asserting rights of passage, most notably 
being Egypt’s effort to claim the Strait of Tiran and thereby forbid any ship from passing to 
or from Israel.  Id. at 47. 
117 Wertenbaker here again well describes the concerns, id. at 46-47: 
Through the fifties, sixties, and seventies, large foreign fleets hovered 
almost continuously off various coasts throughout the world, including 
those of New England and Alaska; local fisherman complained vigorously 
that the foreign ships took more fish than they themselves could, and 
deprived them of catches.  Overfishing depleted fish stocks, and some 
species disappeared from certain areas, while others, like haddock, were 
reported to be all but extinct.  The fleets were East German, Japanese, 
South Korean, French, Polish, American, and—numerically the largest—
Russian.  One knowledgeable conference delegated observed that a chief 
cause of the law of the Sea conference was the persistent failure of the 
Russian wheat crop.  A 1965 study quoted research done in Russia in the 
early nineteen-fifties that showed that fishing could produce a given 
amount of calories in a third of the man-hours it took to produce the 
equivalent amount of calories in beef.  Russian fleets of factory ships (for 
processing fish) and catching ships showed up first off Canada, in 1956, 
then off New England, West Africa, and Argentina, and in the Pacific 
edged down from the waters off Alaska to the waters off the Pacific 
Northwest and California. . . .  The quantity of fish being caught around 
the world had increased more than fourfold in twenty-five years—from 
sixteen million tons a year to sixty-nine million.  “Fishing and pollution 
are all that our politicians want to talk about,” a French delegate 
lamented during the conference.  “For us, the ocean has become a curse.” 
118 See Wertenbaker I, supra, at 40, 47, 48; & Boyle, supra, at 563. 
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detriment of order for all.119  But already a new law of the sea conference—
UNCLOS III—was well underway. 
Part II.  The Development of UNCLOS as International Law Erga 
Omnes 
UNCLOS was a bold initiative of political will and for constituting a 
comprehensive legal order for the oceans.  It grew out of new human 
demands and capacities to use the seas and their scarce resources and from 
the inability of traditional methods of creating and interpreting international 
law to really settle an enduring system of property rules for ocean space.  It 
was a sweeping bargain struck among States with diverse politics, economic 
demands, and geographies.  Critically, it also relied on consensus lawmaking 
backed by binding dispute settlement, while introducing new subjects, 
objects, and actors to international law.120  The expectations and stakes were 
high enough, it was thought, that the international order itself would be at 
risk should the effort fail.121 
A.  UNCLOS as a Grand Bargain 
William Wertenbaker, again reporting from the conference, brilliantly 
synopsized the twelve year negotiations for UNCLOS III: 
                                            
119 See generally Wertenbaker I, supra, at 45-48 (detailing the escalating international 
confrontations about the breadth of the territorial sea, the scope of economic and regulatory 
jurisdiction, and the question of innocent passage through straights, and fishing rights; and 
recounting the representative views of one delegate:  “The prospect of more and worse Cod 
Wars appalled many of the diplomats at the conference.  ‘If you resort to force, you have to be 
willing to follow it to its logical end,’ one said.  ‘The large countries are all at a moral 
disadvantage in confrontations with the little ones, and they’re just as eager for a 
settlement.’”  Id. at 47). 
120 See Allot, supra, at 28-30 (listing the newly created subjects of rights and duties, legal 
relations, and sea areas in UNCLOS). 
121 See id. at 39.  Wertenbaker recounted the specific risks for failure as they stood in 1982: 
Countries could extend their claims of ownership even farther out to sea 
than they had already done, and many, perhaps all, could increase their 
claims to total sovereignty over adjacent waters.  Permission could be 
required for ships of distant countries to pass through territorial waters 
on their way to other countries.  Tolls could be demanded, especially at 
straits, and passage could simply be refused (most countries today are 
well supplied with discouraging short-range missiles); and some countries 
might take forceful measures to spare themselves such threats.  A 
company that started mining the seafloor in defiance of the treaty or of 
the conference might find itself or its subsidiaries threatened with an 
international boycott or seizure of its assets in foreign countries, or, far 
more likely, it might simply lose bids for contracts for aircraft, oil rigs, 
and the like to Japanese or European competitors whose governments 
had accepted the treaty. 
Id. at 64-65. 
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It was a debate over resources, a conference on property and 
ownership.  It might, more informatively, have been titled 
the United Nations Conference on the Uses and Ownership 
of the Ocean and Its Resources.  It was a conference on food, 
on oil, on energy, on minerals, on preservation of the 
environment, on freedom of navigation.  It was a forum to 
right the wrongs done to the developing countries, and they 
brought to its early years the rhetoric of what had become 
known as the New International Economic Order and of the 
North-South dialogue.  Along the way, it was a kind of 
constitutional convention for a world administration for the 
seabed.  It devised new ways of conducting, and making 
decisions at, international gatherings, and became a model 
for other large assemblages of countries seeking to deal with 
complex problems.  Its aim was to bring order and law where 
none existed or where customs were no longer respected and 
countries had begun to squabble.  It dealt with such 
traditional and relatively straightforward matters as piracy, 
smuggling, and freedom of navigation on the high seas, on 
which there was little disagreement; and with hotly disputed 
ones, like the demarcation between the high seas and 
national waters, free passage through straits and through 
the waters of archipelagoes, pollution from ships passing a 
country’s shores, and custody over resources, including food 
supplies and energy.  The list of issues before the delegates 
was stupendous, and the final statements resolving them will 
ultimately constitute, in effect, the largest body of 
international law ever to be codified.  The major problems, on 
which the delegates had to agree, numbered over a hundred, 
but any number of lesser issues, from the preservation of 
whales to the custody of antiquities, were also resolved, 
though they would not have halted the conference if they had 
not been.  When this conference began work, experts 
predicted imminent failure; there were so many issues and so 
many delegates that the demands were, as one political 
scientist wrote eloquently, “quite beyond the competence of 
human beings to manage.”  Another argued persuasively that 
the expectations of so many delegates on such a big agenda 
insured that the conference would fail.  But instead, in the 
end, the number of delegates and the number of issues 
appeared to form a critical mass that overcame 
disagreement.  Countries have never welcomed restraints on 
their freedoms, but the conference made steady, if 
intermittent, progress on a mountain of laws that the 
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countries themselves would be subject to, including 
provisions to insure their compliance.122 
Why did UNCLOS III result in such an agreement where prior efforts 
fell so short?123  Wertenbaker suggests here that the agenda’s very 
ambitiousness gave the negotiations their own momentum.  Quite simply, 
States individually had too much to lose to give up and too much to gain by 
reaching agreement together. 
This “critical mass” was a natural outgrowth of the design of the 
Conference:  negotiations were to contemplate a comprehensive package deal 
and would proceed by consensus under the auspices of the General 
Assembly.124  The UNCLOS preamble makes it explicit that the Convention 
was:  “Prompted by the desire to settle, in a spirit of mutual understanding 
and cooperation, all issues relating to the law of the sea,” and “that the 
problems of ocean space are closely interrelated and need to be considered as 
a whole.”125  This grand bargain was underwritten by a balance of generous 
yet definitely limited coastal State jurisdictions with a robust commons 
beyond, composed of freedoms in the water column and a res publica regime 
for the seabed and its mineral resources.126  Finally settling the “creeping” 
and incongruous coastal State claims was, as discussed in Part I, a primary 
reason for the major maritime countries to come to UNCLOS III, while 
Pardo’s appeal for the seabed struck a chord with developing, newly 
independent, and land-locked and “geographically disadvantaged” 
countries.127  Negotiations about this grand bargain initially appeared to be 
quite confused as they so often followed geographic and economic similarities 
rather than the prevalent ideological coalitions of the Cold War.128  But over 
the whole course of the Conference this tendency actually helped depoliticize 
the debate and enable agreement.129   
                                            
122 Wertenbaker I, supra, at 39-40. 
123 The preamble to UNCLOS acknowledges the inadequacies of UNCLOS I & II by “Noting 
that developments since [UNCLOS I & II] have accentuated the need for a new and generally 
acceptable Convention on the law of the sea.” 
124 See generally Caminos & Molitor, supra, at 873-78; Allot, supra, at 5-12; & Barry Buzan, 
Negotiating by Consensus:  Developments in Technique at the United Nations Conference on 
the Law of the Sea, 75 AM. J. INT’L L. 324 (1981) [hereinafter “Buzan”]. 
125 1982 Convention, supra, pblr. ¶¶ 1, 3 (emphasis added). 
126 See Wertenbaker I, supra, at 52; & Miles, supra, at 172-74.   
127 Wertenbaker I, supra, at 51-52.  See also 1982 Convention, supra, art. 170(2) (defining 
“geographically disadvantaged States”). 
128 See Miles, supra, 160-173 (describing and lamenting the state of regional group 
negotiating dynamics as of 1977). 
129 See Wertenbaker I, supra, at 49-50: 
One of the reassuring, and even pleasurable, aspects of the Third 
Conference . . . was the regularity with which ideological postures and 
alliances foundered on geographic realities . . . :  hostile countries were 
forced into alliances by common interests, and traditional allies found 
themselves opposed on many issues.  Attempts to use the conference to 
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The Convention reflected this grand bargain and careful balance of 
rights, interests, and responsibilities between coastal State jurisdictions and 
the high seas and deep seabed beyond.130  The rights coastal States enjoy in 
any continental shelf extending beyond their EEZs are characteristically 
balanced with obligations to share through the ISA a portion of the revenues 
derived from the exploitation of mineral and non-living resources in their 
continental shelfs.131  Extended coastal State resource rights in the 
continental shelf were also made contingent on new revenue sharing 
obligations to the rest of the international community.132   
To make this part of the bargain work, States did away with the 
problematic 1958 Geneva Continental Shelf Convention ‘exploitability’ 
definition and relied, as the ICJ suggested (but did not insist on as a general 
rule) in Continental Shelf Cases, on the linkage of the legal continental shelf 
to the “natural prolongation” of coastal State territorial landmasses.133  Given 
the centrality of geography in depoliticizing the negotiations, it is of little 
surprise that States turned to putatively objective geoscientific and technical 
criteria, administrated by scientists named to the Commission on the Limits 
of the Continental Shelf (“CLCS”), in delineating the continental shelf 
boundary between coastal State jurisdictions and the deep seabed area 
beyond (“the Area”).134 
A similar balance was struck between coastal State jurisdictions, the 
‘free’ high seas, and the seabed Area.  The reciprocity between the high seas 
                                                                                                                                  
settle old scores failed.  In the matter of fishing off foreign coasts, the 
Soviet Union and South Korea generally saw eye to eye.  The interests of 
Israel, Iraq, and Algeria on the question of passage through straits were 
so similar that every Arab attempt at a formula that would exclude Israel 
from the Strait of Tiran also could be applied to Iraq and the Persian 
Gulf, and was thus opposed by Iraq.  Castro’s Cuba, which exports nickel 
ore, and Chile, a right-wing dictatorship that exports copper, took similar 
positions on production limits on seafloor mining.  The United States and 
the Soviet Union were in agreement on freedom of navigation—passage 
through straits and other issues. 
130 See generally Allot, supra, at 15-17. 
131 Id. art. 82. 
132 See Koh, supra, at xxxiv: 
In the case of article 76 on the continental shelf, the article contains new 
law in that it has expanded the concept of the continental shelf to include 
the continental slope and the continental rise.  This concession to the 
broad margin States was in return for their agreement for revenue-
sharing on the continental shelf beyond 200 miles.  It is therefore my 
view that a State which is not a party to this Convention cannot invoke 
the benefits of article 76. 
See also Cook & Carleton, supra, at 5. 
133 See 1982 Convention, supra, art. 76(1). 
134 See Alexei A. Zinchenko, Emerging Issues in the Work of the Commission on the Limits of 
the Continental Shelf, in LEGAL AND SCIENTIFIC ASPECTS OF CONTINENTAL SHELF LIMITS 223, 
225 (MYRON H. NORDQUIST et al. eds., 2004) ([hereinafter “NORDQUIST et al.”]) [hereinafter 
“Zinchenko”].  For an extended discussion, see Part III(A), infra. 
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and EEZ regimes is reinforced by the provisions in UNCLOS by which both 
coastal States and other States are to give “due regard” for the rights, 
jurisdictions, and freedoms of the other.135  The continental shelf regime is 
not to affect the status of the superjacent waters or to infringe or interfere 
with other States’ freedoms of navigation and marine scientific research.136  
The Area and its res publica status is also not to affect the outer limit of 
coastal State jurisdictions or the legal status of the superjacent high seas.137  
Just as importantly, high seas freedoms must be exercised “with due regard” 
for the Part XI regime with respect to activities in the Area.138  (The enduring 
viability of these balances is taken up in Parts III & IV.) 
B.  UNCLOS and the Necessity of Consensus for Legal Property Rules 
As Pardo suggested in 1967, translating this bargain into an effective 
legal instrument would require consensus.  Consensus can be understood in 
two senses:  as a negotiation procedure and as an instrument of lawmaking.  
During the Conference negotiations, “consensus was a way of making 
moderately unpalatable arrangements easier to swallow.  It was a sort of 
tacit approval granted by waiving disagreement.”139  It also provided veto-
threat leverage to any State that tended to limit the demands individual 
States made to those that could be balanced by others’ proposals elsewhere in 
the package deal.140  In fact, the only votes held during the Conference came 
at the very end of eight years of negotiations.141  This consensus procedure 
marked a deliberate break from UNCLOS I and II, which instead relied on 
delegation to the ILC and supermajority voting.  The resultant Geneva 
Conventions came under attack from all sides:  not even a majority of States 
became parties to them and some of the most important provisions (especially 
on the continental shelf and the breadth of the territorial sea) engendered 
debilitating defections from industrialized, developing, and newly 
independent countries alike.142 
As an instrument of lawmaking, the UNCLOS consensus might have 
suffered the weakness of the numerous General Assembly resolutions that 
are passed by consensus each year but which have no real legal force.  As 
Secretary-General Kofi Annan has described, the weak form of consensus 
                                            
135 1982 Convention, supra, arts. 56 & 58(3).  See Allot, supra, at 15. 
136 1982 Convention, supra, art. 78. 
137 Id. arts. 134(4) & 135. 
138 Id. art. 87(2). 
139 Wertenbaker II, supra, at 53. 
140 See Wertenbaker II, supra, at 76.  See also Miles, supra, at 171-73. 
141 One vote came at the insistence of Turkey over making reservations to the treaty.  See 
Wertenbaker II, supra, at 76.  A vote also was called by Conference President and 
Ambassador Tommy Koh (Singapore), out of respect for opposition by the United States and 
others to the original form and mandate of the ISA, over final adoption of the Convention.  
See Wertenbaker I, supra, at 53; & Wertenbaker II, supra, at 78. 
142 Cf. Buzan, supra, at 326. 
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exhibited in many of these resolutions has no real decisive or normative force 
and “simply reflect[s] the lowest common denominator of widely different 
opinions.”143  Instead, UNCLOS was backed by a grand bargain that allowed 
States together to transcend the zero-sum prisoner’s dilemma to reach a 
strong consensus of a kind that “reflect[s] a genuine unity of purpose.”144   
Consensus thus also would become instrumental in inscribing 
UNCLOS as effective international law erga omnes for ocean space.  As 
Goldsmith and Posner suggest in their rationalist account The Limits of 
International Law, the pre-UNCLOS approaches to the ‘law’ of the sea 
conflated custom with coincidences of interest and treaties with mere 
signaling and coordination.145  Goldsmith and Posner argue that these types 
of unilateralist and inter se international law remain vulnerable to the 
prisoner’s dilemma temptation of defection for short-term gains.146  For 
claims of exclusive offshore jurisdictions, they paint the picture as one of 
regular free-riding and conflict, with cooperation occurring only in the rare 
case where particular States interact repeatedly and where violations are 
easy to identify.147  This certainly accords with the account provided in Part I. 
Whereas Goldsmith and Posner look to pre-UNCLOS practice and find 
little binding law, they also ignore UNCLOS entirely and the possibility its 
strong consensus provides for real international property law.148  Property 
                                            
143 Report of the Secretary-General, In Larger Freedom:  Towards Development, Security and 
Human Rights for All, UN Doc. A/59/2005 ¶ 159 (21 Mar. 2005) [hereinafter “Annan, In 
Larger Freedom”]. 
144 See id. ¶ 159. 
145 See GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra, at 59-66, 87.  Goldsmith and Posner would likely be 
quite critical of the ICJ’s particularly expansive view pre-UNCLOS of the creation of 
customary law when it has come to the law of the sea.  See North Sea Continental Shelf 
(Germany v. Denmark & The Netherlands), 1969 ICJ Rep. 3, 39, 43 (20 Feb.) (viewing the 
1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf as reflecting “at least emergent rules of 
customary international law”—despite the fact that they had failed to attract even a majority 
of States to become Parties—and as satisfying the usual requirement that the rule have been 
accepted for a considerable amount of time before becoming effective as customary law when 
“short though it might be, State practice, including [specially affected States], should have 
been both extensive and virtually uniform in the sense of the provision invoked,” and “should 
have occurred in such a way as to show a general recognition that a rule of law or legal 
obligation is involved”). 
146 See id. at 23-43, 87.  Goldsmith and Posner accept the theoretical possibility of 
multilateral customary international law, but are skeptical about whether it can exist in 
practice given that the difficulties in overcoming a bilateral prisoner’s dilemma—that States 
can define cooperation, have low discount rates, expect the game to continue indefinitely, can 
monitor compliance, and that they calculate a net gain from cooperation versus defection—
are all the more pronounced as the number of States increases.  See id. at 35-38.  Goldsmith 
and Posner also accept that multilateral treaties are negotiated, but argue that, after 
negotiation, “states cooperate (or not) in pairs, with each state in a pair complying with the 
common terms as long as the other state in the pair does.”  Id. at 87. 
147 See id. at 59-66. 
148 In this respect, their book is mis-titled.  Goldsmith and Posner focus on the ‘inner’ limits 
of international law by positing that what is traditionally identified as opinio juris or pacta 
sunt servanda can really just be reduced to States’ rational, interest-maximizing choices.  
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rules are different in kind than the private inter se rights and obligations 
established by contract or custom.  Property rules must be held erga omnes 
(or in rem), against and respected by all, or else they may be limited or 
extinguished.  An individual purchaser of land may do so by private contract 
with the prior owner, but the new owner will have to publicly record the 
transaction and fence off the property to defeat others’ prescriptive, adverse, 
or bona fide claims.  Similarly, a nation’s claim to sovereignty and 
international personality may be born from a bilateral compact or 
decolonization, but it will not be secure until respected by neighboring States, 
foreign interests, and, of course, the cartographers. 
Property rules in ocean space are particularly difficult to reconcile with 
an international law modeled only from unilateral acts and inter se 
relationships.  Individual littoral States have an immediate stake in how a 
shared border is delimited, but everyone else also has an interest, albeit more 
diffuse, in the delimitation as well.  States’ distant water flag vessels, for 
example, would need to know in whose jurisdiction and under whose laws 
they are operating.  The is also a generally shared interest in the outer limits 
of coastal States’ jurisdictions because beyond that the ocean commons 
necessarily begins where every State has an interest in seeing that resources 
not be monopolized or degraded. 
UNCLOS attempted to establish true erga omnes property rules for 
ocean space in which the bargained spatial delineations would be agreed to 
and respected by concomitant strong consensus.149  This structure allowed 
the Conference to not only resolve problems lingering from UNCLOS I & II, 
but to settle on rules for issues not even considered during previous 
negotiations.  The most important provisions of UNCLOS codified:  a twelve-
mile territorial sea150 (including for archipelagic States151) and twenty-four-
mile contiguous zone,152 coupled with the right of innocent passage for 
others;153 a 200-mile offshore EEZ;154 marine scientific research freedoms 
even in others’ EEZs;155 access to and from the sea for land-locked States;156 
natural resource rights in the extended continental shelf,157 and the 
                                                                                                                                  
Their “revisionist” analysis, however, dismisses or, in the case of UNCLOS, actually ignores 
those instruments that expand national and international choices and cooperation and thus 
might properly fall at the ‘outer’ limits of international law.  Cf. Oona A. Hathaway & Ariel 
N. Lavinbuk, Rationalism and Revisionism in International Law, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1404 
(2006) (reviewing GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra).  Goldsmith’s and Posner’s book thus more 
properly might be called Limiting International Law. 
149 See generally Buzan, supra. 
150 1982 Convention, supra, art. 3. 
151 Id. arts. 46-49. 
152 Id. art. 33. 
153 Id. arts. 17-26, 45. 
154 Id. arts. 56-57. 
155 Id. Part XIII. 
156 Id. art. 125. 
157 Id. arts. 76-77. 
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corresponding obligation of revenue-sharing;158 the reservation of the 
“common heritage” seabed Area and the establishment of the ISA for its 
mineral resources;159 and expansive freedoms in the high seas.160  States 
assured themselves against unilateral abrogation of these rules by a general 
prohibition on reservations,161 binding dispute settlement for many 
disputes,162 and a prohibition on incompatible inter se agreements.163   
Negotiators were not able to resolve every issue of ocean space, leaving 
some of the more difficult vague or unresolved.164  Others were left to be 
“integrated” or “implemented” by future developments in the law of the 
sea.165  The biggest defect for the original UNCLOS, of course, came from 
                                            
158 Id. art. 82. 
159 Id. Part XI and the 1994 ISA Implementing Agreement. 
160 Id. arts. 87, 116-20. 
161 Id. art. 309.  Article 310 allows States to make declarations or statements “with a view, 
inter alia, to the harmonization of its laws and regulations with the provisions of this 
Convention, provided that such declarations or statements do not purpose to exclude or to 
modify the legal effect of the provisions of this Convention in their application to that State.” 
162 See id. Part XI, Section 5; & Part XV.  Arvid Pardo in his critical 1983 “preliminary 
appraisal” described the UNCLOS dispute settlement system as “the most flexible, 
comprehensive and binding system of dispute settlement contained in any general 
international convention.”  Pardo, 1983 Preliminary Appraisal, supra, at 491.  But certain 
important types of disputes may be insusceptible to binding dispute resolution.  Alan Boyle 
has noted that States left room for themselves to avoid binding resolution, or even 
conciliation, of sensitive fishing and scientific research disputes in the EEZ.  See Alan E. 
Boyle, Dispute Settlement and the Law of the Sea Convention:  Problems of Fragmentation 
and Jurisdiction, 46 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 37, 42-44 (1997) [hereinafter “Boyle, Fragmentation 
and Jurisdiction”].  Boyle has also argued that possibly all disputes involving delimitation of 
the continental shelf beyond the EEZ are beyond the jurisdiction of any binding dispute 
settlement.  See id. at 44-46.  For a contrary view, see infra n.239.  Cf. Rosemary Rayfuse, 
The Future of Compulsory Dispute Settlement Under the Law of the Sea Convention, 36 VICT. 
U. WELLINGTON L. REV. 683, 703-06 (2005) [hereinafter “Rayfuse”].  Rayfuse finds dispute 
settlement gaps with respect to declarations avoiding jurisdiction (including Australia’s 
refusal to submit continental shelf claims, including to Antarctica, to outside settlement), 
other purportedly self-contained regimes concerning overlapping subject-matter (such as 
possible coextensive WTO jurisdiction over any attempts to extend domestic environmental 
protection measures to areas beyond national jurisdictions), and parallel, and possibly 
preclusive, procedures under other treaties.  Regarding the latter, Rayfuse cites, the 
Southern Bluefin Tuna and MOX Plant arbitrations which, after initial findings of prima 
facie UNCLOS jurisdiction by ITLOS, the arbitrators found that the later-in-time and more 
specialized (though not binding) measures prescribed by the Convention on Biological 
Diversity and other treaties precluded the binding dispute settlement for fisheries and 
marine environment disputes under UNCLOS. 
163 1982 Convention, supra, art. 311(3).  See also Caminos & Molitor, supra, at 563-64. 
164 See generally Pardo, 1983 Preliminary Appraisal, supra, at 492-96. 
165 UNCLOS incorporates prior nonconflicting law and embraces subsequent developments 
refining or expanding on the law of the sea.  See 1982 Convention, supra, pmbl. ¶ 8 (“matters 
not regulated by this Convention continue to be governed by the rules and principles of 
general international law”); & art. 311.  UNCLOS Article 311, “Relation to other conventions 
and international agreements,” expressly supercedes only the 1958 Geneva Conventions and, 
rather than claiming to be ‘self-contained’, UNCLOS otherwise has an “integrated” 
relationship with other sources of international law.  See Boyle, supra, at 565-56. 
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opposition over Part XI by the United States and other industrialized 
countries.  These countries attempted to establish a competing mining regime 
that would be more decentralized and impose fewer production quotas, 
subsidies, and technology transfers.166  But potential conflicts between the 
competing arrangements also frustrated a secure property rights framework 
in which mining ventures could be undertaken and thereby necessitated the 
1994 ISA Implementing Agreement.167  While this Agreement was not 
adopted according to the requirement of consensus procedures for any 
subsequent protocol conferences,168 it has the critical effect of adding the 
signature of the United States—and accession by the likes of the United 
Kingdom, France, Germany, and Russia—to the overall UNCLOS regime.  
The Agreement abrogated many of the operating provisions most problematic 
for industrialized countries, while retaining the basic status of res publica for 
the deep seabed and its mineral resources. 
UNCLOS since its adoption regularly has been host to organic 
legislative growth by strong consensus.  Although some States have stated 
objections to substantive debate or decision-making at the annual States 
Parties meeting (“SPLOS”),169 they agreed by consensus at their 2001 
meeting to effectively extend for an additional five years the time allowed for 
coastal States to prepare and make their extended continental shelf 
submissions to the CLCS.170  States Parties took this action out of necessity 
because the CLCS had not adopted the Scientific and Technical Guidelines on 
which submissions would be reviewed until May 1999, and this late date 
made the original 2004 deadline unreasonable.  Also, developing and small-
island States in particular171 expressed concern over the technical and 
                                            
166 See generally KLEIN, supra, at 336-46. 
167 See id. at 341-46.  Here Klein recounts a number of difficulties with the alternate seabed 
mining regime.  Both UNCLOS and the alternate regime were theoretically applicable to a 
mining operation and would have provided potentially conflicting rules and dispute 
settlement procedures if, for example, a mining corporation from a non-UNCLOS country 
entered into a reciprocal agreement for a seabed operation with an entity from a State Party.  
The final Chairman of the Conference, Ambassador Tommy Koh of Singapore, even 
threatened to bring a case before the ICJ should any State’s national engage in mining 
outside the original Part XI framework.  See also Wertenbaker II, supra, at 82. 
168 See 1982 Convention, supra, art. 312.  The 1994 Implementing Agreement was rather a 
modification and extrapolation of the Convention under more general principles of 
international law.  See Freestone & Elferink, supra, at 170-71. 
169 See 1982 Convention, supra, art. 319(2)(e); & Treves, supra, at 61-65. 
170 See UN Doc. SPLOS/72 (29 May 2001).  Article 4 of UNCLOS Annex II provided an 
original deadline of “within 10 years of the entry into force of this Convention for that State,” 
which at the earliest would have been 16 November 2004, ten years after UNCLOS entered 
into force on 16 November 1994.  This SPLOS decision, however, changed the start-date for 
the 10-year submissions period to 13 May 1999 when the CLCS adopted its Scientific and 
Technical Guidelines, to which States and the CLCS would make and evaluate submissions.  
The current earliest submission deadline, applicable to the States Parties as of the date of 
the SPLOS decision, is thus 13 May 2009. 
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scientific difficulties they faced in meeting the original deadline.172  These 
issues are taken up extensively in Part III. 
Consensus has also been carried forward by the General Assembly’s 
annual law of the sea resolutions.173  One substantive result was the 
consensus prohibition on large-scale pelagic driftnet fishing in the high 
seas.174  This practice involves suspending nets that can be several miles long 
in waters to catch whatever swims by (in the hope of netting tuna, but too 
often getting whales and other bycatch).  This ban evolved over a series of 
General Assembly resolutions, adopted by consensus, that made specific 
reference to UNCLOS.175  Despite the general provision in UNCLOS for 
“freedom” of fishing, the General Assembly recognized that driftnet fishing 
“can be a highly indiscriminate and wasteful fishing method that is widely 
considered to threaten the effective conservation of living marine 
resources.”176  The resolutions proceeded to call for increased cooperation, 
study, reporting, and a phased-in moratorium on the practice.177  A similar 
progression may now be occurring with respect to the fishing practice of 
unregulated deep seas bottom trawling—a development that is taken up 
extensively in Part IV(C).178 
                                                                                                                                  
171 See, e.g., Position Paper on the Time Frame for Submissions to the Commission on the 
Limits of the Continental Shelf (submitted by Australia, Fiji, Marshall Islands, Federated 
States of Micronesia, Nauru, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, 
Tonga, and Vanuatu), UN Doc. SPLOS/67 (10 May 2001). 
172 For an account of the negotiations leading to the deadline extension, see generally Division 
for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, Issues with Respect to Article 4 of Annex II to the 
Convention (Ten-Year Time Limit for Submissions), available at 
<http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/issues_ten_years.htm>. 
173 The most recent Sustainable Fisheries resolution, for example, was adopted by consensus 
and the most recent omnibus Oceans resolution was adopted by a vote of 141 in favor to 1 
against (Turkey), with 4 abstentions.  See Press Release, GA/10426, 56th & 57th Meetings, 
Plenary, Annex, (29 Nov. 2005), available at 
<http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2005/ga10426.doc.htm>.  See also Tullio Treves, The 
General Assembly and the Meeting of States Parties in the Implementation of the LOS 
Convention, in STABILITY AND CHANGE IN THE LAW OF THE SEA:  THE ROLE OF THE LOS 
CONVENTION 55, 66-74 (ALEX G. OUDE ELFERINK ed. 2005) [hereinafter “Treves”]. 
174 See Treves, supra, at 66-67; & Donald R. Rothwell, The General Assembly Ban on Driftnet 
Fishing, in COMMITMENT AND COMPLIANCE:  THE ROLE OF NON-BINDING NORMS IN THE 
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM 121, 145 (DINAH SHELTON ed., 2000) [hereinafter “Rothwell”].  
For a critical view, see William T. Burke et al., United Nations Resolutions on Driftnet 
Fishing:  An Unsustainable Precedent for High Seas and Coastal Management, 25 OCEAN 
DEV. & INT’L L. 127 (1994). 
175 UN Doc. A/RES/44/225 pmbl. ¶¶ 7, 10 (1989); UN Doc. A/RES/45/197 pmbl. ¶ 3 (1990); & 
UN Doc. A/RES/46/215 pmbl. ¶ 3 (1991). 
176 UN Doc. A/RES/44/225 pmbl. ¶ 2 (1989). 
177 Id. ¶ 4; & UN Doc. A/RES/46/215 ¶ 3(c) (1991). 
178 See UN Doc. A/RES/59/25 ¶¶ 66-71 (2004); UN Doc. A/RES/60/31 ¶¶ 69-74 (2005).  Bottom 
trawling is a fishing practice by which weighted nets are scraped across seamounts to catch 
the fish living above.  The practice, and the response of States to it under the UNCLOS 
regime is discussed in depth in Part IV(C). 
 32 
 
Thus UNCLOS represents both new directions for the bargained law of 
the sea and a necessary consensus instrument for constituting property rules 
for ocean space.  With age and practice it has so far accommodated reforms 
and legal developments by States’ consensus.  The rest of this paper takes up 
some of the important challenges to UNCLOS that are just now ripening. 
Part III.  Meeting the Legal and Implementation Challenges of 
Article 76:  SIDS as Ridge Laboratories or Canaries in the 
Continental Shelf Coal Mine? 
The offshore resources of the seabed and subsoil have been used and 
exploited by humans for thousands of years.179  They have been subject to 
coastal States’ various claims for nearly as long.  Since Truman’s 
Proclamation, the ‘continental shelf’ has come to mark the property line 
separating coastal States’ jurisdictions from the commons beyond.  But 
defining the legal continental shelf has been more problematic.  
Consternation over the vague and permissive 1958 Geneva Convention, as 
well as greater human understandings of ocean geology, processes, and 
resources,180 instigated a new regime in UNCLOS.  UNCLOS reached 
consensus over the continental shelf by balancing extended coastal margins, 
limited by definite legalized scientific and technical formulae, with a robust 
commons beyond.181 
But implementation of Article 76 is off track.  The first continental 
shelf claim submission deadline faced by the 129 early-adopter States Parties 
is 13 May 2009.182  But, out of the 60 or more countries183 that could 
                                            
179 See generally Victor Prescott, Resources of the Continental Margin and International Law, 
in COOK & CARLETON, supra, at 64-81.  Although fisheries, ecosystems, and other raw 
materials are important continental shelf resources, hydrocarbons formed from organic 
continental sediments in the continental shelf are potentially far more economically 
valuable.  Id. at 75.  Waste disposal on the continental shelf has also been an issue for 
coastal State jurisdiction.  Id. at 80-81. 
180 Peter J. Cook & Chris M. Carleton, Introduction, in COOK & CARLETON, supra, at 3-5. 
181 See discussion supra Part II(A). 
182 See supra, Part II(B), and accompanying text, and discussion infra Part III(A). 
183 The number of States that have a potential extended continental shelf claim has 
continually increased since UNCLOS was adopted both as more is known about the 
geography and geomorphology of the seabed and as new coastal States have come into being.  
The UN Secretariat in 1978 estimated 33 eligible coastal States.  Victor Prescott later 
estimated 56 potentially eligible coastal States.  And most recently Galo Carrera has 
estimated 91 bases for extended continental shelf claims.  See United Nations Convention on 
the Law of the Sea and the Delineation of the Continental Shelf:  Opportunities and 
Challenges for States, at 31, 83, available at 
<http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/documents/clcsopen.htm>.  The CLCS envisions a 
scenario of 59 potentially eligible States, 50 of which may have a 2009 deadline.  See UN Doc. 
SPLOS/135 at 14 (25 July 2005).  This may still underestimate the number of potential 
claims as Carrera does not list Palau, for example, with its Palau ridge as among the 
countries that might have a claim under Article 76. 
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potentially claim an extended continental shelf,184 only six submissions so far 
have been made to the CLCS.185  Only one of these—by Brazil—is from G77 
developing country and no small island developing State (“SIDS”) has yet 
made a submission.  And the full Article 76 mechanism has yet to be tested 
by any State actually depositing its “final and binding” delineation with the 
Secretary-General, or by exercising its jurisdiction  in the extended 
continental shelf area. 
Maritime boundaries have been a persistent source of conflict and, 
given the stakes—approximately 25% of the seabed is potentially claimable 
as continental shelf186—it is not unreasonable to expect additional difficulties 
as Article 76 is implemented into the international order.  In replacing 
‘exploitability’ and the quasi-legal system of unilateralist and inter se claims, 
Article 76 brings its own challenges for both international law and science.  
If, for example, a State misses the 2009 deadline does it prejudice any claim 
to an extended continental shelf in favor of the more general interest in the 
seabed “common heritage”?  What if the scientists who compose the CLCS 
make a legal interpretation of Article 76 that prejudices a coastal State’s 
asserted rights and obligations under UNCLOS?  And, if in the meantime an 
oil well is prospected in a marginal area that may or may not be claimed as 
legal shelf, would drilling fall under UNCLOS Part VI or Part XI? 
Uncertainty over these and other questions187 by themselves may not 
engender the same level of concern as did ‘exploitability’ from the Geneva 
Convention.  Nevertheless, conflict over erga omnes rights at any delineation 
line necessarily affects every State and may set the precedent for 
fragmentation and an undermining of the whole regime.  This Part analyzes 
the most likely candidates for implementation difficulties and legal conflict 
over Article 76:  SIDS, who face both the legally and politically controversial 
“ridge issues”188 as well as a relative lack of capacity to satisfy them.  What is 
needed is directed attention by consensus to the special situation faced by 
SIDS with respect to Article 76, and a move to a more active role by DOALOS 
and the CLCS to achieve a viable delineation process. 
                                            
184 The term ‘extended continental shelf’ nowhere exists in UNCLOS, but it is used here for 
simplicity to refer to the seabed and subsoil claimable beyond 200 miles as a coastal State’s 
“natural prolongation” under Article 76. 
185 Up-to-date information on States’ continental shelf submissions can be found at the CLCS 
website:  <http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/clcs_home.htm>. 
186 Peter J. Cook & Chris M. Carleton, Introduction, in COOK & CARLETON, supra, at 3 
[hereinafter “Cook & Carleton”].  The authors estimate the total area within the 200-mile 
default continental shelf and EEZ to be about 60 million square km. (20% total ocean area) 
with perhaps an additional 5% (15 million square km.) claimable via Article 76, not including 
the Antarctic.  Id. 
187 This paper does not even address the intractable questions about Antarctica and the 
relationship between UNCLOS and the Convention to the Southern Ocean.  See Zinchenko, 
supra, at 241-45. 
188 See generally Philip A. Symonds et al., Ridge Issues, in COOK & CARLETON, supra, at 285 
[hereinafter “Symonds et al.”]. 
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A.  “Implementing” Article 76:  The Definition, Delineation, and Difficulties of the Legal 
Continental Shelf under UNCLOS 
In a masterfully rich package, Article 76 codifies a legal continental 
shelf definition relying on scientific and technical determinations of distance, 
geomorphology, and geology.189  It presents a positive yet circumscribed 
definition and a scientific-technical process with the CLCS to “implement”190 
the “correct”191 delineation accordingly.  (Delimitation between opposite or 
adjacent States is instead left to “equitable” “agreement on the basis of 
international law.”192)  Yet science has both costs and limits when it comes to 
establishing an effective legal order. 
1.  Definition, Rights, and Obligations in the UNCLOS Continental Shelf 
Article 76 first provides that the legal continental shelf is comprised by 
the “sea-bed and subsoil” that “extend” “throughout the natural prolongation” 
of a coastal State’s “land territory.”193  This differentiates the shelf in basic 
terms from the superjacent waters and from the deep ocean floor beyond.  It 
also codifies the “natural prolongation” definition first appearing in the 1969 
Continental Shelf Cases.  “Natural prolongation” is deemed to extend either 
to a default 200-mile legal continental shelf,194 or beyond this to the “outer 
edge of the continental margin.”  Article 76(3) defines “continental margin” as 
comprising the “submerged prolongation of the land mass of the coastal 
State” (while excluding “the deep ocean floor with its oceanic ridges”).  
“Submerged prolongation of the land mass” of the coastal State is thus 
narrower than “natural prolongation of its land territory,” since the latter 
includes this 200-mile default regardless of the geology or geomorphology of 
the land mass itself.  Article 76(4) provides that fixed points of the 
                                            
189For a detailed and comprehensive account of the development of Article 76, see generally II 
UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA 1982:  A COMMENTARY 837-83 (SATYA 
N. NANDAN et al. eds. 1993) [hereinafter “II UNCLOS COMMENTARY”].  See also Wertenbaker 
I, supra, 57-58. For a description of the relevance of the different scientific branches, see Galo 
Carrera, Wide Continental Margins of the World:  A Survey of Marine Scientific 
Requirements Posed by the Implementation of Article 76 of the United Nations Convention on 
the Law of the Sea, 3, paper presented at 1999 ABLOS Conference, Monaco (9 Sept.), 
available at <http://www.gmat.unsw.edu.au/ablos/ABLOS99Folder/ablos99_papers.htm>.  
(Carrera is a member of the CLCS.)  ‘Geomorphology’ is the physical and quantitative “study 
of the forms of the land’s surface and of the processes that mold them.”  Geography, 
ENCYLOPÆDIA BRITANNICA ONLINE, retrieved 10 Apr. 2006, available at 
<http://ezproxy.nyu.edu:2055/eb/article-32053>.  ‘Geology’ is broader; the “scientific study of 
the Earth, including its composition, structure, physical properties, and history.”  Id., 
available at <http://ezproxy.nyu.edu:2055/eb/article-9036467>.  Carrera also identifies 
“hydrography” as among the scientific and technical considerations, though this might also 
just be thought of as a variation on a distance criterion. 
190 Cook & Carleton, supra, at 5. 
191 Zinchenko, supra, at 226. 
192 1982 Convention, supra, art. 83(1).  See also infra n.239 and accompanying text. 
193 1982 Convention, supra, art. 76(1) (emphasis added). 
194 Compare id. art. 57 with art. 76(1).  See also II UNCLOS COMMENTARY, supra, at 874. 
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“continental margin” not more than 60 miles apart may be calculated by two 
alternate and geomorphologic and geologic195 formulae and three different 
limits.  The “Irish” formula196 places the “outer limit” out to where often 
hydrocarbon-rich sediments have settled down the continental margin in 
detectable thicknesses, while the “Hedberg” formula197 calculates the “foot of 
the continental slope” to estimate where the land mass begins its rise from 
the deep ocean floor.198  This extended continental shelf can exist out to up to 
350 miles or 100 miles from the 2,500 meter isobath, except for “ridge” claims 
that are limited to just 350 miles.199 
Coastal States enjoy “exclusive,” “sovereign” erga omnes rights to 
explore and exploit “natural resources” or to “drill” in the extended 
continental shelf.200  This is an economic and regulatory jurisdiction.  But 
these extended rights are characteristically balanced by negotiated 
concessions.  Rights in an extended continental shelf do not extend to, and 
may not prejudice, the superjacent high seas.201   Extended continental shelf 
mining operations are subject to equitable revenue-sharing obligations 
through the ISA.202  And the extended continental shelf is circumscribed by a 
definite “outer limit.” which, if extending beyond the default 200 miles, is to 
                                            
195 The relative importance of geology versus geomorphology in Article 76 has been the 
subject of much thoughtful and complex discussion in the literature, particularly as regards 
the methods of proof required to adequately measure the foot-of-slope (i.e., geomorphic “point 
of maximum change in the gradient at its base” or the more geologic “evidence to the 
contrary” of Article 76(4)(b)).  Compare Steinar Thor Gundlaugsson, Natural Prolongation 
and the Concept of the Continental Margin for the Purposes of Article 76, in NORDQUIST et al., 
supra, at 61 (arguing that the Article 76 formulae are primarily geomorphic) [hereinafter 
“Gundlaugsson”]; with Richard T. Haworth, Determination of the Foot of the Continental 
Slope by Means of Evidence to the Contrary to the General Rule, in NORDQUIST et al., 121, 
123-27 (observing that the CLCS Guidelines embody a complicated and even rather confused 
mix of geologic and geomorphologic considerations in interpreting the two formulae) 
[hereinafter “Haworth”].  See also, e.g., Nuno Marques Antunes & Fernando Maia Pimentel, 
Reflecting on the Legal-Technical Interface of Article 76 of the LOSC:  Tentative Thoughts on 
Practical Implementation, 10-16, presented at ABLOS Conference, Monaco (29 Oct. 2003), 
available at <http://www.gmat.unsw.edu.au/ablos/ABLOS03Folder/ablos03_papers.htm> 
[hereinafter “Antunes & Pimentel”]; Dave Monahan, Determination of the Foot of the 
Continental Slope as the Point of Maximum Change in the Gradient at Its Base, in 
NORDQUIST et al., supra, at 91.  This discussion will lead to many difficult scientific and legal 
debates by countries preparing submissions and throughout the CLCS process, most of which 
are beyond the scope of this paper.  The discussion is most acute in the context of ridge 
issues, which are dealt with for SIDS in Part III(B). 
196 Article 76(4)(i). 
197 Article 76(4)(ii). 
198 See Smith & Taft, supra, at 19. 
199 See 1982 Convention, supra, arts. 76(3), (5), & (6). 
200 Id. arts. 77 & 81. 
201 Id. art. 78.  For a brief discussion of the negotiation of this Article, see John Norton Moore, 
Overview of the UNCLOS Negotiations, in NORDQUIST et al., 13, 15. 
202 1982 Convention, supra, art. 81.  Article 82(1) actually provides for extended continental 
shelf revenue sharing from “non-living resources,” whereas Part XI is concerned with 
“mineral resource” exploitation.  See infra Part IV(A). 
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be delineated in good faith according to the legal-scientific process established 
by Article 76.203 
2.  The Scientific and Legal Challenges of the Delineation Process 
The three stages of this delineation process—submission preparation, 
CLCS review, and delineation deposit—operate like inverted notice-comment-
rulemaking and each pose distinct scientific and legal challenges.  Perhaps 
the most poignant difficulty for States’ good faith preparation of submissions 
comes from the UNCLOS deadline for doing so.204  The original submission 
deadline was in 2004, but SPLOS by consensus extended this to 13 May 2009 
for States who were Parties to UNCLOS by 13 May 1999 when the CLCS 
published its Scientific and Technical Guidelines.205  States acceding to 
UNCLOS thereafter continue to have a due date ten years after accession.206  
Although 2009 is still a few years away, continental shelf submissions take 
years of work and great expense and expertise to prepare.207 
A Norwegian NGO, GRID-Arendal, that works with DOALOS and 
UNEP to provide services to developing countries has identified the different 
phases involved throughout the Article 76 process.208  The preparatory 
“scanning” and “desktop” phases involve the coastal State building 
familiarity with Article 76 and identifying, accessing, and analyzing relevant, 
available geoscientific data to ascertain whether the country may have a 
claim worth pursuing at all.  Every State that could have an extended 
continental shelf claim would seem to be under a good faith obligation to at 
least undertake a desktop study.209  Even a very small desktop study is likely 
to cost upwards of US $250,000.210  But if extensive data is already available, 
a well done desktop study can supplant much of the work of the next two 
phases—“data acquisition” and “data interpretation”—which are where the 
real heavy (and expensive) science plays its part.  Measuring depth and slope 
                                            
203 Article 76(8), together with Annex II, provides the basic process. 
204 Good faith is a general requirement of international law and is reaffirmed in UNCLOS 
Article 300. 
205 See UN Doc. SPLOS/72 (29 May 2001).   
206 See 1982 Convention, supra, Annex II art. 4. 
207 To give just a basic physical sense of the task, the recent Australian submission took over 
ten years of work by its Attorney-General and Departments of Geoscience, Foreign Affairs, 
and Environment and Heritage concerning a claimed area of 3,372,000 square kilometers 
(including a plurality of Antarctica); the submission required some 700 kilograms (1540 
pounds) of paper just to print.  See AUSTRALIA ATTORNEY-GENERAL, ANNUAL REPORT 2004-05, 
68 (2005).  While Australia is perhaps an extreme example, from UNCLOS’s entry into force 
it took Ireland took nine years to complete its submission while Brazil took sixteen, and so 
the difficulty of the task must not be underestimated—particularly for those without the 
resources of larger or more developed countries. 
208 See <http://www.continentalshelf.org/>. 
209 UNCLOS Article 76(7) provides that coastal States “shall delineate” any extended 
continental shelf while Article 300 requires that all such obligations be performed in good 
faith. 
210 This will be the approximate cost of Palau’s desktop study with GRID-Arendal. 
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will usually involve a combination of multibeam sonar and satellite sea 
surface altimetry.211  Sediment thickness (the other main criterion for 
determining the continental shelf’s legal outer limits) can be measured by a 
variety of means, including seismic reflection and refraction (using near-
surface artificial explosions to generate a wave whose properties are recorded 
as it impacts with the seabed),212 or by coring and sampling the seabed.213  
Other techniques could include determinations of crustal type (continental 
versus oceanic214) by means of satellite and aerial gravity and magnetic data-
gathering.215 
When the data acquisition and interpretation phases are completed, a 
submission can finally be prepared for CLCS review.  The CLCS is to 
“consider,” “make recommendations,” and provide requested scientific and 
technical “advice” regarding coastal States’ continental shelf submissions on 
the basis of its Scientific and Technical Guidelines and Rules of Procedure.216  
If the State disagrees with the recommendations, it “shall” make a revised 
submission to the CLCS for reconsideration.217  This process could repeat any 
number of times until the State deposits its delineation.218 
The 21-member CLCS has a unique role in international law.  It has 
been characterized variously as a “canary in the mineshaft,” “policeman,” 
“watchdog,”219 and “legitimator” of would-be extended continental shelf 
claims.220  It is not an adversarial or adjudicatory body with competence to 
                                            
211 See generally John Hughes Clarke, Present-Day Methods of Depth Measurement, in COOK 
& CARLETON, supra, 139.  On interpretation, see generally David Monahan, Interpretation of 
Bathymetry, in COOK & CARLETON, supra, at 160. 
212 See generally Shigeru Kasuga et al., Seismic Reflection and Refraction Methods, in COOK 
& CARLETON, supra, 177. 
213 See generally Dennis A. Ardus et al., Geological Techniques, in COOK & CARLETON, supra, 
214. 
214 The relevance of crustal types, particularly with respect to Article 76(3) & (6), are 
discussed more fully infra Part III(B). 
215 See generally Richard M. Carruthers & John D. Cornwell, Gravity and Magnetic Methods, 
in COOK & CARLETON, supra, 194. 
216 1982 Convention, supra, art. 76(8) & Annex II art. 3.  See also SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL 
GUIDELINES OF THE COMMISSION ON THE LIMITS OF THE CONTINENTAL SHELF, UN Doc. 
CLCS/11, at 7 (13 May 1999) [hereinafter “SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL GUIDELINES”]; & 
RULES OF PROCEDURE OF THE COMMISSION ON THE LIMITS OF THE CONTINENTAL SHELF, UN 
Doc. CLCS/40 (2 July 2004) [hereinafter “RULES OF PROCEDURE”]. 
217 Id. Annex II art. 8.   
218 This back-and-forth with the CLCS has been aptly described as a “narrowing down ‘ping-
pong’ procedure.”  McDorman, supra, at 306 (quoting P.R.R. Gardiner, The Limits of the Area 
Beyond National Jurisdiction—Some Problems with Particular References to the Role of the 
Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, in MARITIME BOUNDARIES AND OCEAN 
RESOURCES 69 (GERALD BLAKE ed. 1987).  See also Smith & Taft, supra, at 20. 
219 Peter F. Croker, The Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf:  Progress to Date 
and Future Challenges, in NORDQUIST et al., supra, 215, 221. 
220 Ted L. McDorman, the Role of the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf:  A 
Technical Body in a Political World, 17 INT’L J. MARINE & COASTAL L. 310, 319-21 (2002) 
[hereinafter “McDorman”]. 
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prescribe a binding boundary.221  Nor is it like other legal “non-compliance” 
mechanisms that are engaged in a corrective or punitive manner when a 
State has not satisfied its international commitments.222  The CLCS is to be 
composed exclusively of “experts in the field of geology, geophysics or 
hydrography” from an “equitable geographical representation.”223  (It is 
telling, in fact, that none of the CLCS members have any formal legal 
training.224)  Although the turn to science was intended to depoliticize 
delineation, the CLCS process is still, in the words of two respected 
practitioners (one lawyer, one scientist), “dependent on the knowledge, the 
experience, and occasionally the bias of the scientist involved.”225 
It is difficult at this stage to assess as a general matter whether 
scientific-administrative bodies can be counted on to effectively oversee 
unilateral property claims in an international legal order.  So far only six 
submissions have been made and no State has yet deposited its “final and 
binding” extended continental shelf delineation with the Secretary-General.  
There is room for optimism, however, about the envisaged scientific back-
and-forth between the submitting State and the CLCS as Russia is in the 
midst of substantially revising its 2001 submission on the basis of CLCS 
recommendations and Brazil has submitted supplementary information 
regarding some of its more problematic fixed reference points.226 
Yet the CLCS has taken steps of its own to obscure how it formulates 
its recommendations.  Sessions of the CLCS are generally closed to all but 
the State whose submission is being considered.227  The CLCS considers itself 
bound by States’ requests to keep their submissions information 
confidential,228 which has the effect also of stripping any details of the 
                                            
221 See Smith & Taft, supra, at 20. 
222 See generally Martti Koskenniemi, Breach of Treaty or Non-Compliance?  Reflections on 
the Enforcement of the Montreal Protocol, 3 Y.B. INT’L ENVTL. L. 123 (1992). 
223 See 1982 Convention, supra, Annex II art. 2(1). 
224 See Note by the Secretary-General, Curricula Vitae of Candidates Nominated by States 
Parties for Election to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, UN Doc. 
SPLOS/81 (20 Mar. 2002).  Several of the CLCS members have published articles and 
attended conferences dealing with the law of Article 76 and continental shelf delineation.  
But the CLCS members by their education, training, and professional experience are 
emphatically scientific, not legal, experts.  Cf. Cook & Carleton, supra, at 6. 
225 Cook & Carleton, supra, at 6. 
226 Information on the recommendations on Russia’s submission as well as the additional 
information submitted by Brazil to modify its submission can be found at the CLCS website.  
See <http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/clcs_home.htm>. 
227 See RULES OF PROCEDURE, supra, Rules 23 & 52. 
228 See id. Annex II.  UNCLOS, however, nowhere requires the CLCS to respect requests for 
confidentiality.  The CLCS did ask States Parties at their eighth meeting to consider the 
CLCS confidentiality rules in conjunction with the issue of privileges and immunities of 
CLCS members, particularly when dealing with confidential information.  See UN Doc. 
SPLOS/26 ¶ 2 (12 Mar. 1998).  Yet neither does the Convention on the Privileges and 
Immunities of the United Nations requires confidentiality, nor do the CLCS Rules of 
Procedure specify any guidelines for what kind of information merits confidentiality. 
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CLCS’s deliberations from the public executive summaries of its 
recommendations.229  This confidentiality policy seems squarely at odds with 
the obligation that States publish and disseminate knowledge resulting from 
marine scientific research.230  The CLCS also refuses to consider written 
interventions by States that are not opposite or adjacent to the submitting 
State.231  These policies only make it more difficult for other States to 
contribute to and learn from others’ submissions about how the best science 
should be brought to bear in support of different types of claims. 
Without more practice and transparency, it is similarly difficult to 
assess the efficacy of the CLCS in interpreting and applying international 
law.  Despite its turn to science, Article 76 is not free from legal ambiguities 
that the CLCS will have to confront in making its recommendations.232  Yet it 
remains to be seen what kind of margin of appreciation States will tolerate by 
this scientific-technical body—especially where the Commission’s 
interpretation of legal provisions might prejudice what a coastal State views 
as part of its “inherent” rights or what others may view as “common 
heritage.”  This is likely to become an issue in weighing geology versus 
geomorphology for preparing and evaluating foot-of-slope calculations and 
ridge claims.233   
The final component of the Article 76 process involves a State’s “final 
and binding” continental shelf outer limit delineation done “on the basis” of 
the CLCS’s recommendations.234  This is where erga omnes rights claimed 
under Article 76 will really be tested.  No State yet has deposited its 
delineation with the Secretary-General and so it is again impossible at this 
point to assess the success of Article 76 holistically or in any individual case.  
It is foreseeable, however, that conflict could arise where a coastal State and 
                                            
229 See RULES OF PROCEDURE, supra, at 23. 
230 See 1982 Convention, supra, art. 244.  Article 246(6) could be read to allow coastal States 
to withhold such information in areas “at any time publicly designate . . . areas in which 
exploitation or detailed exploratory operations focused on those areas are occurring or will 
occur within a reasonable period of time.”  Yet the CLCS Rules of Procedure nowhere 
mention this requirement, and submitting States that have apparently made private 
requests to the CLCS to keep data confidential have not yet made any such public 
designation under this Article. 
231 See UN Docs. CLCS/42 ¶ 17 (14 Sept. 2004) & CLCS/44 ¶ 17 (3 May 2005). 
232 It has been suggested, for example, that the Convention should have provided that some 
of the commissioners be lawyers.  See Zinchenko, supra, at 229 (citing L.D.M. Nelson, The 
Continental Shelf:  Interplay of Law and Science, in 2 LIBER AMICORUM JUDGE SHIGERU ODA 
301 (2002)). 
233 See discussion, infra, Part III(B).  On foot-of-slope issues, see generally Haworth, supra, 
123-29, 135-36.  But cf. SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL GUIDELINES, supra, Guideline 5.1.3 
(“interpret[ing]” the “general rule” for calculating foot of slope to be the determination of the 
point of maximum change in gradient per the second clause of Article 76(4)(b), rather than 
“evidence to the contrary” provided for in the first clause).  On the relative importance of 
geology or geomorphology in determining whether an extended continental shelf exists at all 
for ridge claims, see generally Antunes & Pimentel, supra. 
234 1982 Convention, supra, art. 76(8). 
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its opposite, adjacent, and distant-water colleagues disagree over whether the 
delineation is appropriately “base[d]” on the CLCS recommendations and 
thus undoubtedly “final and binding.”235  The self-imposed secrecy under 
which the CLCS operates is further likely to muddle these assessments.  
Further, given the late date and sophisticated science involved, the 2009 
submissions deadline could be missed by any number of developing and small 
island States. 
The test for Article 76 would then be whether and how it 
accommodates agreement in the face of implementation difficulties and legal 
disputes.  Consensus decision-making is one approach already taken:  States 
Parties agreed to allow an additional five years for many coastal States to 
prepare their CLCS submissions.236  Another possibility could be dispute 
settlement, though any assertion of binding jurisdiction would likely meet 
resistance.237  A third approach might be for the ISA or any other State to 
invoke breach and international responsibility for any undue appropriation 
erga omnes of the res publica Area.238  The rest of this Part is devoted to 
                                            
235 See McDorman, supra, at 317-18. 
236 See UN Doc. SPLOS/72. 
237 A coastal State’s rights to the continental shelf have long been viewed as “inherent” and 
independent of external validation and the ICJ’s inter se view on standing has been taken to 
suggest that States may exempt themselves from binding dispute settlement over 
continental shelf delineation altogether.  See UN Doc. SPLOS/64 ¶¶ 38 & 42 (1 May 2001); 
Smith & Taft, supra, at 19-20; & Boyle, Fragmentation and Jurisdiction, 45-46.  Cf. 1982 
Convention, supra, art. 77(3).  However, “outer limit” delineation is not a dispute type 
expressly listed in UNCLOS as among those from which States may opt-out of adjudication.  
UNCLOS Article 298(1)(a)(i) allows States to opt out of binding settlement for “disputes 
concerning the interpretation or application of articles 15, 74 and 83 relating to sea boundary 
delimitations” (emphasis added).  Boyle notes that this by no means guarantees a binding 
settlement to delimitation between opposite or adjacent coastal States.  See Boyle, 
Fragmentation and Jurisdiction, supra, at 44-46.  Boyle here also rejects the possibility of 
binding jurisdiction for States and/or the ISA before the ICJ or ITLOS under the general 
Part XV dispute settlement provisions, and also the possibility of compulsory jurisdiction 
under the Seabed Disputes Chamber because such a submission would not involve the 
“interpretation or application” of Part XI.  See 1982 Convention, supra, art. 187(a).  But 
Boyle goes a step further and also asserts that Article 298 allows States to opt-out of binding 
jurisdiction for disputes “at the outer margins of maritime boundaries” (such as between the 
continental shelf and seabed Area)  Id. at 45-46.  However, Article 298 allows opting-out of 
disputes concerning Articles 15, 74, and 83 only, which concern only “delimitation” of 
maritime boundaries for opposite or adjacent States.  These three referenced articles are in 
fact silent about delineation of the outer edge of an continental shelf vis-à-vis the Area.  See 
McDorman, supra, at 317-19.  “Delimitation” appears elsewhere in UNCLOS, but only with 
reference to internal or territorial waters and for disputes over opposite or adjacent States’ 
maritime boundaries; see Arts. 15, 50, 74, 76(10) 83, 84(1), & 134(4).  “Delineation” appears 
essentially only with reference to “the outer limits” of the continental shelf, particularly in 
Article 76(7).  This suggests that States cannot opt-out of “outer limit” delineation disputes 
by Article 298(1)(a)(i).  The question of who would have standing to bring a binding 
adjudication for delineation disputes is taken up in the next note. 
238 The St. Pierre and Miquelon Arbitration (Canada v. France), 95 I.L.R. 543 (1992), 
contemplated that intervention by the ISA was necessary for any adjudication that would 
delineate the outer limits of the continental shelf.  Without ISA intervention or CLCS 
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expounding on a particular set of difficulties facing SIDS and the 
preferability of consensus and concerted action to sustain Article 76. 
B.  The Precarious Position of SIDS Under Article 76 
Islands are like stitches in the sea; neither continent nor ocean, they 
mark the rifts in both.  This is also why islands are likely to be at the center 
of Article 76 delineation problems—islands were not well represented at 
UNCLOS III and their tricky geologies and geomorphologies are not neatly 
provided for in Article 76.  Yet islands may be at least as “specially affected” 
by ocean activities as are other maritime nations; as Ambassador Pardo of 
Malta put it in 1967, islands “live and breathe” by the ocean and it was this 
historical-social and physical reality that led his call for a new oceans’ 
order.239 
What emerged for the continental shelf legal regime left many island 
countries in a precarious position.240  The basic legal issue for islands 
concerns the relative role for geology and geomorphology in Article 76:  
whether islands, because they are not in many cases geologically continental 
land masses, can claim an extended continental shelf at all, or whether, in 
fact, Article 76 provides an extended legal shelf for any coastal State for 
which a continuous, geomorphologic foot-of-slope can be calculated.241 
George Taft, of the U.S. State Department Legal Adviser’s office, has 
most strongly articulated what might be called the ‘restrictive geologic’ 
position.242  Taft emphasizes Article 76(1) & (3) as capturing the 
“fundamental aspect” of Article 76.243  Paragraph (3) in particular is taken as 
                                                                                                                                  
recommendations, the tribunal limited its task to delimiting the countries’ shared bilateral 
continental shelf boundary and refused to consider the outer limit of the legal shelf with 
respect to either coastal State.  Boyle critiques the tribunal’s conclusion by arguing, first, 
that neither the ISA nor the CLCS “has any competence to delimit the boundary between the 
shelf and the seabed;” and, second, that the ISA can neither intervene or be a party in 
UNCLOS Part XV compulsory jurisdiction, nor be subject to Seabed Dispute Chamber 
compulsory jurisdiction because the dispute would not involve “the interpretation or 
application of Part XI.”  Boyle, Fragmentation and Jurisdiction, supra, at 46.  It is highly 
arguable whether in fact the delineation of the continental shelf “outer limit” necessarily 
does concern the “application” of Part XI, thus making such a dispute “between States 
Parties” eligible for Seabed Disputes Chamber Section 5 compulsory jurisdiction under 
Article 187(a).  See discussion infra Part IV(A).  Similarly, given the erga omnes character of 
property claims, any other State should be able to invoke the international responsibility of a 
coastal State for excessive or irregular extended continental shelf claims.  For a discussion, 
see the preceding note and n.307 infra. 
239 Pardo, supra, at 1. 
240 See 1982 Convention, supra, art. 121(2). 
241 See generally Antunes & Pimentel, supra, at 10-13. 
242 See Smith & Taft, supra, at 20; & George Taft, Solving the Ridges Enigma of Article 76 of 
the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, presented at ABLOS Conference, 
Monaco (18 Oct. 2001), available at 
<http://www.gmat.unsw.edu.au/ablos/ABLOS01Folder/ablos01_papers.htm> [hereinafter 
“Taft”]. 
243 Id. at 4-5 (emphasis added). 
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expressing the genetic geologic distinction between oceanic and continental 
land masses;244 this paragraph provides on the one hand that the continental 
margin “consists . . . of the shelf, the slope, and the rise,” while on the other 
that “it does not include the deep ocean floor with its oceanic ridges.”245  
Differentiating ‘oceanic’ ridges from ‘continental’ shelf-slope-rise reflects to 
Taft the “generally understood meaning, both legally and scientifically,” of 
the continental shelf.246  Further, “an oceanic ridge of the deep ocean floor 
does not become something else when it merely crosses the 350 nautical mile 
limit . . . [and] does not change character, as a matter of law or geology, 
because it is linked to land.”247  He would thus exclude all “oceanic islands”248 
on, for example, the mid-oceanic ridge system, which “is essentially oceanic 
and part of the deep seabed, notwithstanding its proximity to certain 
islands.”249  He also denies that there are ridges that are neither oceanic or 
continental, or that there was any “recognition or acceptance” at the 
Conference of ridge claims of mixed continental-oceanic lineage.250  To Taft 
the paragraph (4) formulae and paragraph (5) maximum limits are not 
independent geomorphic bases for extended continental shelf claims, but 
rather they “refine” and “limit” the more general definition of paragraphs (1) 
& (3).251  Taft emphasizes that this interpretation will ensure “the integrity of 
the geographical scope of the Area.”252  Taft ominously warns that States who 
would attempt to claim non-‘continental’ ridges should expect “political 
backlash,” “protests,” and “public queries” before the CLCS and elsewhere.253 
Brekke and Symonds, among others,254 have taken issue with Taft’s 
interpretation and have attempted to articulate how Article 76 accommodates 
                                            
244 Brekke and Symonds, supra, at 175, describe the geology thusly:  “There are distinct 
differences in the composition and origin of oceanic and continental crust.  The distinction is 
so profound that oceanic and continental crusts are regarded as the Earth’s two most 
fundamental crustal types.” 
245 Emphasis added. 
246 Taft, supra, at 5. 
247 Id. at 8. 
248 A phrase used by Antunes & Pimentel, supra, at 10. 
249 Taft, supra, at 5-6 (emphasis added). 
250 Id. at 7.  Smith & Taft, supra, at 20, aver that “there is no indication in the travaux 
preparatoires that [the first sentence of Article 76(6) on “submarine ridges”] has any known 
and accepted applicability.”   
251 Smith & Taft, supra, at 6. 
252 Taft, supra, at 11.  He may be overstating the geographic and economic incursion into the 
Area as all extended continental shelf claims are subject to the maximum limits specified in 
Article 76(5) & (6) and also to revenue-sharing under Article 82. 
253 Id. at 9.  The CLCS has opted not to hear interventions from non-opposite or adjacent 
States, though it is conceivable that such protests could extend to requests for binding 
arbitration.  See supra Part III(A)(2). 
254 See, e.g., Antunes & Pimentel, supra. 
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ridge claims.255  They stress that the ‘continental shelf’ of Article 76 has a 
meaning “very different” from that used in geology.256  They note that Article 
76(3) speaks of the continental margin in primarily geomorphic terms as 
“compris[ing] the submerged prolongation of the land mass of the coastal 
State.”  This emphasis looks from the land mass seaward.257  Brekke and 
Symonds also observe that, while it does exclude “oceanic ridges,” Article 76 
does not make any actual reference to crustal types (“crustal neutrality”).258  
Indeed, they analyze paragraphs (3) & (6) as a “compromise” effort to 
distinguish among various types of offshore rises so as to best embody land 
masses’ geomorphologic “submerged prolongation.”259  The manifestation of 
this effort is paragraph (4), which provides alternate formulae applying a 
foot-of-slope calculation to determine the “outer limit.”  Thus, any seafloor 
feature around which it is possible to draw a continuous foot of slope 
according to the paragraph (4) formulae would be eligible for an extended 
shelf claim, while those whose foot of slope is separated from the land mass 
by deep ocean floor are excluded.260  Geology enters the picture only 
secondarily when “evidence to the contrary” (such as geologic characteristics 
shared between the land mass and the elevated feature) yields a more 
reliable foot-of-slope than does the “point of maximum change in the gradient 
at its base;” and to distinguish between “integral” “submarine ridges,” which 
have a maximum “outer limit” of 350 miles, and “submarine elevations that 
are natural components of the continental margin,” which may benefit from 
the maximum limit of 100 miles beyond the 2,500 meter isobath.261 
The CLCS Scientific and Technical Guidelines largely support Brekke 
and Pimentel, but also emphasize that islands will have to undertake 
especially rigorous geomorphologic and geologic research if they are to make 
a viable claim at all.  The Guidelines tentatively embrace crustal neutrality 
and conclude that “geological crust types cannot be the sole qualifier in the 
                                            
255 Harald Brekke & Philip A. Symonds, The Ridge Provisions of Article 76 of the UN 
Convention on the Law of the Sea, in NORDQUIST et al., supra, 169, 171 [hereinafter “Brekke 
& Symonds”]. 
256 Id. at 170. 
257 Cf. Taft, supra, at 8 (“[I]n Analyzing paragraph 6, one must proceed from the land 
seaward and from the sea landward; and one must look at the geology of the ridge, including 
but not limited to geomorphology” (emphasis added).) 
258 See Brekke & Symonds, supra, at 180-83. 
259 Id. at 180.   
260 Id. at 184-85.  However, parts of the deep ocean floor could readily be legal shelf under 
Article 76(4)(a)(ii), in this view, for those genetically continental shelfs that do not have an 
appreciable continental rise. 
261 See Brekke & Symonds, supra, at 185-91 (emphasizing that “submarine ridges” are those 
that have mixed or different crustal types or origins but that are “integral” to the margin, 
while “submarine elevations” are “natural” to the margin and share origins and crustal types 
with it) (emphasis added).  See also Antunes & Pimentel, supra, at 24-28 (describing similar 
practical principles, but also rather circularly arguing that islands cannot have “submarine 
elevations that are natural components of the continental margin” because islands are not 
geologically continental). 
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classification of ridges and elevations of the sea floor into the legal categories 
of [Article76(6)].”262  And in fact, a study produced by the Secretary-General 
during UNCLOS III anticipated that a variety of geologic ridge-type island 
countries likely had viable extended continental shelf claims, including 
Iceland, Fiji, the Federated States of Micronesia, and Mauritius.263  Yet the 
Guidelines demur from detailing just what qualifiers the CLCS views as most 
important, favoring instead examination “on a case-by-case basis.”264  This 
case-by-case approach must consider an array of scientific and legal factors:  
“[i] natural prolongation of land territory and land mass, [ii] morphology of 
ridges and their relation to the continental margin as defined in paragraph 4, 
and [iii] continuity of ridges.”265  To put it another way, an island country’s 
submission will be incomplete without evidence both of ridge morphology and 
of geologic “relation” and “continuity”—without certainty about how the 
CLCS will view either. 
To add to their evidentiary and legal difficulties, island ridge claims 
can also be particularly expensive and difficult to undertake.  Mid-oceanic 
ridges; which includes among developing countries the Galapagos Islands 
(Ecuador), Prince Edward Island (South Africa), Easter Island (Chile), and 
Rodriguez (Mauritius); naturally have a smooth curve to the oceanic deep 
ocean floor and it is thus geomorphically impossible in all but the most 
“exceptional circumstances” to identify a foot-of-slope according to evidence of 
the “point of maximum change in the gradient at its base.”266  This will 
necessitate a showing of “evidence to the contrary” in the form of new gravity, 
magnetic, and bathymetric surveying as well as single beam or swath 
bathymetry data acquisition, all of which can be highly “arbitrary,” 
“inconsistent,” “inefficient,” and “expensive.”267  For other SIDS in the Pacific 
and Indian oceans, the necessary task of differentiating between “oceanic 
ridges,” “submarine ridges,” and “submarine elevations that are natural 
components of the continental margin” can be similarly cumbersome.  The 
task would most likely require the further acquisition of expensive core 
samples to determine whether and for how far particular seafloor elevations 
share the geological characteristics and origin of the coastal State land 
mass.268 
                                            
262 SCIENTIFIC & TECHNICAL GUIDELINES, supra, § 7.2.9 (emphasis added). 
263 See UN Doc. CLCS/26 at 31 (20 Apr. 2000) (citing UN Doc. A/CONF.62/C.2/L.87/Add.1 
(1978)).  See also Brekke & Symonds, supra, at 176. 
264 Id. § 7.2.11. 
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266 Alan Evans et al., Article 76:  The Ridge Issue, 5 & 9, delivered at ABLOS, Monaco (29 
Oct. 2003), available at 
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267 Id. at 6-11. 
268 See Brekke & Symonds, supra, at 186-91; & Antunes & Pimentel, supra, at 15. 
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Islands are thus subject to a confluence of the most onerous scientific 
and legal burdens for claiming an extended continental shelf under Article 
76.  Their submissions are likely to exact considerable time and some 
measure of imperfection, and are thus likely targets for international 
challenges and “protests.”269  But, given their intimate physical and social 
relationship to the ocean, it is highly likely that many islands countries will 
take seriously the notion that they have “inherent” rights in an extended 
legal shelf.  Island continental shelf claims are thus ripe candidates for 
discord over the entire Article 76 regime.  What is to be done? 
C.  The Problems and Prospects for Implementing Article 76 “in Particular” for SIDS 
1.  Special Capacity-Building, Advice, and Assistance for SIDS and Other Developing Countries 
The degrees of special legal uncertainties and particular scientific 
difficulties facing SIDS in meeting their obligations under Article 76 have not 
gone unheeded.  It was primarily SIDS that instigated the extension of the 
original submissions deadline.270  The CLCS also has a mandate “to provide 
scientific and technical advice” that could be utilized by any coastal State 
preparing its submission.271  The General Assembly, acting on a request by 
States Parties, has established a voluntary Trust Fund to provide training, 
technical and scientific advice, and personnel “to assist developing States, in 
particular the least developed countries and small island developing States” 
in preparing desktop studies and submissions project planning (though not in 
acquiring new data).272  DOALOS has also organized several regional 
training sessions to train staff from developing countries in preparing a 
submission and has finished, but not yet published, a training manual for 
this purpose as well.273  And the General Assembly has asked the United 
Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), via GRID-Arendal, to store and 
handle available data on the outer continental margin to serve, in particular, 
“developing countries and small island developing States” in implementing 
Article 76.274 
                                            
269 See Taft, supra, at 9.  Cf. Haworth, supra, at 121 (“[I]t is the responsibility of the coastal 
State to challenge [the Scientific and Technical Guidelines] where it feels them to be 
unwarranted or without firm foundation.”).  See also discussion supra Part III(A)(2). 
270 See Notes Verbales from the Government of Seychelles Regarding the Extension of the Time 
Period for Submission to the Commission on the Limit of the Continental Shelf, UN Doc. 
SPLOS/66 (10 May 2001); & Position Paper on the Time Frame for Submissions to the 
Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, UN Doc. SPLOS/67 (10 May 2001) 
(submitted by Australia, Fiji, Marshall Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, Nauru, 
New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, and Vanuatu). 
271 1982 Convention, supra, Annex II, art. 3(a)(b).  The CLCS’s other function is to consider 
and make recommendations about coastal States’ Article 76 submissions. 
272 A/RES/55/7 ¶¶ 18-19 & Annex II (27 Feb. 2001) (emphasis added); & A/RES/58/240 ¶ 76 & 
Annex (5 Mar. 2004).  See also UN Doc. SPLOS/59 (6 June 2000). 
273 See UN Doc. A/RES/60/30 ¶ 16 (8 Mar. 2006). 
274 UN Doc. A/RES/57/141 ¶ 38 (21 Feb. 2003) (emphasis added). 
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All these efforts represent, in theory, a sensible and appropriate 
response to the Article 76 legal, scientific, and technical challenges faced by 
SIDS.  Remedial efforts to ease compliance and defray costs for developing 
countries under international treaties are not new to international law.275  
The mechanisms adopted under UNCLOS have sought to assist SIDS in 
gathering available data, training, and providing avenues for further 
consultations and advice as requested.  These efforts understandably focus on 
the desktop study phase since, if good data exists and if the study is done 
well, this can obviate much of the need for expensive subsequent data 
acquisition—particularly for small States that may only have to prove a 
handful of total data points to make a submission. 
2.  The Status of SIDS in Completing Submissions to the CLCS 
Despite these well-intentioned affirmative efforts, there has still been 
frustratingly little progress for SIDS in making progress under Article 76.  
With only three years left until the first 2009 deadline, there are clear 
reasons for concern about the progress in SIDS’ implementation of Article 76. 
No SIDS country has yet made any submission to the CLCS.  Also, the 
desktop study and training Trust Fund has over one million dollars available, 
but only one SIDS country (and two total countries) has yet made an 
application to, and received assistance from, the Fund.276  And no country, 
SIDS included, has requested any scientific or technical advice from the 
CLCS.277 
Cost is one of the reasons progress for SIDS has been so halting.  
Although the Trust Fund has been established for training, advice, and 
desktop studies, its Terms of Reference have largely frustrated its purpose:  
the Trust Fund operates on a reimbursement basis, which means that SIDS 
and others have to finance their training and desktop studies themselves in 
the hopes of later being reimbursed.278  Even charges incurred by SIDS in 
                                            
275 Cf. Abram Chayes & Antonia Handler Chayes, On Compliance, 47 INT’L ORG. 175, 194-95 
(1993) (discussing efforts under the Montreal Protocol to remedy the situation by 1990 of “the 
great majority” of States not reporting emissions under the Protocol being developing 
countries who lacked capacity or resources to comply; the Montreal Protocol thus became 
“the first treaty under which the parties undertake to provide significant financial assistance 
to defray the incremental costs of compliance for developing countries”). 
276 See Advance and Unedited Reporting Material To Be Issued as the Report of the Secretary-
General on Oceans and the Law of the Sea, 61st sess., agenda item 69(a) ¶ 53.  The number 
and identity of applicants to this Trust Fund is not publicized, but the fact that applications 
have been made and funded was gleaned from an interview with Gertrude Blake of the 
DOALOS Office of Legal Affairs on 29 August 2005 at her office in New York ‘hereinafter 
“Blake interview”]. 
277 Briefing with Phil Symonds, Senior Adviser—Law of the Sea, Geoscience Australia, 
Member of the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, in New York, NY (21 Apr. 
2006) [hereinafter “Symonds briefing”]. 
278 The General Assembly resolution establishing the Trust Fund provides:  “The Secretary-
General will provide financial assistance from the Fund on the basis of the evaluation and 
recommendations of [DOALOS]  Payments will be made against receipts evidencing actual 
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asking the CLCS for advice must go through this reimbursement process.279  
Further, there is also no established ‘pre-approval’ process whereby DOALOS 
could guarantee that some or all of a desktop study project would be 
reimbursed upon completion. 
This situation poses obvious risks and difficulties for SIDS.  Even 
small training programs and desktop studies can run to several hundred 
thousand dollars and pose a recognized hardship.280  They have no guarantee 
when appropriating or borrowing funs of later being reimbursed.  By the time 
their desktop study is completed, the Trust Fund may be exhausted, and if it 
is not the submitting State still risks that the Trust Fund will deny 
reimbursement.281 
SIDS face further difficulties in looking to the CLCS for advice or 
guidance.  The Scientific and Technical Guidelines provide only nominal 
guidance by stipulating that the CLCS will evaluate ridge claims “on a case-
by-case basis” and according to an array of geologic and geomorphologic 
factors.282  Any further guidance or advice from the CLCS comes at a price:  
the time required of CLCS members giving advice must be compensated, and 
this advice is not binding on the full Commission.283  SIDS have also had 
little opportunity to learn from the ridge science and practices of others.  The 
CLCS has had occasion to make recommendations only on Russia’s 
                                                                                                                                  
expenditures for approved costs.”  A/RES/55/7 Annex II ¶ 23 (emphasis added).  This makes 
the reimbursement arrangement explicit.  A later resolution amended this paragraph to 
read:  “The Secretary-General will provide financial assistance from the Fund for requests 
approved on the basis of the evaluation and recommendation of the Division on the advice of 
the Panel of Experts.  Payments will be processed by the [United Nations] in accordance with 
standard practices.”  A/RES/58/240 Annex ¶ 6. (emphasis added).  The terms of this latter 
resolution seem to take away the reimbursement arrangement, but in fact DOALOS 
interprets “standard practices” to mean ‘reimbursement upon presentation of receipts.’  
Blake interview, supra.  Reimbursement is the UN “standard practice.”  Cf. Model 
Memorandum of Understanding Between the United Nations and [Participating State] 
Contributing Resources to [the United Nations Peacekeeping Operation], art. 6, appended to 
Note by the Secretary-General, UN Doc. A/51/967 3, 5 (27 Aug. 1997). 
279 See UN Doc. A/RES/55/7, at 13, Annex II ¶ 12(b). 
280 See UN Doc. SPLOS/59. 
281 The first Trust Fund resolution 55/7, established that reimbursements would be assessed 
by DOALOS, presumably according to its own good faith and discretion.  The General 
Assembly changed this mandate in its second Trust Fund resolution, 58/240, to allow a 
“Panel of Experts” to provide “advice” to DOALOS about disbursing payments from the Trust 
Fund.  This Panel is composed of representatives of countries contributing to the Trust Fund.  
Blake interview, supra.  Trust Fund applications thus be susceptible to any number of 
economic, political, or administrative interests and concerns by DOALOS and Trust Fund 
contributing countries. 
282 SCIENTIFIC & TECHNICAL GUIDELINES, supra, §§ 7.2.10 & 7.2.11. 
283 UNCLOS envisions that the CLCS will operate by way of sub-commissions that make 
recommendations on individual submissions to the full Commission, which then considers 
and votes on those recommendations.  There is no place for dispositive opinions or advice by 
just one CLCS member.  See 1982 Convention, supra, Annex II arts. 5-6; & Symonds briefing, 
supra. 
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submission, yet only a bare summary of those are available.284  New Zealand 
and Australia also now made submissions containing ridge-elements, but 
these are still under review.  Other developed countries with likely ridge 
claims have not yet made any submission to the CLCS.285  Even if there were 
good models, the secrecy by which the CLCS considers submissions has done 
little to contribute to any appreciation of how to tailor the application of ridge 
science to the Article 76 legal framework in the individual case.286 
3.  Facilitating Progress and Order for SIDS Under Article 76 
Clearly the current course of Article 76 for SIDS is unsustainable.  The 
uncertain legal import of the ridge provisions has been compounded by a 
palpable lack of progress on undertaking the required geological and 
geomorphological data-gathering and study.  Without going so far as to 
suggest a revision of Article 76, and cognizant of the fact that the CLCS is not 
inclined to revise or further elaborate on its Scientific and Technical 
Guidelines,287 there are practical steps that SIDS and others could take 
together to assure the orderly implementation of Article 76. 
The various avenues of capacity building, advice, and assistance 
established “in particular” for SIDS are well positioned to assist them in 
preparing a desktop study and in assessing whether a full submission would 
be appropriate given the obligations under Article 76.  DOALOS-sponsored 
training sessions and its training manual are now well established, and so 
the biggest holdup here is in getting financing for desktop studies actually 
underway.  Even if the Trust Fund will not deviate from the reimbursement 
approach, it is not prevented from at least providing some advance 
assurances that all or part of a properly accounted for project would be 
reimbursable.  This could facilitate in securing short-term, low interest loans 
or the appropriation of moneys from national treasuries. 
If pre-approving each individual country’s Trust Fund application 
would be too cumbersome, expensive, or would pose too many accounting 
risks to the Fund and DOALOS, then the Fund could work directly with 
consultants or regional organizations looking to take on several individual 
countries’ desktop studies.  Grid Arendal already has a General Assembly 
mandate under UNEP to build a continental shelf data center (a “one stop 
data shop”288) and to assist developing countries in preparing their 
submissions.289  The South Pacific Applied Geoscience Commission 
(“SOPAC”) too is looking to hire a consultant to do desktop studies for a 
                                            
284 See Report of the Secretary-General:  Oceans and the Law of the Sea, UN Doc. 
A/57/57/Add.1 ¶¶ 38-41 (8 Oct. 2002). 
285 These include, for example, Norway (Bouvet Island), Iceland, Japan, France (St. Pauls 
Island), and the United States. 
286 See discussion of UNCLOS Articles 244 & 246(2) in n.232 supra Part III(A)(2). 
287 Symonds briefing, supra. 
288 See <http://www.continentalshelf.org/index.cfm?pageID=12>. 
289 See UN Doc. A/RES/57/141 ¶ 38. 
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number of the region’s countries to bring some benefits of scale to the expense 
of individual desktop studies.290  Both entities could work with DOALOS 
directly to package pre-approved desktop study programs for SIDS and other 
developing countries. 
The other main avenue for accommodating SIDS in implementing 
Article 76 might be a States Parties decision on submissions procedure.  The 
States Parties have by consensus already extended the submissions deadline 
once before and agreed then to keep the difficulties of SIDS and developing 
countries to meet the deadline under review.291  Clearly the object should be 
to enable all countries with a potentially viable claim to make a submission 
and see it through, if appropriate, to a “final and binding” delineation.  The 
deadline cannot be extended indefinitely as an excuse for avoiding 
implementation altogether and deadlines can be useful in corralling action.  
One sensible alternative approach, then, might be for States Parties to decide 
to accept the completion of a desktop study by SIDS by the 2009 deadline as 
good faith performance and further agree to a limited additional extension, 
with additional international assistance, to finalize submissions.292 
Legal conflicts over Article 76 delineations may yet become an issue for 
UNCLOS, but the more immediate issue is avoiding conflict through 
competent scientific and technical implementation.  If SIDS are at least 
making demonstrable progress towards satisfying Article 76, and if other 
States retain confidence that the process is proceeding reasonably and in 
good faith, conflicts will be minimized.  Here international law has the 
opportunity to play a constructive, rather than adversarial, role:  
administrative adjustments could facilitate bringing together the necessary 
scientific, technical, and financial resources, while consensus decision-making 
could again accommodate initiatives for capacity-building, patience, and 
progress in meeting the Article 76 challenges faced by SIDS. 
Part IV.  The Enduring Frontier:  Two Problems for UNCLOS and 
the Seabed “Common Heritage” 
Establishing an area beyond national jurisdictions served as the foil in 
the Conference negotiations to limited national jurisdictions.  The then-
                                            
290 Regional efforts could save especially on computer hardware and GEOCAP software 
licensing costs. 
291 See UN Doc. SPLOS/72 (29 May 2001).   
292 Cf. Legal Opinion on Whether It Is Permissible, Under the United Nations Convention on 
the Law of the Sea and the Rules of Procedure of the Commission, for a Coastal State, which 
Has Made a Submission to the Commission in Accordance with Article 76 of the Convention, 
to Provide to the Commission in the Course of the Examination by It of the Submission, 
Additional Material and Information Relating to the Limits of Its Continental Shelf or 
Substantial Part Thereof, which Constitute a Significant Departure from the Original Limits 
and Formulae Lines that Were Given Due Publicity by the Secretary-General of the United 
Nations in Accordance with Rule 50 of the Rules of Procedure of the Commission, UN Doc. 
SPLOS/46 (7 Sept. 2005) (answering this question in the affirmative). 
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recent discovery of polymetallic nodules also expanded the terms of the law of 
the sea by lighting the imaginations about this potential seabed wealth and 
the new conflicts it could engender.  It is not too much to say that the seabed 
was the biggest catalyst for UNCLOS. 
This crystallized in a political bargain that reified coastal States 
generous and certain maritime boundaries while allowing that certain uses 
and benefits of the seabed would be administered for all States by the 
International Seabed Authority.  What became Part XI, in turn, denies 
anyone legal title to any part of the seabed, acknowledges that all have an 
interest in it, and requires that “activities in the Area” be carried out under 
the authority and regulations of the ISA.  This public property regime might 
be contrasted with the roughly res communis high seas regime of Part VII, 
which emphasizes freedoms of action and economic activity limited only by 
the “due regard” to be given to the freedoms of others. 
The crash of the commodities markets and the Soviet-style command-
bureaucracy model in the late 1980s took much of the wind out of seabed 
mining and the original form of the ISA.293  The ISA even in its post-1994 
Implementing Agreement form has yet to play any significant role with 
respect to human activity beyond national jurisdictions, only approving the 
first plan of work for mineral exploration in 2005.294  But, to be sure, human 
interest and activity about the seabed has only expanded since the adoption 
of UNCLOS as science and technology are putting new deep sea resources 
within reach.  The spatial property rules for UNCLOS and Part XI are being 
called into question both as the potential for intellectual property in genetic 
and biological resources shifts the focus of just what it means for any part of 
the seabed to be “appropriated,” and as destructive fishing practices, such as 
bottom trawling, that originate in the ‘free’ high seas increasingly target the 
seabed.  The ISA and the ITLOS Seabed Disputes Chamber have the 
competence to resolve this legal uncertainty, though it would be preferable 
for the sake of political and legal order to forge new negotiated consensus. 
A.  Disentangling Part XI:  The UNCLOS Regime for the Seabed and Its Resources 
The ‘Area’s area’ is the “seabed and ocean floor and subsoil thereof, 
beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.”295  To define it negatively, the 
Area is what is left after subtracting the EEZ, legal continental shelf, and 
superjacent waters.296  Delineation of the Area vis-à-vis the continental shelf 
                                            
293 See CHURCHILL & LOWE, supra, at 237. 
294 Ambassador Pardo’s “conservative estimate” in 1967 of gross annual revenues from deep 
seabed mining by 1975 was US $6 billion.  Pardo, supra, at 17, 2d sess. ¶ 9.  The reality of 
seabed mining has been much more modest.  Only in August 2005 did the ISA Council 
approve its first plan of work for polymetallic modules in the Clipperton-Clarion zone of the 
northeast Pacific Ocean, following a request by Germany.  See Satya N. Nandan, Statement 
Under United Nations Agenda Item 75:  Oceans and the Law of the Sea (28 Nov. 2005). 
295 1982 Convention, supra, art. 1(1). 
296 See id. arts. 134(4) & 135. 
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can be difficult enough, but it gets further confused once the layers of 
substantive property, equity, and regulatory rules of Part XI are then 
applied.  This subsection sets forth these layers of imperfectly overlapping 
rules so as to provide a useful foundation for the rest of the analysis in this 
Part.  It also describes the basic res publica legal regime for the Area—that it 
may not be privately appropriated and that “activities in the Area” must be 
carried out under the authority and regulations of the ISA—which Parts 
IV(B) and IV(C) then call into question for new human activities 
(bioprospecting and bottom trawling) and other legal regimes (intellectual 
property and high seas freedoms) that are now encroaching on the seabed.297 
Part XI, as modified by the 1994 ISA Implementing Agreement, moves 
from broad, peremptory principles to specific rules governing “mineral” 
resources.  The peremptory298 first principle of Part XI is that:  “The Area and 
its resources are the common heritage of mankind.”299   To this end, Article 
137(1) proscribes and denies recognition to claims or exercises of “sovereignty 
or sovereign rights,” or unilateral or private “appropriation,” over “any part” 
of the Area or its resources.300 
Against this broad principle for “the Area and its resources,” the 
narrower focus of Part XI is decidedly on “resources”—rights in which “are 
vested in mankind as a whole.”301  “Resources” is itself a term of art, defined 
as “all solid, liquid or gaseous mineral resources in situ in the Area.”302  
                                            
297 Cf. YIANNOPOULOS, supra, at 415 (Public things are “owned by the state or its political 
subdivisions, but this ownership is of a public law nature for the benefit of all persons.”). 
298 See 1982 Convention, supra, art. 311(6) (“States Parties agree that there shall be no 
amendments to the basic principle relating to the common heritage of mankind set forth in 
article 136 and that they shall not be party to any agreement in derogation thereof.”). 
299 Id. art. 136 (emphasis added). 
300 Emphasis added. 
301 Id. art. 137(2). 
302 Id. art. 133(a).  That “resources” is modified by “mineral” still remains a point of political 
contention at least.  The G77 continues to insist, for example, that “resources” was not 
qualified by the requirement that they be “mineral” in nature in the 1970 Declaration of 
Principles, which is referenced in the UNCLOS preamble.  See Sabelo Sivuyile Maqungo 
(South Africa), Statement on Behalf of the Group of 77 and China at the Meeting of the Ad 
Hoc Open-Ended Informal Working Group to Study Issues Relating to the Conservation and 
Sustainable Use of Marine Biological Diversity Beyond Areas of National Jurisdiction *1 (13 
Feb. 2006) (on file with author) [hereinafter “G-77 Biodiversity Statement”].  At one point in 
his 1967 speech, in fact, Ambassador Pardo refers to the recommendation by the World Peace 
Through Law Conference (“which was attended by over 2,000 lawyers and judges from over 
100 countries”) that the General Assembly “issue a proclamation declaring that the non-
fishery resources of the high seas, outside the territorial waters of any State, and the bed of 
the sea beyond the continental shelf, appertain to the United Nations and are subject to its 
jurisdiction and control.”  Pardo, supra, at ¶ 104, 14.  But cf. VI UNCLOS COMMMENTARY, 
supra, at 76 n.9 and accompanying text (favoring the textual approach to limit “resources” to 
“minerals”).  The UNCLOS Preamble does cite the 1970 Declaration of Principles, but the 
Convention purports only to “develop the principles” therein, rather than codify them.  1982 
Convention, supra, pmbl. ¶ 6 (emphasis added).  Further, although the 1970 Declaration of 
Principles was passed without a dissenting vote, it was not actually passed by consensus.  A 
number of industrialized countries harbored sufficient reservations about it to call for a vote, 
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“Activities in the Area” are “all activities of exploration for, and exploitation 
of” the Area’s mineral resources.303  “Activities in the Area,” in turn, must be 
“organized, carried out and controlled by the Authority,”304 and according to 
Part XI and the ISA’s rules and regulations established thereunder.305 
Part XI establishes a robust mandate for the ISA’s governance of 
activities in the Area.  Article 140(2) provides for equitable revenue-sharing 
derived from activities in the Area.306  Article 143 provides that both States 
Parties and the ISA may carry out marine scientific research in the Area for 
peaceful purposes and with a view to disseminating the results of such 
research.  Article 145 provides an environmental regulatory mandate that 
“necessary measures shall be taken . . . to ensure effective protection for the 
marine environment from harmful effects” caused by activities in the Area, 
and to this end tasks the ISA with responsibility for adopting appropriate 
rules to protect and conserve marine flora and fauna from environmental 
hazards. 
Consistent with ensuring an effective, universal property rules regime, 
Part XI provides definite options for State responsibility, regulatory 
elaboration, and dispute settlement with respect to activities in the Area.  
Responsibility to ensure compliance by States and their nationals with the 
rules of the ISA and Part XI—and liability should they not oblige—is 
provided by Article 139.307  The ISA can also elaborate and adopt new 
                                                                                                                                  
to which they abstained.  The final vote was 108-0-14.  See DOALOS, CHM LEGISLATIVE 
HISTORY, supra, at 161-88. 
303 1982 Convention, supra, arts. 1(3) & 134(2). 
304 Id. art 153. 
305 Id. arts. 139(1) (establishing State responsibility to ensure that activities in the Area are 
“carried out in conformity with [Part XI]”) & 153(1) (requiring that activities in the Area be 
carried out according to the “rules, regulations and procedures” of the ISA). 
306 In exchange for providing a procedure certain for industrial enterprises to undertake 
seabed resource exploitation, this form of revenue sharing clearly was a central promise of 
UNCLOS and a primary motivation for many developing States to accede to the Convention.  
See discussion, infra Part II(A). 
307 The invocation of State responsibility by Article 139 thus raises the possibility of whether 
an injured State may invoke unilateral countermeasures under general international law in 
addition to or in lieu of ISA or Part XI, Section 5 jurisdictions.  See ILC State Responsibility 
Draft Articles, supra, art. 49.  Given that States’ owe obligations regarding activities in the 
Area erga omnes, under the logic of the Draft Articles any other State Party could invoke the 
responsibility of a breaching State.  See id. art. 42(b).  But the scope of State responsibility 
under the general rules may be limited by lex specialis.  Draft Article 55 provides that 
general State responsibility law (and its countermeasures) is residuary, being applicable 
“where and to the extent that the conditions for the existence of an internationally wrongful 
act or the content or implementation of the international responsibility of a State are 
governed by special rules of international law” (emphasis added).  The ILC Commentary 
articulates a kind of presumption against derogation by the special of the more general, for 
“there must be some actual inconsistency between them, or else a discernible intention that 
one provision is to exclude the other.”  INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION, COMMENTARIES TO 
THE DRAFT ARTICLES ON RESPONSIBILITY OF STATES FOR INTERNATIONALLY WRONGFUL ACTS, 
UN Doc. A/56/10 at 358 (2001) (emphasis added).  Although UNCLOS nowhere explicitly 
excludes the operation of general responsibility law, it is difficult to envision how a State in 
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regulations for activities in the Area as they develop:  the ISA Council (“the 
executive organ of the Authority”308) must decide within three years whether 
it will act on a request by “any” State Party to regulate activities in the Area 
relating to “any resource other than polymetallic nodules.”309 
Compulsory legal recourse and remedies for disputes involving Part XI 
or activities in the Area can be found in Part XI, Section 5.  Section 5 
provides binding settlement for disputes involving States’ or the ISA’s 
liability arising from commercial contract disputes.310  It also provides 
binding jurisdiction in the Seabed Disputes Chamber of ITLOS for disputes 
“between States Parties” concerning the “interpretation or application” of 
Part XI and for other public law-type disputes involving the propriety of 
nondiscretionary acts by States or the ISA under Part XI.311  This makes 
disputes falling under Section 5 unique in the UNCLOS framework because 
these compulsory jurisdictions are expressly not affected by the choice of 
dispute settlement procedures available for other law of the sea disputes.312  
Nor must all parties give consent for jurisdiction to attach:  disputes 
                                                                                                                                  
good faith could invoke unilateral countermeasures against another in light of the fact that 
UNCLOS provides binding dispute settlement, as well as the possibility of interim measures, 
for seabed disputes under Part XI, Section 5.  Even if immediate resort to countermeasures is 
unavailable, the general principles of cessation, proportionality, and reparation for breach 
can inform the measures applied by any tribunal.  Cf. JOOST PAUWELYN, CONFLICT OF NORMS 
IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW:  HOW WTO LAW RELATES TO OTHER RULES OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 216-36 (2003).  And the erga omnes nature of the breach should favor 
allowing any State to invoke such a claim. 
308 1982 Convention, supra, art. 162(1). 
309 See id. art. 162(2)(o)(ii) & 1994 ISA Implementing Agreement, supra, §§ 1(15)(a)-(15)(b).  
The ISA is currently considering draft regulations on exploration and exploitation of 
polymetallic sulphides and cobalt-rich ferromanganese crusts.  See UN Doc. 
ISBA/10/C/WP.1/Rev.1 (6 Sept. 2005).  Beyond this, it might be argued that section 1(15)(a) 
of the 1994 Agreement limits the States that may make such a request because, rather than 
providing for “any” State to make such a request, it refers specifically to requests by a State 
whose national “intends to apply for approval of a plan of work for exploitation.”  Article 2(1) 
of the 1994 Agreement provides only a narrow scope of preemption of the original UNCLOS 
by the Agreement and only for instances of actual “inconsistency” between the two 
instruments.  With respect to requests by States Parties to the Council, section 1(15)(a) of 
the Agreement could have, but does not clearly, limit such requests, for example, “only when” 
made by those States that potentially would engage in activities in the Area.  Section 1(15)(a) 
could also quite plausibly be read only to apply to the additional power granted to the 
Council in the second half of Section 1(15), which enables it not only to heed Article 
162(2)(o)(ii), but also to elaborate and adopt “any additional rules, regulations and 
procedures necessary to facilitate the approval of plans of work” (emphasis added).  This 
reading is bolstered by the fact that Section 1(15)(a), in limiting requests to Parties with 
intent “to apply for approval of a plan of work,” mirrors  the language granting additional 
powers to the Council for approval of plans of work in Section 1(15).  Such a reading would 
not then preclude its operation in tandem with UNCLOS Article 162(2)(o)(ii).  Article 2(1) of 
the 1994 Agreement thus would suggest that these two provisions be “interpreted and 
applied together as a single instrument.” 
310 Id. art. 187(c)-(e). 
311 Id. arts. 187(a)-(b); 188(1); & 189. 
312 Id. art. 287(2). 
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“concerning the interpretation or application” of Part XI may be brought to 
an ad hoc panel of the Seabed Disputes Chamber “at the request of any party 
to the dispute.”313  Further, the Seabed Disputes Chamber may issue 
provisional measures to preserve the status quo or prevent “serious harm to 
the marine environment” when it has satisfied itself of prima facie 
jurisdiction.314  Part XI, in other words, provides not only for a specific 
property regime to govern the Area, but also for the enforceability necessary 
to effectuate the property rules contained therein. 
B.  Intellectual Property in the Deep:  Intangible Rights in a Spatial Regime? 
Until just recently, humankind knew very little about life in the deep 
seas.  As Gianni has observed: 
Throughout human history, the deep ocean has often 
inspired both wonder and fear.  It has been variously seen as 
a dark and mysterious place entirely inhospitable to life or 
the home of the legendary sea monsters and leviathans that 
haunted the fevered imaginations of ancient mariners.  The 
deep sea was even perceived as the origin of life itself, the 
source of the so-called “primordial ooze” which the now 
famous expedition of the HMS Challenger set out to find in 
the late 1800s.  More recent scientific investigations have 
served to confirm and increasingly reveal the truly 
remarkable extent of the mystery and diversity of life in the 
deep sea.315 
This deep sea biodiversity is a new frontier for science and industry as 
well as a topic of increasing importance for international law.  Research 
institutions, as well as the pharmaceutical, health care, cosmetics, and 
agricultural industries, are increasingly interested in the biodiversity 
associated with mineral-rich, deep sea, warm hydrothermal vents and cold-
seeps.316  At least several hundred patents have now been issued by the 
United States, the European Union, Japan and other developed countries for 
organisms, products, and processes originating in the deep.317  A patent 
                                            
313 Id. art. 188(1)(b) (emphasis added). 
314 Id. art. 290. 
315 MATTHEW GIANNI, HIGH SEAS BOTTOM FISHERIES AND THEIR IMPACTS ON THE BIODIVERSITY 
OF VULNERABLE DEEP-SEA ECOSYSTEMS: OPTIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL ACTION, 1 (IUCN, 
2004) [hereinafter “GIANNI”]. 
316 See Report of the Secretary-General, Oceans and the Law of the Sea, UN Doc. 
A/60/63/Add.1, ¶ 83-90 (15 July 2005). 
317 See SALVATORE ARICO & CHARLOTTE SALPIN, BIOPROSPECTING OF GENETIC RESOURCES IN 
THE DEEP SEABED:  SCIENTIFIC, LEGAL AND POLICY ASPECTS 20-21 (UNU-IAS Report, 2005), 
available at <http://www.ias.unu.edu/publications/details.cfm/articleID/671> [hereinafter 
“ARICO & SALPIN”]; David Kenneth Leary, More than Just Bugs and Bioprospecting in the 
Abyss:  Designing an International Legal Regime for the Sustainable Management of Deep-
Sea Hydrothermal Vents Beyond National Jurisdiction, pp. 280 & Appendix 2, 491-97 
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entails a bundle of exclusive, temporary property rights that are intended, in 
the words of the U.S. Constitution, “to promote the Progress of Science and 
useful Arts.”318  Patents are the primary means by which bioprospectors have 
sought to recoup the “very high costs” of exploring and developing new deep 
sea products (estimated anywhere from US$231 million to $1.7 billion per 
new drug).319 
Patents are granted by national governments and effectuated 
internationally (and erga omnes) through the Agreement on Trade-Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (“TRIPS”).320  Intellectual property 
rights under TRIPS operate as all international property rights must—by one 
country’s issuance and others’ recognition.  But this has not gone without 
controversy as bioprospecting has expanded.321  Countries with biotechnology 
industries have asserted either that Part XI accommodates “bioprospecting” 
(biological or genetic research carried out for commercial purposes) under the 
high seas freedom of marine scientific research, or that UNCLOS is simply 
not relevant to bioprospecting.322  The result of either view would be 
                                                                                                                                  
(Macquarie University Centre for Environmental Law Ph.D. thesis, 2005) (listing 37 
hydrothermal vent products patents from a cursory and “by no means exhaustive” search); & 
SARA MAXWELL et al., MEDICINES FROM THE DEEP 3 (NRDC, 2005) (listing deep sea medicinal 
products in development) [hereinafter “MAXWELL et al.”]. 
318 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8. 
319 UN Doc. A/60/63/Add.1, ¶ 108 (15 July 2005). 
320 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 15 Apr. 1994, 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, art. 27(1), 
Legal Instruments—Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994) available at 
<http://www.wto.org/english/docs_ e/legal_e/27-trips_01_e.htm> [hereinafter “TRIPS”].  Some 
instruments adopted within the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) 
framework also regulate international intellectual property rights, the analysis here is limits 
to TRIPS as this is the most comprehensive and universal such instrument.  See Fernanda 
Millicay, A Legal Regime for the Biodiversity of the Area, 18th Hamilton Shirley Amerasinghe 
Fellowship on the Law of the Sea paper, at 47 n.202 (2005) (in possession of author) 
[hereinafter “Millicay”]. 
321 Cf. Sabrina Safrin, Hyperownership in a Time of Biotechnological Promise:  The 
International Conflict to Control the Building Blocks of Life, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 641, 642 
(2004) [hereinafter “Safrin”]: 
As more patents issue for synthesized genes, more raw genes are legally 
enclosed by developing nations.  This interactive spiral of increased 
enclosure, or hyperownerhip, results in the suboptimal utilization, 
conservation, and improvement of vital genetic material.  It generates 
tensions between nations and threatens individuals and indigenous 
communities.  The global commons is being subjected to a global tug of 
war over genetic material at the expense of the global common good. 
322 See Advance and Unedited Report on the Work of the United Nations Ad Hoc Open-Ended 
Informal Working Group to Study Issues Relating to the Conservation and Sustainable Use of 
Marine Biological Diversity Beyond Areas of National Jurisdiction, UN Doc. A/61/** ¶¶ 32 & 
35 (9 Mar. 2006), available at 
<http://www.un.org/Depts/los/reference_files/new_developments_and_recent_adds.htm> 
[hereinafter “Marine Biodiversity Advance Report”]; & ARICO & SALPIN, supra, at 32.  See 
also 1982 Convention, supra, art. 87(1)(f). 
 56 
international patenting of deep sea living resources on a first-come-first-
served basis.323  This has provoked concern by developing countries, who have 
expressed concern that the fruits of marine scientific research cannot be 
owned at all, or else ought to be viewed as “common heritage of mankind” 
subject to ISA regulatory and revenue-sharing jurisdiction.324 
Other authors have taken up the important question of how developed 
and developing countries’ approaches to intellectual property from the deep 
seas ought to be reconciled.325  This subsection largely avoids this debate by 
focusing on the question precedent:  whether the need for a new deep sea 
intellectual property regime is felt by a sufficient plurality of nations to make 
a new property rules agreement a viable political and legal necessity.  In 
answering this antecedent question in the affirmative, this section briefly 
analyzes this intersection of TRIPS and UNCLOS and finds that the 
Convention provides fairly clear grounds for denying patentability for 
products derived from pure marine scientific research and for those covering 
organisms themselves collected in the Area.  Beyond this, however, neither 
UNCLOS nor TRIPS provides reliable rules for prospecting or exploiting 
marine biological and genetic resources.  This section concludes that the legal 
conflict, uncertainty, and fracturing of deep sea intellectual property rights 
necessarily resulting from this analysis should be impetus enough for some 
form of new bargained consensus that would universally recognize 
bioprospecting patents while making some manner of equitable concessions 
or benefits sharing to developing countries. 
TRIPS requires that patents “shall be available” for “any inventions” 
that are new, that involve an inventive step (or are non-obvious), and that 
are capable of industrial application (or are useful).326  TRIPS expressly 
contemplates the patentability of micro-organisms and their microbiological 
processes, though it allows States to refuse patentability for higher trophic 
level plants and animals (provided they are given some form of effective 
protection).327  Beyond this, however, TRIPS allows non-recognition of a 
foreign-granted patent only where necessary to protect “ordre public or 
                                            
323 See Millicay, supra, at 52. 
324 See Marine Biodiversity Advance Report, supra, ¶¶ 33-34; G-77 Biodiversity Statement, 
supra; & n.304 supra.  See also 1982 Convention, supra, art. 241. 
325 See, e.g., Safrin, supra, at 642-43 (arguing that “hyperownership” should be addressed in 
part by developed countries taking “international regard” of the reaction of developing 
countries before granting a patent for any part of the genetic commons); Millicay, supra, 
(favoring extension of the “common heritage of mankind” principle to genetic resources in a 
necessary elaboration on the seabed regime); & Leary, supra, at 290 (advocating a “Global 
Commons Trust Fund” approach to genetic resources whereby part of the funds raised by 
commercial exploitation of commons resources would be applied by a trustee to conserving 
other such resources). 
326 TRIPS, supra, art. 27(1) & n.5. 
327 Id. art. 27(3)(b).  See also ARICO & SALPIN, supra, at 43. 
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morality;” “mere” prohibition by domestic law cannot suffice for non-
recognition.328 
Under this framework, developed countries have granted patents for 
biological substances and micro-organisms themselves (“per se”).329  This has 
blurred the traditional distinction between unpatentable ‘discoveries’ and 
patentable ‘inventions.’  It is understandable how genetically-engineering 
organisms are inventive and thus patentable,330 yet developed countries are 
going well beyond genetically engineered products in issuing patents.  The 
Guidelines for Examination issued by the European Patent Office,331 for 
example, affirm that “mere discovery” is unpatentable, but provide that if a 
micro-organism is shown to produce a “technical effect,” then it may be 
patentable.332  The Guidelines provide that one covered technical effect can be 
“microbiological processes,” such that if a micro-organism reproduces 
asexually then “the micro-organism can be protected per se as it is a product 
obtained by a microbiological process.”333  This could be read to allow 
patenting of any asexually reproducing micro-organism without a showing 
that this reproduction is independently useful.334  Naturally occurring 
substances are also patentable in the United States and Japan, for example, 
when they can be isolated from previously unknown or undetected materials 
or organisms.335  In many cases, in fact, patents have been issued for micro-
organisms and substances per se seemingly independent of any useful process 
or product synthesized from them.336  This has provoked a political reaction 
by developing countries, but this so far has had little legal effect as, again, 
“mere” domestic illegality is insufficient under TRIPS to deny recognition to 
international patents. 
Just as TRIPS can give intellectual property rights life outside 
national borders, the issue for developing countries is then whether they are 
under a concomitant obligation to recognize patents for per se micro-
organisms and substances collected beyond national jurisdictions.  The 
answer UNCLOS provides depends on two problematic determinations:  the 
prior intent of the person or entity collecting the material and the spatial 
zone in which the micro-organism is collected.  UNCLOS Article 241 would 
                                            
328 TRIPS, supra, art. 27(2). 
329 See Millicay, supra, at 48-49; & CARLOS M. CORREA, SOVEREIGN AND PROPERTY RIGHTS 
OVER PLANT GENETIC RESOURCES, Commission on Plant Genetic Resources, FAO Background 
Study Paper no. 2, at 12-14 (1994) [hereinafter “CORREA”]. 
330 See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980). 
331 See EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE, 2005 GUIDELINES FOR EXAMINATION IN THE EUROPEAN 
PATENT OFFICE, available at <http://www.european-patent-office.org/online/index.htm>. 
332 Id. § 2.3.1. 
333 Id. § 3.5.1.  See also CORREA, supra, at 13 (“No major differences exist in industrialized 
countries with respect to the patentability of microorganisms and of microbiological 
processes.”). 
334 See id. 
335 See id. 
336 See ARICO & SALPIN, supra, at 21. 
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seem expressly to preclude patenting the results of “marine scientific 
research.”337  UNCLOS does not define ‘marine scientific research.’338  
Instead, a more informal distinction is frequently made between “pure” 
marine scientific research unpatentable by Article 241 and “applied” 
bioprospecting, which is carried out with prior commercial intent and might 
thus be patentable.339  Yet this informal distinction is not generally 
recognized by many developing countries340 and is not always workable in 
practice as the results of science undertaken initially for ‘pure’ research 
purposes are frequently passed directly to industry.341 
The spatial property rules system adopted in UNCLOS further 
complicates international patent rights.  The basic spatial issue under 
UNCLOS would be whether an organism is collected in the water column, 
and thus be subject to the high seas regime, or from the seabed, in which case 
it would be part of the Area.342  If collected in the water column, the difficult 
issue just discussed of whether the collection was part of marine scientific 
research or commercial bioprospecting arises.  If collected from the seabed, 
the intricacies of res publica and Part XI arise.  It must be conceded that 
living micro-organisms are not “mineral resources” subject to ISA 
jurisdiction.  But this does not exclude them from Part XI altogether.  Recall 
that Article 137(1) proscribes any exercises of sovereignty or appropriation 
over “any part of the Area.”  This provision echoes the concern voiced by 
Ambassador Pardo about mere exploitability of the deep seabed becoming the 
basis for new property claims.  On this basis, and according to its plain terms, 
Article 137(1) quite simply prohibits patenting seabed organisms in whole or 
in part; the further engineering of that material might well be patentable, 
but the material itself may not be under Part XI. 
Thus UNCLOS provides two possible bases for denying claims of 
international patentability:  Article 241 prohibits any property claims arising 
from marine scientific research and Article 137(1) prohibits against any 
appropriation of any part of the Area.  These provisions, being part of 
international law, comprise more than “merely” domestic law and may thus 
also be appropriate bases for denying patentability under TRIPS.343 
Neither basis would be easily or reliably demonstrated.  The intent of 
the individual or entity that originally collected the biological material from 
                                            
337 1982 Convention, supra, art. 241:  “Marine scientific research activities shall not 
constitute the legal basis for any claim to any part of the marine environment or its 
resources.” 
338 See ARICO & SALPIN, supra, at 16.  UNCLOS Article 251 obliges States to develop future 
guidelines for ascertaining “the nature and implications” of marine scientific research—an 
undertaking not yet formalized.  See discussion infra nn.346-47 and accompanying text. 
339 See id. at 15. 
340 See G-77 Biodiversity Statement, supra. 
341 See UN Doc. A/60/63/Add.1 ¶ 202. 
342 See ARICO & SALPIN, supra, at 56; & Millicay, supra, at 55. 
343 See TRIPS, supra, art. 27(2). 
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the deep seas will almost certainly not be recorded on a patent application; 
the mere fact that a patent is sought should always provide sufficient 
grounds to assert at least some commercial intent.  Further, patent 
applications rarely record whether the biological material was collected in the 
seabed or water column or within or beyond national jurisdictions, and 
anyway this information could be readily manipulated if patentability were 
at stake.344 
By providing prima facie, but problematic, bases for nonpatentability, 
UNCLOS has the potential to muddy TRIPS patents considerably.  The 
political discontent many developing countries are beginning to articulate 
over a biotech free-for-all in the deep sea commons could be channeled to 
distrust and refutation of international patents that may have been derived 
from organisms ostensibly protected from appropriation by Part XI.  This 
could bring developed countries, in turn, to restrict developing countries’ 
biotech access or to bring counterclaims or countermeasures.  Either way, a 
fractious showdown between UNCLOS and WTO law and dispute settlement 
could be in the offing.  The consequences of a patent showdown at the very 
least would undermine the erga omnes respect necessary for international 
property rights. 
Fortunately, both UNCLOS and TRIPS point the way forward:  each 
invites reviews of their respective provisions concerning marine scientific 
research, bioprospecting, and intellectual property.  UNCLOS Article 251 
urges the elaboration of general criteria and guidelines to assist in 
ascertaining the “nature and implications” of marine scientific research.  To 
this end, a working group on marine biodiversity beyond national jurisdiction 
was convened at the General Assembly in early 2006, though no substantive 
outcome (beyond an expression by a number of countries of a desire to meet 
again) was reached.345  TRIPS also requires a special review, which began in 
1999, of the patentability of living organisms, though this review is still 
ongoing.346   
Although neither review has yet yielded any new agreement, if 
developing countries assert the legal right under UNCLOS and TRIPS to 
deny patentability for deep sea micro-organisms, and industry in developed 
countries would stand to benefit from effective patenting, significant gains 
could be realized by cooperation.  On this basis, further international 
negotiations and consensus about deep sea intellectual property rights could 
well be in the offing.  The details of such a regime are beyond the scope of this 
                                            
344 See Leary, supra, 83-86, 491-97.  As part of the TRIPS Article 27(3)(b) review, a number of 
G-77 countries have pushed for greater disclosure in patent applications about the country of 
origin of biological and genetic material, but any requirement to disclose the exact location of 
deep sea collection remains problematic for the reasons mentioned.  See Reviews, Article 
27.3(b) and Related Issues, available at 
<http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/art27_3b_background_e.htm>. 
345 See generally Marine Biodiversity Advance Report, supra. 
346 See TRIPS, supra, art. 27(3)(b). 
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inquiry, though doubtless it would seek to ensure an effective patent system 
for bioprospectors while not unfairly or inequitably appropriating the deep 
sea genetic commons. 
C.  Deep Sea Fisheries Under Part XI:  When High Seas Freedoms Hit Rock Bottom 
A similar impasse may be developing with respect to another deep sea 
activity:  bottom trawl fishing.  Bottom trawling involves dragging large 
weighted nets across the seabed to catch the fish living in the waters just 
above.347  Trawling has aroused longstanding and mounting concern about its 
destructiveness to fisheries and ecosystems.  Britain in the nineteenth 
century asserted regulatory authority beyond the traditional three-miles to 
protect its fisheries from trawlers operating off its waters.348  This practice is 
increasingly recognized today as destructive to the coral, sponge, and other 
organisms that live on or about the seabed.349  It has mobilized a network of 
more than 1,400 marine scientists against it.350  It is the subject of heated 
discussions at nearly every global oceans forum351 and will likely consume 
the attention of the fisheries and oceans General Assembly negotiating 
                                            
347 See UN Doc. A/60/189 ¶ 116.  Regulations recently promulgated by the United States 
North Pacific Fishery Management Council to ban bottom trawling in the Aleutian Island 
area off Alaska defines the practice as:  “bottom contact mobile gear (BCMG) including 
pelagic trawls that contact the bottom, non-pelagic trawls, dredges, and troll gear that 
contacts the bottom (including singlebar gear).”  EFH Final Action NPFMC (10 Feb. 2005), 
available at <http://www.fakr.noaa.gov/npfmc/current_issues/HAPC/HAPCmotion205.pdf>.  
EC Council Regulation 602/2004 prohibits bottom trawling over the Darwin Mounds area by 
providing that "Vessels shall be prohibited from using any bottom trawl or similar towed nets 
operating in contact with the bottom of the sea . . . " (emphasis added). 
348 See GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra, at 65.  See also FAO, THE STATE OF WORLD FISHERIES 
AND AQUACULTURE 115 (2004) [hereinafter “FAO 2004 FISHERIES REPORT”]. 
349 As the Secretary-General has described the practice: 
Deep-water fisheries often target features, such as seamounts and ridges, 
where food inputs advected by topographically enhanced currents support 
benthic communities dominated by hard and soft corals, sponges and 
other suspension feeders.  Bottom trawls pick up these benthic 
communities as by-catch or otherwise reduce them to rubble.  Given the 
slow growth of deep-water corals and uncertain rates of recruitment, the 
re-establishment of deep-water coral reefs will probably take centuries to 
millennia.  Continued unrestricted fishing could destroy reefs in many 
areas, leading to extinction for the large proportion of seamount species 
with highly restricted distribution. 
Report of the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. A/60/63/Add.1 36, ¶ 145 (15 July 2005) (emphasis 
added).  See also GIANNI, supra, at 12-18 (discussing the destructive impact of bottom 
trawling).  See also NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, EFFECTS OF TRAWLING AND DREDGING ON 
SEAFLOOR HABITAT 20-22 (2002) (concluding that trawling directly “reduce[s] habitat 
complexity,” “result[s] in discernable changes in benthic communities” from large-bodied fish 
to smaller-bodied organisms, and “reduces the productivity of benthic habitats,” and also 
identifying reef-forming coral as “particularly vulnerable”). 
350 See Richard Black, Deep-Sea Trawling’s ‘Great Harm’, BBC News (6 Oct. 2004), available 
at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/3719590.stm>. 
351 See, e.g., Marine Biodiversity Advance Report, supra, ¶ 31. 
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sessions at least through 2006.352  It is also the focus of a series of recent 
General Assembly resolutions calling on States and Regional Fisheries 
Management Organizations and arrangements (“RFMOs”) to “take action 
urgently” to address this and other destructive fishing practices.353 
As the majority of coastal fisheries are being fished at or above 
capacity,354 fishing activities are starting to move farther out into the ocean 
and into waters up to 2000 metres deep.355  Although it is now only a US 
$300-400 million per year industry and nets only 0.025% of the total world 
fish catch,356 bottom trawling is a particularly efficient method of catching 
these deep water fish.357  Bottom-dwelling fish populations tend to aggregate 
among, and depend on, seamount habitats and coral beds and reefs,358 which 
are readily decimated by the scraping action of trawl nets.359  Bottom 
trawling works not just by scooping up schools of fish, but as the nets scrape 
                                            
352 The General Assembly in 2004 by consensus urged States and RFMOs to “take action 
urgently” to address destructive fishing practices “within two years,” which makes 2006 the 
year when a review of progress on actions taken will occur.  UN Doc. A/RES/59/25 ¶¶ 66-71. 
353 See UN Docs. A/RES/60/31 ¶¶ 69-74 & A/RES/59/25 ¶¶ 66-71. 
354 See FAO 2004 FISHERIES REPORT, supra, at 32.  The FAO reported that 52 percent of fish 
stocks were “fully exploited” (producing at near-maximum sustainable limits), while 16 
percent were fished out and “needed rebuilding.”  Id.  This may yet underestimate the 
situation as it does not account for “fishing down the marine food chain” as the result of the 
depletion of top predators and a shift towards low-trophic pelagic fish and invertebrates.  
Daniel Pauly et al., Fishing Down Marine Food Webs, 279 SCIENCE 860, 860 (1998). 
355 Report of the Secretary-General, Sustainable Fisheries, Including Through the 1995 
Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 Relating to the Conservation and Management of 
Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, and Related Instruments, UN Doc. 
A/60/189 34, ¶ 116 (2 Aug. 2005).  More than ninety percent of the best fishing grounds are 
within EEZs.  See Wertenbaker I, supra, at 51. 
356 See GIANNI, supra, at 48-51.  The fishing industry and some prominent RFMOs have 
questioned the methodology and data used by Gianni in arriving at his conclusions about the 
economics of bottom trawling.  His report primarily relies on 2001 data from the UN FAO, 
and in this respect may now be out of date in certain aspects.  But his report is the most 
comprehensive look thus far about the issue.  Gianni is in the process of updating his report 
for 2006, and any updated version might then be read in conjunction with the report of the 
Secretary General on destructive fishing practices beyond national jurisdictions, per General 
Assembly Resolution 60/31 ¶ 73. 
357 See Anthony J. Koslow, Seamounts and the Ecology of Deep-Sea Fisheries, 85 AM. 
SCIENTIST 168 (1997).  Deep water species and fish are really “seamount aggregators” as they 
rely on seamounts for their relative shallowness compared to the abyssal plain, protection 
from ocean currents, and for the food that tends to get swept up and trapped by seamount 
topography.  It is this rough topography that makes traditional mid-water net or long-line 
fishing ill-suited to catching the orange roughy and oreo fish stocks that are fished in these 
waters and which, combined with the tendency of these fish to aggregate densely, makes 
bottom trawling so effective in catching these deepwater fish.  See id. 
358 See Report of the Secretary-General, Oceans and the Law of the Sea, UN Doc. 
A/59/62/Add.1 47-49 (18 Aug. 2004). 
359 See GIANNI, supra, at 14-17. 
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the seafloor they generate noise and kick up a cloud of subsoil and coral 
debris that attracts fish into the nets.360 
Bottom trawling thus evokes a potential clash between freedoms of the 
high seas and the res publica seabed regime.  The basic distinction between 
the “free” water column and the “common heritage” seabed beyond national 
jurisdictions has always been legally complicated.361  Given that “the 
problems of ocean space are closely interrelated and need to be considered as 
a whole,”362 and because this practice directly impacts the seabed, might 
bottom trawling move beyond a “freedom” of the high seas to an infringement 
on the seabed common heritage?  There is little doubt that coastal States 
have jurisdiction to regulate bottom trawling on the extended continental 
shelf.363  But even many of those most vocal in calling for a prohibition 
against bottom trawling in international waters seem to have accepted that 
the practice falls into a lacuna of the “free” high seas.364  This section argues, 
                                            
360 See FRAN RECHT, DESCRIPTION OF FISHING GEARS USED ON THE U.S. WEST COAST at App. 8 
p. 10 (Draft 3 Dec. 2003) (citing SIMON JENNINGS et al., MARINE FISHERIES ECOLOGY (2001); 
& JOHN C. SAINSBURY, COMMERCIAL FISHING METHODS (1996)) [hereinafter “RECHT”]. 
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that no person or State may prospect or explore for resources in the Area without the 
blessing of the ISA.  See 1982 Convention, supra, annex III, arts. 2(1)(b) (requiring 
prospectors to provide a “satisfactory written undertaking” of prospectors’ compliance with 
the Convention and with the ISA) & 3(3) (requiring that all resource exploration be 
“approved” by the ISA).  Seldon’s mare clausum and res nullius view of the oceans too would 
have been at odds with all of Part XI and also Article 87(2), which requires that States 
exercise high seas freedoms “with due regard” to other States’ freedoms and Part XI. 
362 1982 Convention, supra, pmbl. ¶ 3. 
363 See id. art. 77 (providing coastal States exclusive jurisdiction for exploring and exploiting 
the “natural resources” of the seabed and subsoil of the continental shelf, which includes 
“living organisms belonging to sedentary species”).  See also Samuel Pyeatt Menefee, 
“Republics of the Reefs:”  Nation-Building on the Continental Shelf and in the World’s 
Oceans, 25 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 81, 85-95 (1994) (describing in detail the protracted United 
States v. Ray litigation by which the U.S. government secured a permanent injunction 
against an effort to build an offshore resort by dredging and building upon submerged coral; 
the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals finally held that the reefs were “natural resources” under 
the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf to which the United States had 
exclusive jurisdiction for purposes of exploration and exploitation (see United States v. Ray, 
423 F.2d 16, 22 (5th Cir. 1970))) [hereinafter “Menefee”]. 
364 The typical suggestion then is that this lacuna should be filled by a new implementing 
agreement-type instrument or more robust sectoral regulation.  See, e.g., Kristina M. Gjerde 
& David Freestone, Unfinished Business:  Deep-Sea Fisheries and the Conservation of Marine 
Biodiversity Beyond National Jurisdiction Editors’ Introduction, 19 INT’L J. OF MARINE & 
COASTAL L. 209 (2004); E.J. Molenaar, Unregulated Deep-Sea Fisheries:  A Need for a Multi-
Level Approach, 19 INT’L J. OF MARINE & COASTAL L. 225 (2004); & Moritaka Hayashi, Global 
Governance of Deep-Sea Fisheries, 19 INT’L J. OF MARINE & COASTAL L. 289 (2004).  It is 
telling that the most visible NGO on this issue, the Deep Sea Conservation Coalition (which 
is actually a network of individual NGOSs, such as Conservation International, the Natural 
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by contrast, that bottom trawling exploits coral “mineral resources” and thus 
might well be considered an “activit[y] in the Area.”  As such it would fall 
under the system of effective regulation and binding environmental 
protection envisioned under Part XI.  At the very least, the possibility that 
the seabed and its resources are being razed ought to invite the directed 
attention of the General Assembly, the ISA, or even the binding jurisdiction 
of the Seabed Disputes Chamber. 
1.  “Activities in the Area”:  Corals and Their Calcium Structures as “Mineral Resources” 
A few brief facts about coral itself must first be established.365  Corals 
are composed of colonies of individual polyps accreted on the calcium 
carbonate skeletal remains of prior generations.  Coral structures are thus 
composed of a living outside layer attached to an inert calcium anchor in the 
seabed.  The accretion process is gradual and coral communities tend to be 
old (up to 8,000 years) and to develop slowly.  Corals may live in warm or cold 
water, and both types exist within and beyond national jurisdictions.  
Shallow tropical water corals (like staghorn) can form massive stony reef 
structures.  Coral reefs can be found in deep and cold waters as well (like 
Lophelia and the gorgonians).  Both warm and cold water corals are centers 
for marine ecosystems and form critical habitat benefiting marine life at 
every trophic level. 
There are also economic uses of coral.  It is harvested, produced, and 
sold both as live or dead ‘habitat’ for aquarium hobbyists and as polished 
gemstones for jewelry.  Coral has been mined for limestone and jewelry in 
many parts of the world, dating from 500 BC.366  Compounds with medicinal 
promise have been isolated from coral as well.367  And at least one attempt 
has been made to construct an independent island oasis on top of a coral atoll  
arguably beyond national jurisdiction.368 
Might coral, then, be interpreted as a legal “mineral resource” that 
would set in motion the Part XI path of licensing, regulation, and 
responsibility for “activities in the Area”?  The general rule of treaty 
interpretation is provided by Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law 
of Treaties:  “A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with 
                                                                                                                                  
Resources Defense Council, and Greenpeace), has a website with the domain name 
“savethehighseas.org”. 
365 This general information on coral biology and ecology is taken from the Coral Reef 
Information System (“CoRIS”), run by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 
of the US Department of Commerce, which can be accessed at: <http://www.coris.noaa.gov/>.  
See also 1 GLOBAL CORAL REEF MONITORING NETWORK, STATUS OF THE CORAL REEFS OF THE 
WORLD (CLIVE WILKINSON ed. 2004). 
366 See FILLMORE C.F. EARNEY, MARINE MINERAL RESOURCES 178-80 (1990). 
367 See MAXWELL, supra, at 3 (discussing sarcodictyin, isolated from the Mediterranean coral 
Sarcodictyon roseum that acts similarly to the drug Taxol against cancers). 
368 The Minerva Reef some 315 miles southwest of Tonga was the subject of an ultimately 
failed effort in the early 1970s to literally build a new country upon a shallow but solid reef 
foundation.  See generally Menefee, supra, at 95-102. 
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the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context 
and in the light of its object and purpose.” 
Finding “accord” over the “object and purpose,” or the “ordinary 
meaning” of mineral resources “in their context,” for Part XI is not as easy as 
it ought to be.  As George Reeves has thoroughly explored for the 
jurisprudence of US courts who have struggled with interpreting “minerals”: 
The word “mineral” is a word of general language and is not 
per se a word of art.  It is not a definite term and has no 
definite and certain meaning which can be applied in all 
cases.  On the contrary it is used in many senses.  It is a 
word which is incapable of a definition which would be 
uniformly applicable, but rather is susceptible of limitation 
according to the intention with which it is used in a 
particular instrument or statute.  Each case must be 
determined upon its own facts.369 
Bearing in mind the pedestrian nature of the word “minerals,” 
UNCLOS Article 133(a), in turn, provides: 
“resources” means all solid, liquid or gaseous mineral 
resources in situ in the Area at or beneath the seabed, 
including polymetallic nodules370 
The inclusion of “all” to modify “mineral resources” is a particularly 
significant textual choice.  It suggests that the minerals governed “be all 
inclusive, and that no substance legally cognizable as a mineral is to be 
excluded.”371 
This broadly inclusive baseline accords with how Article 133(a) came 
about.  Though the Conference negotiators were particularly focused on 
polymetallic nodules because their exploitation seemed imminent,372 “mineral 
                                            
369 George E. Reeves, The Meaning of the Word “Minerals”, 54 N.D. L. REV. 419, 423 (1978) 
[hereinafter “Reeves”].  Reeves’ view is thus broadly in line with the general rule of 
interpretation provided by Article 31 of the Vienna Convention.  Reeves discounts any “broad 
comprehensive” definition, such as one that divides all substances into ‘animal,’ ‘vegetable,’ 
or mineral, because this approach could not help but include under the ‘mineral’ category all 
inorganic matter and would thus become “a grant or reservation of the entire estate.”  Reeves 
endorses instead reference to the “common,” or “plain, ordinary, usual, natural, accepted, or 
popular meaning of the word.”  Reeves, supra, at 427-28.  See also N. Pac. R.R. Co. v. 
Soderberg, 188 U.S. 526, 530 (1903) (“The word ‘mineral’ is used in so many senses, 
dependent upon the context, that the ordinary definitions of the dictionary throw but little 
light upon its signification in a given case.”). 
370 Emphasis added. 
371 Reeves, supra, at 477. 
372 Arvid Pardo in 1967 urged that the new seabed regime should focus first on mineral 
resources, the commercial exploitation of which he thought was “imminent,” while leaving 
the question of deep sea fisheries to the future.  But his conception of deep sea fisheries today 
seem more like science fiction than the deep sea fisheries that existed then and have 
developed since:  “Fish husbandry, utilizing techniques such as the use of dolphins as sheep-
dogs, and air-bubble curtains to delimit and protect fish ranges are no longer science fiction; 
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resources” was never meant strictly or literally.  Successive negotiating texts 
grappled with expansive enumerations of the substances and geophysical 
characteristics that would qualify as “mineral resources.”  The penultimate 
version even provided that all “solid substances” on the seabed would be 
covered by Part XI, which almost certainly would have included coral.  
Negotiators finally dropped the laundry-list for the final blanket reference to 
“all solid, liquid or gaseous mineral resources in situ.”  The final text was 
meant to summarize the prior proposals while steering clear of particular 
descriptive lists that might then be read to limit by omission any particular 
“mineral resources.”373  Given the incomplete state of knowledge about the 
deep seabed and its resources, even an expansive list of the substances or 
characteristics of covered “mineral resources” might well have hindered the 
continued effectiveness of Part XI for evolving economic uses of the seabed.374 
                                                                                                                                  
these together with other techniques, are clearly foreseen possibilities that may transform 
the entire world food picture in fifteen years’ time.”  Pardo, supra, at ¶¶ 33-34.  In fact, deep 
sea trawling was developed and has been used for centuries, if only in nearer coastal waters.  
See GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra, at 65 (discussing the “exogenous shock” that destructive 
trawling posed and its instrumental role in the development of more expansive maritime 
jurisdictions in the nineteenth-century). 
373 See VI UNCLOS COMMENTARY, supra, at 74-75.  The “resources” provision underwent 
three changes in scope to reach its final incarnation.  Between the 1977 Informal Composite 
Negotiating Text (“ICNT”) and the 1980 Second Informal Composite Negotiating Text (“ICNT 
Rev.2”), negotiators dropped reference to “helium, nitrogen, carbon dioxide, water, steam 
[and] hot water” (substances that are not “in situ in the Area at or beneath the seabed”), 
while moving from reference to “useful” and “solid” seabed minerals to the ICNT Rev.2 
provision more generally for “solid substances.”  See id. at 74-75 (emphasis added).  These 
descriptive lists were then summarized and replaced by the concise final phraseology of “all 
gaseous, liquid or solid resources.”  See id. at 75. 
Allot, supra, at 7, has cautioned against viewing UNCLOS negotiating texts as 
travaux préparatoires, as used in Article 32 of the Vienna Convention.  He granted a 
“possible exception” for the “successive published texts of the Convention” (which would 
include the ICNT, the ICNT Rev. 2, and the Draft Convention).  He writes: 
[Miscellaneous Conference documents] do not have the objective 
character of negotiating facts, the actual material chain of causation of 
the resulting instrument, which is the essence of traditional travaux.  The 
random and disorderly character of some of them and the partisan 
character of much of the rest mean that it would be wiser to regard them 
as a new kind of phenomenon, a physical manifestation of the decision-
making process of consensus. 
374 See VI UNCLOS COMMENTARY, supra, at 76:  “Although greater detail as to what 
constitutes ‘resources’ was included in every draft of what became article 133, the Conference 
finally decided not to place such specific limitations on the definition in light of the relative 
lack of detailed information on the Area.”  See also Reeves, supra, at 459 (endorsing the rule 
that the discovery of a mineral on a property after the execution of a property instrument 
does not exclude that mineral from any grant of mineral resources). 
Now that the Assembly has finished the priority of implementing regulations on 
prospecting and exploration for polymetallic nodules (ISBA/6/A/18 (4 Oct. 2000)), Russia has 
invoked Article 162(2)(o)(ii) for the Council to adopt, and the Assembly to approve, rules, 
regulations, and procedures for exploration for polymetallic sulphides and cobalt-bearing 
crusts.  See Statement of the President on the Work of the Assembly During the Resumed 
Fourth Session, ISBA/4/A/18 at ¶ 14, 3 (31 Aug. 1998).  Rules for the exploration and 
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So might then coral be “legally cognizable as a mineral”?  Coral in fact 
has been legally recognized as a mineral.  Out of consideration for coral’s 
economic value, when UNCLOS was adopted at least two countries placed 
coral in the same category as other more traditional minerals in their 
classifications of goods, products, and services.375  In Brazil coral was 
described as a “crude mineral[] without any specific application” and classed 
together with various hydrocarbons and other solid building materials.376  
Taiwan, likewise, classed coral together with “precious metals,” “diamonds,” 
and “minerals not otherwise classified.”377 
Legal minerals can be recognized, as the Texas Supreme Court put it, 
as those substances that “are rare and exceptional in character or possess a 
peculiar property giving them special value.”378  Certainly the potential age, 
vulnerability, medicinal, economic, and ecosystem value of corals would make 
them “exceptional,” “peculiar,” and of “special value.”379  Guano, for example, 
has been held to be a mineral and, like calcium in coral, accretes in 
significant quantities over a great period of time.380  Other courts have used 
this rationale to find legal minerals in a number of other “rare,” 
“exceptional,” “peculiar,” or “special” substances.381 
The fact that the calcium skeletal structure of coral is of organic origin 
does not deprive it of the legal or scientific possibility of being a mineral.  The 
Encylopædia Britannica notes that minerals may be defined as “any 
                                                                                                                                  
exploitation of these minerals have since been drafted for approval by the Council.  See 
ISBA/10/C/WP.1/Rev.1 (6 Sept. 2005). 
375 Both Brazil and Taiwan have since adopted the Nice Agreement list, which classes coral 
with the likes of “amber,” “mother-of-pearl,” and “meerschaum.”  Available at 
<http://www.wipo.int/classifications/fulltext/nice8/enmain.htm>. 
376 See ETHAN HORWITZ, 1 WORLD TRADEMARK LAW AND PRACTICE, at BRA App A-12 (2d ed. 
1992) (translating and reprinting Brazil Normative Act No. INPI-0051 (27 Jan. 1981)) 
[hereinafter “HORWITZ”].  Hydrocarbons, for example, are not a mineral under the scientific 
definition (see discussion infra this subsection), but a 1981 Report of the Chairman of the 
Drafting Committee to the Plenary on UNCLOS Article 133 specified:  “It is understood that 
mineral resources include other non-living resources, such as hydrocarbons.”  UN Doc. 
A/CONF.62/L.67/Add.16 (3 Aug. 1981).  See also discussion infra; & VI UNCLOS 
COMMENTARY, supra, at 75. 
377 See HORWITZ, supra, at vol. 3, TAI App A-5 (“Precious metals, diamonds, pearls, jade, 
coral, rock crystal, carnelian, precious stones, minerals not otherwise classified, and the 
products of such items and imitations thereof.”). 
378 Heinatz v. Allen, 147 Tex. 512, 523, 217 S.W.2d 994 (1949). 
379 See also Reeves, supra, at 430 (“An important criterion is whether the substance has 
economic value; that is, whether the substance is more valuable than the land in which is 
contained and for that reason is sought after and extracted from the land by mining, 
quarrying, or other special means for removal.”)  The question of whether coral itself is 
exploited by bottom trawling is the subject of the next subsection, infra.  But that it has 
independent economic value is indicative of mineral nature. 
380 See id. at 476 (citing sources). 
381 These substances have included:  chromate of iron, diamonds, borax, salt, soda carbonate, 
soda nitrate, sulfur, alum, asphalt, gilsonite, amber, mica, phosphate, magnesite, fluorspar, 
silica, and novaculite.  Id. 
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naturally occurring homogeneous solid that has definite chemical composition 
and a distinctive internal crystal structure,” and lists carbonates among the 
major groups of minerals.382  Hydrocarbons, for example, are organic in origin 
yet they are commonly viewed legally as minerals and were understood as 
such for UNCLOS.383 
Coral thus very plausibly can be legally recognized as a “mineral.”  To 
summarize, the definition used by the US Department of the Interior is 
instructive: 
“Mineral” refers to any substance that (1) is recognized as 
mineral, according to its chemical composition, by the 
standard authorities on the subject, or (2) is classified as 
mineral product in trade or commerce, or (3) possesses 
economic value for use in trade, manufacture, the sciences, or 
in the mechanical or ornamental arts.384 
Although it would need only to meet one of these criteria, coral meets all 
three.  The calcium carbonate that is the foundation of coral reefs on the 
seabed is chemically identical on an atomic scale with the calcium carbonate 
that composes limestone.385  Coral also was actually classed as a mineral at 
the time of UNCLOS by several countries.  And coral certainly possesses 
actual and much potentially undiscovered economic value as it is traded, 
studied, built-upon, and used for fishing, medicines, and sustenance. 
2.  “Activities in the Area”:  “Exploitation” as Consumptive Use 
Having established that coral and its calcium skeletal structures can 
and indeed have been legally considered as minerals, it must be asked 
whether bottom trawling might also “exploit” coral and thus be an “activity in 
the Area.”  Black’s Law Dictionary defines ‘exploitation’ quite broadly:  “The 
act of taking advantage of something.”386  What advantage do trawlers take 
from coral?  Although the effects of bottom trawling have been analogized to 
“strip-mining,”387 trawlers typically do not intend to harvest coral for sale 
(even if they do bring up significant amounts of coral as bycatch).388  Instead, 
                                            
382 ENCYLOPÆDIA BRITANNICA, “mineral” (retrieved 16 Jan. 2006), available at 
<http://search.eb.com/eb/article-9052829> (emphasis added). 
383 See id.; & UN Doc. A/CONF.62/L.67/Add.16 (3 Aug. 1981). 
384 43 C.F.R. § 2400.0-5(h) (2006) (emphasis added).  See also Reeves, supra, at 430-31 n.76. 
385 Stony corals also form dense and hard calcium reefs not dissimilar in chemical properties 
from inorganically formed limestone rock. 
386 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 619 (8th ed. 2004). 
387 See, e.g., Nathalie Rey, High Time for the High Seas—the Wild, Wild West of the Oceans, 
11 ECO 4 (2005), available at <http://www.ukabc.org>. 
388 Gianni cites a study by scientists at the National Institute of Water and Atmospheric 
Research in New Zealand that estimated that 10,000 tons of coral for only 4,000 tons of fish 
were brought up by bottom trawl nets in the first year of fishing on the South Tasman Rise.  
See GIANNI, supra, at 15.  But Reeves notes that “the word ‘mineral’ is derived from the word 
‘mine,’ and a strict etymological interpretation would define ‘mineral’ as a substance dug out 
of the earth by means of a mine.”  Reeves, supra, at 434. 
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trawling “exploits” coral by targeting, relying on, and directly impacting coral 
such that, as Grotius (and even Locke) would recognize, the practice 
forecloses other present or future uses of that coral.  Grotius reasoned:  “all 
that which has been so constituted by nature that although serving some one 
person it still suffices for the common use of all other persons, is today and 
ought in perpetuity to remain in the same condition as when it was first 
created by nature.”389  Locke too emphasized that one’s right in using 
common resources may persist so long as there is “enough, and as good” left 
for others to use the resource as well.390 
Bottom trawling at least seriously raises the issue of whether it leaves 
“enough, and as good” coral habitat and ecosystems for others in its wake and 
thus readily constitutes “exploitation” for Part XI purposes.  Unlike during 
the time of Grotius or Locke, UNCLOS was adopted in the recognition that 
the ocean’s resources are finite and that seabed resources in particular 
cannot accommodate open and free access.391  Like “mineral resources” in 
Article 133, “activities of exploitation” in Article 1(3) is modified by “all” and 
ought to be interpreted broadly and without limitation to any specific use 
derived from the activity.392  Going further, it is actually no accident that 
coral is vulnerable to this fishing practice.  Corals are well known centers for 
other marine biodiversity and they provide critical habitat reproductive 
grounds for fish and other species which trawlers, in turn, rely on when they 
target bottom fish stocks.  That they are destroyed by bottom trawling not 
only diminishes fishing prospects for other fishers,393 but it impugns the 
possibility that the coral itself might come to any future human use.  
Further, trawlers actually make direct use of coral because the scraping and 
dragging action of the trawl gear creates a noise and debris cloud that 
attracts and herds fish right into the path of the trawl net.394  Because 
trawling thus clearly takes advantage of coral, it thereby should be 
considered exploitation. 
                                            
389 GROTIUS, MARE LIBERUM, supra, at 23-24. 
390 JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT § 33 (1690).  Locke viewed 
resources generally as plentiful and so his emphasis was in showing how the addition of an 
individual’s labor to an unowned resource inured property rights to that person.  But Locke, 
id. § 31 (italics in original, underline added), also recognized limits in this regard: 
The same law of nature, that does by this means give us property, does 
also bound that property too.  God has given us all things richly. . . .  But 
how far has he given it us?  To enjoy.  As much as any one can make use 
of to any advantage of life before it spoils so much he may by his labour 
fix a property in:  whatever is beyond this, is more than his share, and 
belongs to others.  Nothing was made by God for man to spoil or destroy. 
391 See Wertenbaker II, supra, at 68. 
392 UNCLOS Article 1(3) provides:  “‘activities in the Area’ means all activities of exploration 
for, and exploitation of, the resources of the Area.” 
393 See GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra, at 65. 
394 See RECHT, supra, at App. 8, p. 10. 
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3.  Regulatory, Litigious, and Political-Legal Options to Effectively Address Bottom Trawling Under 
UNCLOS 
If coral is a “mineral resource” that trawling “exploits,” then the 
practice would be an “activity in the Area” and thus subject to ISA regulation 
and State responsibility under Part XI.  The row over bottom trawling is 
primarily about its destructive effects on seabed habitat and ecosystems, and 
so the most appropriate avenue would be under Article 145.  This Article 
provides that “necessary measures shall be taken . . . to ensure effective 
protection for the marine environment” with respect to activities in the Area, 
and, in particular, that the ISA “shall adopt appropriate rules, regulations 
and procedures” to do so.   
Part XI leaves two corresponding options for a concerned State to raise 
bottom trawling.  “Any” State Party could invoke Article 162(2)(o)(ii) to 
require the ISA Council within three years to provisionally adopt rules, 
regulations, and procedures for activities in the Area other than those 
concerning polymetallic nodules.  The Council, being composed largely of the 
industrial countries that also are more likely to have the capacity for deep 
and distant water fishing fleets, could well decide that bottom trawling is not 
an “activity in the Area.”  But Article 162(2)(o)(ii) is framed in the positive 
(“rules, regulations and procedures . . . shall be adopted within three years”), 
and thus the Council would seem to have to actually issue a provisional 
decision to this effect that the Assembly, where consensus is preferred but 
where all States Parties have a vote, would have to finally approve.395 
The other option under Part XI would be the invocation of 
responsibility or litigation against a State or the ISA for failure to “ensure 
effective protection for the marine environment” with respect to an activity in 
the Area.396  This sets a higher standard for activities in the Area than for the 
rest of ocean space where States have an obligation merely “to protect and 
preserve” the marine environment.397  Such a claim for effective protection 
could even seek provisional measures to enjoin activities that result in 
“serious harm to the marine environment.398  Further, the ITLOS Seabed 
Disputes Chamber has compulsory jurisdiction under Section 5 over disputes 
between States Parties that concern “the interpretation or application” of 
Part XI (which would include the interpretation of “mineral resources”)—
                                            
395 On the power of the Assembly to consider and approve the rules, regulations, and 
procedures of the Authority provisionally adopted by the Council per Article 162(2)(o)(ii), see 
1982 Convention, supra, art. 160(1) & (2)(f)(ii).  Issues of composition and procedure are 
specified in Article 159 and the 1994 ISA Implementing Agreement, § 3(2)-(4), & (7).  The 
Implementing Agreement provides:  “if the Assembly does not accept the recommendation of 
the Council on any matter, it shall return the matter to the Council for further 
consideration,” and that the Council must then “reconsider the matter in the light of the 
views expressed by the Assembly.”  Id. § 3(4). 
396 1984 Convention, supra, art. 145 (emphasis added). 
397 Id. art. 192. 
398 Id. art. 290. 
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even if only one party so requests.399  The Chamber may also hear cases 
brought against the ISA for “acts or omissions of the Authority” alleged to be 
in violation of Part XI,400 which, again, could include the specific obligation of 
the ISA to adopt “appropriate rules and regulations” to ensure the “effective 
protection” of the marine environment from activities in the Area.401 
Forcing the issue at the ISA or ITLOS would be politically explosive, 
but unregulated damage incurred to the res publica seabed and “common 
heritage” might also be incalculable.  Part XI, even with the 1994 ISA 
Implementing Agreement, is still on legally shaky ground.  It was the subject 
of the most damaging defections to consensus about the original UNCLOS.  
The ISA’s efficacy and legitimacy has yet to really be tested from the exercise 
of its regulatory or revenue-sharing powers over activities in the Area.  And 
the United States has yet to become a full Party to UNCLOS out of lingering 
suspicions about the whole project of Part XI.402  On the other side, however, 
a prima facie case that would bolster the seabed “common heritage” by 
expanding the definition of “activities in the Area” could meet the swift 
support of many G-77 countries who are concerned about being left out of new 
deep sea endeavors by the limitation of Part XI to strict readings of “mineral 
resources.”403  Either way, unregulated bottom trawling would seem to 
prejudice any efforts under UNCLOS or TRIPS to formulate a regime for 
marine biodiversity beyond national jurisdictions.  For the sake of regulating 
one destructive practice, the whole seabed debate started by Ambassador 
Pardo might be torn right back open. 
The alternative to action under Part XI would be the negotiation of a 
new consensus to address the issue.  In what might be taken as an emerging 
normative consensus that unregulated bottom trawling is, in fact, an 
unsustainable problem, countries both big and small have imposed serious 
restrictions on the practice within their EEZs.  Australia and New Zealand 
have taken ever greater steps since 1999 to restrict or prohibit vulnerable 
seamounts and coral reefs from bottom trawling.404  After 30-50% of its cold-
water corals had already been destroyed by bottom trawling, Norway has 
engaged in an aggressive effort to find these corals within its waters and set 
them off limits to trawling.405  The European Union, whose member countries 
have the largest bottom trawl fleets operating beyond national jurisdictions, 
                                            
399 See id. art. 188(1)(b); & discussion, supra Part IV(A). 
400 See id. art. 187(b)(i) & Annex VI art. 37. 
401 It might be argued in response that any such claim would actually be invoking a 
discretionary power of the Authority and thus exempt from Part XI, Section 5 jurisdiction.  
See id. art. 189.  But Article 145 is cast in obligatory “shall” terms, rather than in terms of 
powers the ISA “may” in its discretion exercise. 
402 See Scott, supra, 12-16. 
403 See G-77 Biodiversity Statement, supra. 
404 See GIANNI, supra, 62.  See also Mic Dover, ‘Destructive Fishing’ Ban for NZ, BBC NEWS 
(21 Feb. 2006), available at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/sci/tech/4735474.stm>. 
405 See GLOBAL CORAL REEF MONITORING NETWORK, 1 STATUS OF CORAL REEFS OF THE WORLD 
125 (2004). 
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have recently finalized regulations that prohibit the practice on the Darwin 
Mounds off Scotland and the United Kingdom.406  Canada too has acted to 
protect vulnerable coral reef ecosystems from bottom trawling off Nova 
Scotia.407  Palau imposes civil and criminal penalties on bottom trawlers 
within its own waters, on any Palauan bottom trawling anywhere in the 
world, and on any entity licensed to do business in Palau that “engage[s] in or 
assist[s] in bottom trawling, anywhere in the world.”408  And the United 
States in March 2006 banned bottom trawling in 150,000 square miles in its 
EEZ from Mexico to Canada,409 and it has concurrent legislation pending in 
both houses of Congress to ban bottom trawling in areas that contain deep 
sea coral and sponge ecosystems.410 
But beyond national jurisdictions, the failure of most present-day 
RFMOs to regulate the practice at all is an object lesson in the inadequacy of 
regional and inter se arrangements beyond national jurisdictions to govern 
the global commons without at least a baseline international consensus for 
action.  As the spokesman for New Zealand’s fisheries industry, Phil Heatley, 
bluntly acknowledged:  “Destroying the New Zealand fishing industry by way 
of a blanket moratorium would achieve nothing because other nations would 
still be able to bottom trawl the high seas completely unabated.”411  The 
concern for individual and regional measures, in other words, is of distant-
water free-riding and fragmentation.  Deep sea and discreet stocks targeted 
by bottom trawlers are generally outside the competence of the 1995 
Implementing Agreement, which by contrast is concerned with straddling 
and highly migratory stocks.412  And only one RFMO—the Commission for 
the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR) (which is 
                                            
406 See Council Regulation (EC), No. 602/2004. 
407 See Gully Marine Protected Area Regulations, SOR/2004-112. 
408 See RPPL No. 7-17 §§ 3-6 (2006). 
409 See 71 Fed. Reg. 10614 (2 March 2006), 50 C.F.R. § 660.306(h).  See also 50 C.F.R. § 
679.22 (restricting trawling off Alaska); 50 C.F.R. § 648.14(a)(44) (restricting trawling off the 
Northeast). 
410 See Bottom Trawl and Deep Sea Coral Habitat Act, S.1735 (8 Sept. 2005) & H.R. 3778 (14 
Sept. 2005). 
411 Bottom Trawling Proposal Not Enough for Greenpeace, (15 Feb. 2006), available at 
<http://www.stuff.co.nz/stuff/0,2106,3572345a7693,00.html>.  New Zealand’s Department of 
Conservation has sounded a similar note:  “New Zealand would be prepared to support, in 
principle, the concept of an interim global moratorium on bottom trawling on the high seas if 
such a proposal had sufficient support to be a practical and enforceable option.”  Department 
of Conservation, Bottom-Trawling Strategy (emphasis added), available at 
<http://www.doc.govt.nz/Conservation/Marine-and-Coastal/Fishing/120~Bottom-trawling-
strategy.asp>. 
412 Articles 2 & 3 of the 1995 Implementing Agreement limit its scope to straddling stocks 
and to highly migratory fish stocks, while leaving out stocks that are discreet to areas beyond 
national jurisdictions.  See generally Balton & Zbicz, supra.  See also GREENPEACE, DEEP 
DEEP TROUBLE!  REGIONAL FISHERIES MANAGEMENT ORGANISATIONS, THE UN FISH STOCKS 
AGREEMENT AND THE REGULATION OF HIGH SEAS BOTTOM TRAWLING 3 (2005). 
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actually the result of a separate international convention413)—has instituted 
any sort of comprehensive policy towards bottom trawling.414  In the Pacific, 
Indian, Central Atlantic, and Southwest Atlantic oceans—the majority of the 
world’s ocean space—there is no RFMO with even potential competence to 
regulate bottom trawling and so the practice continues unregulated.415 
The General Assembly, “the chief deliberative, policy-making and 
representative organ of the United Nations”416 and the forum where 
UNCLOS was born, would be the most natural place for negotiation of a 
consensus for global action on destructive bottom trawling.  Leaving the 
problem to bottom-up, unilateral, regional, and sectoral regulation actually 
incentivizes non-parties to free-ride and take advantage of others’ 
‘disarmament,’ and thus diminishes the benefits (and thus motivations) of 
those who would disarm.  The consensus process turns this dynamic on its 
head—those who might just free-ride around others’ RFMO must actively 
and publicly object to a proposed consensus resolution.  Consensus action at 
the international level also moots the concern that States’ individual actions 
might be undermined by those not at the table. 
The precedent for a consensus for action on unregulated bottom 
trawling already exists.  The 1992 General Assembly driftnet fishing ban 
began with domestic legislation and regional instruments, particularly 
among countries in the South Pacific, to restrict the practice.417  With distant 
water fishing fleets coming to the South Pacific from Japan, Taiwan, and 
Korea in the north, in 1987 the United States, together with many South 
Pacific countries, led the way with restrictions on the practice in national 
waters and commitments to negotiate international restrictions for the high 
seas.418  This has since been followed by legislation in more than 40 other 
countries, including the European Union, to restrict the practice.  By Fall 
1989, eighteen countries introduced what became consensus UNGA 
Resolution 44/225, which called for a moratorium on the practice by 1992.  
The substance of this resolution was codified in the Wellington Convention 
                                            
413 See Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources, done 20 May 
1980, TIAS No. 10,240, reprinted in 19 ILM 837 (1980). 
414 The North East Atlantic Fisheries Commission also recently closed four seamounts and 
part of the mid-Atlantic Ridge from all fishing, including bottom trawling, for a period of 
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for the Prohibition of Fishing with Long Driftnets in the South Pacific, which 
opened for signature on 24 November 1989 and entered into force on 17 May 
1991.  These commitments were followed up by a series of consensus General 
Assembly resolutions, decisions, and oversight to implement an effective (and 
successful) ban.419 
This precedent might now be repeating itself with bottom trawling.  
The General Assembly in 2004 requested States and RFMOs “to take action 
urgently” to address destructive fishing practices “within two years,” and in 
2005 requested the Secretary-General to prepare a special report for 2006 to 
assist States in this review.420  The increasing domestic regulation of the 
practice ought to be reflected in this review.  And the negotiating dynamic 
may be changing too as the U.S. Senate has now passed a bill imposing trade 
sanctions under its High Seas Driftnet Act on countries that allow 
unregulated bottom trawling in international waters.421  Perhaps also the 
invocation of ITLOS or ISA jurisdiction under Part XI could impel interested 
countries to come to a new consensus for action at the General Assembly.422  
Certainly there is room for common political ground around which an 
effective consensus could be built on this issue:  many developing countries 
have long been concerned with preserving the seabed and its resources as 
‘common heritage’ and, even if the practice may not fall into that legal 
category in Part XI, developed countries and their biotech companies 
certainly also have a strong interest in precaution and in ensuring that 
seabed ecosystems are not destroyed before their value can be realized. 
Conclusion:  UNCLOS as Property Law and Lawmaking 
The conflicts engendered by ever more expansive unilateralist and 
inter se claims to ocean space led Ambassador Pardo to make his appeal for a 
new law of the sea and motivated the move in UNCLOS to universalism and 
consensus over property rules that, by their very nature, must be held and 
respected erga omnes to be effective.  This paper has examined the operation 
of two critical property law issues emphasized by Pardo:  the “outer limit” of 
the continental shelf and the extent of res publica for the seabed commons.  
As this paper has explored, these each face their own pitfalls and promises 
for maintaining the necessary consensus separating law from disorder. 
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Pardo’s first concern was with delineating a true outer limit to the 
continental shelf, and with UNCLOS this is now a matter of implementing 
the delicate balance between applied science and supervised unilateral claims 
embodied in Article 76.  This approach still has much to prove.  The attempt 
to ‘legalize’ scientific criteria still retains legal vagueness and ambiguities as 
well as the uncertainties inherent in any nascent scientific endeavor.  
Further, the administrative and financial support established to assist in 
working through these challenges has brought its own bureaucratic obstacles.  
This has led to a near-perfect storm for SIDS, which rely most heavily on 
marine resources for their culture and survival yet also face the most complex 
dilemmas in Article 76—all the while having generally the least capacity 
available to prepare their submissions.  If unheeded, this presents the 
formula for an eventual showdown between SIDS’ “inherent” rights to a 
continental shelf, irrespective of secondary deadlines and CLCS procedures, 
and the interests, expectations, and bargained consensus of the international 
community embodied in Article 76.  And one country’s fall (or jump) off this 
tightrope could well lead to opportunistic leaps by others and a general 
discrediting of the UNCLOS continental shelf regime. 
Pardo’s other main proposal was for a non-appropriable and equitable 
seabed regime.  The challenges facing the seabed come not from 
implementation of a legal process, but from substantive overlap and even 
conflict between Part XI and other international law.  Part XI seems to 
provide clear grounds to refute the assertion of international patent rights for 
seabed organisms.  This could set the stage for a fragmentation of 
international intellectual property rights under TRIPS and the UNCLOS 
seabed regime.  And the expansion of bottom trawl fishing that directly 
impacts and exploits coral and the seabed is excused under high seas fishing 
freedoms, but could also be viewed as infringing on the basic tenets of the 
seabed “common heritage” and thus could invoke individual State 
responsibility or the ISA’s regulatory jurisdiction under Part XI. 
At each juncture, the need for maintaining property rules erga omnes 
can also become an effective and constructive tool for encouraging countries 
to work together on managing the implementation, development, and 
proliferation of the law governing ocean space.  Uncertainty and conflict over 
rules that demand consensus invite renegotiation and further agreement by 
all.  For Article 76 this has meant extending deadlines and instituting 
initiatives to aid SIDS and other developing countries in implementation, and 
any continuing difficulties can be handled by progressive steps, patience, and 
a shared commitment to working through the Article 76 process.  For Part 
XI—still the most tenuous part of UNCLOS—the basic res publica status of 
the seabed, together with the regulatory jurisdiction of the ISA and binding 
dispute settlement under Section 5, make the stakes especially high.  
Averting a showdown over patents or bottom trawling will require building 
new international agreements onto and within the UNCLOS consensus 
framework. 
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The preamble states that UNCLOS is to “contribute to the 
strengthening of peace, security, cooperation, and friendly relations among 
all nations.”  That is the spirit too of this paper.  To save a regime, sometimes 
its foundations must be turned and shaken to be set back right. 
 
